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Introduction: 
Porous Borders, Sleights of the Written Hand, and the Long Shadow of Legalized Slavery 
 
The Shadows of Ferguson 
On the afternoon of August 9, 2014, an 18-year old African American man lay dead on a street in 
Missouri. A police officer had shot him at least six times during an altercation that no one on the 
scene could quite understand or explain. The young man, Michael Brown, was unarmed. 
Moments earlier, just before noon, he had stolen a few packages of cigarillos from a convenience 
store—a petty crime, the type of offense that, on another day or in another town, might elicit a 
stop and possibly an arrest. Michael Brown could hardly have imagined that he was putting his 
life in danger when he reached behind the counter and grabbed the cigarillos without paying for 
them. Nevertheless, his life ended mere minutes later. Brown was dead by 12:03pm, following a 
struggle at the window of officer Darren Wilson’s police cruiser and a brief pursuit in the street. 
The entire interaction between Brown and Wilson took just 90 seconds.1  
In the days that followed, protesters took to the streets of Ferguson, outraged amid reports 
that Wilson had shot the unarmed Brown while Brown’s hands were raised in surrender.2 Police 
responded to the protests in full force, brandishing billy clubs and riot shields. The aftermath of 
Michael Brown’s death included a three-month grand jury hearing, which failed to produce an 
indictment of Officer Wilson, and a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into civil rights 
violations by the Ferguson Police Department. The violence in Ferguson thus provoked intense 
																																																								
1 See Paula Mejia, “Altercation Between Michael Brown and Darren Wilson Unfolded in 90 
Seconds: Report.” Newsweek, 15 Nov. 2014. Mejia’s article arrives at this conclusion by using a 
collection of sources that include dispatch call records, tweets, police reports, and interviews. 
2 Outrage on this point has manifested in the protest chant, “Hands up, don’t shoot.” 
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debate about the killing of Michael Brown, the function of law enforcement, and the nature of 
protest in general. To this day, the mere word “Ferguson” conjures associations not only with 
Michael Brown, but also with police violence, institutionalized racism, and the birth of the Black 
Lives Matter movement.  
The documents from the grand jury investigation raise far more questions than they 
answer about what happened to Michael Brown on August 14, 2014. In the Narrative Report of 
Investigation (2), the Saint Louis County Medical Examiner offers a physical description of 
Brown’s corpse, followed by another description of the reported events leading up to Brown’s 
death. The report states in part: 
The deceased became belligerent towards Officer WILSON. As 
Officer WILSON attempted to exit out of his patrol vehicle the 
deceased pushed his door shut and began to struggle with Officer 
WILSON, during the struggle the Officers [sic] weapon was un-
holstered. The weapon discharged during the struggle. 
The deceased then ran down the roadway. Officer WILSON then 
began to chase the deceased. As he was giving chase to the deceased, 
the deceased turned around and ran towards Officer WILSON. 
Officer WILSON had his service weapon drawn, as the deceased 
began to run towards him, he discharged his service weapon several 
times. 
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On first glance, this narrative summary is mere bureaucratic formality, protocol designed to 
produce a paper trail of the police investigation. The report’s language, however, is remarkable 
for the efficiency with which it disposes of Michael Brown—both in name and in body. Despite 
having previously identified Brown by name at the outset of the report, this section refers to him 
solely as “the deceased.” In contrast, the report consistently and repeatedly names Officer 
Wilson, capitalizing his surname for emphasis. The effect of these naming conventions is a sly 
evacuation of Brown’s identity and a subtle legitimization of Officer Wilson. For the reader, the 
narrative becomes one about Wilson rather than Brown, who has been reduced to a nameless 
corpse.  
Despite the refusal to call Brown by his name, the report nevertheless reminds the reader 
relentlessly of Brown’s deadness. Taken out of the context of an awkward bureaucratic 
document, sentences such as “The deceased then ran down the roadway,” and “The deceased 
became belligerent . . . .” are striking and horrific—they appear to describe supernatural or 
paranormal events. Though Michael Brown only actually became “the deceased” after being 
fatally shot, the report figures him as a corpse even in the events that preceded his death. In the 
hands of the medical examiner, Michael Brown is dead even before his altercation with Darren 
Wilson—and his deadness is wrapped up in the implicit characterization of him as a criminal 
accused of threatening or assaulting a police officer. The report thus manages to chip away at 
Brown’s humanity and his personhood even while it makes him culpable for his own death. 
This report and the national conversation surrounding Michael Brown’s death raise a host 
of troubling questions about the relationship between law and law enforcement in contemporary 
American culture, particularly regarding how these institutions coalesce around black bodies. 
Under whose authority is a person visible as a subject, or a legal person? Why does American 
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legal culture repeatedly figure black bodies as the living dead, and how does legal language leach 
out into larger cultural narratives about race and violence? Where does law begin, and where 
does it end? What is the role of language and literary production in both shaping and interpreting 
law?  
These questions and the related national conversation about Michael Brown’s death were 
everywhere as I began my work on Human Rites. These were the questions on my mind as I read 
and wrote about Nat Turner’s execution, James Williams’s disappearance after the publication of 
his slave narrative, and Jane Johnson’s complicated and tenuous inclusion in the legal history 
surrounding her own escape from slavery. It was not difficult to trace a line between the subject 
matter of my antebellum research to the racialized violence against Michael Brown, Eric Garner, 
and Sandra Bland. Although this project focuses on the period from 1830-1860, I have felt at 
each stage that I am also very much writing about the present. Human Rites thus looks at the 
long history of legalized racial violence in the United States and turns to the antebellum period as 
a critical moment in the national history of racism—a period from the Republic’s infancy when 
slavery remained legal, when geographical and legal maps were drawn and re-drawn, national 
mythologies of law were taking root, and new genres of literature were constantly materializing 
and, just as quickly, disappearing. It is during this period, I argue, that law and literature 
fomented a set of peculiar, often vexing methods for reckoning with the specter of legalized 
slavery. These methods reveal that, in the context of slavery at least, it becomes ultimately 
impossible to distinguish legal texts from other types of literature. Not only does law borrow 
significant discursive ammunition from literature, but literary texts themselves are also often 
inherently legal.  
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“Law and Literature,” “Law,” and “Literature” 
In many respects, this dissertation is an un-doing, a dismantling of the borders that we typically 
draw around the categories of “law” and “literature.” It is altogether too easy, I argue, to preserve 
these boundaries on the grounds that one keeps us in the realm of the “real world” while the 
other is the product of creative or artistic labor. It is true that legal texts authorize or mandate 
highly visible effects in the world—a legal judgment can deprive a person of freedom, property, 
or even life. Those material results frequently mark law’s capacity for intense violence, as Robert 
Cover observes when he writes, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death” 
(“Violence and the Word” 1601). But as I demonstrate over the course of four chapters, law is 
also an incredibly fragile instrument, highly susceptible to creative manipulation, and most of all, 
deeply dependent on the human hand writing it. Appearing to emanate from disembodied courts, 
mystical doctrines, or even a divine source of natural law, legal rules are constantly being re-
written; they are adapted to different circumstances, utterly contingent upon political and cultural 
pressures, and often incompatible with each other.  
 In addition to troubling the boundaries of law, I put pressure on literature’s borders, as 
well. It would be equally irresponsible, I argue, to ignore literature’s engagement with the real 
and the material—and particularly the extent to which “the real” is squarely on the table in 
nineteenth-century African American literature. More than mere artistic flourish, I demonstrate 
that literature shares significant terrain with legal discourse on the levels of both form and 
content. I grapple with literature’s complicity in the project of legalized slavery—I cannot and 
would not claim literature as a redemptive site immune from the racialized violence that so 
infuses the law of the period, but I do regard literature as a complex, encrypted, and potentially 
radical site of legal critique. 
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Law and Literature 
Literary critics and legal scholars alike have, using a variety of methodologies, sought to better 
understand the relationship between law and literature. The connection between the two is at 
once intriguing and elusive, made more contentious by the disciplinary differences that divide 
the scholars who work at this intersection. As a general matter, most law and literature 
scholarship itself falls into one of two binaries: law in literature or law as literature. Both 
versions of interdisciplinary work have made significant contributions to the field—nevertheless, 
for reasons which I discuss below, neither approach adequately addresses the specific 
intersections that I examine in Human Rites. 
 Scholars who study law in literature often address literature—and fiction in particular—
as a unique site of sense-making with the potential to isolate or explain life’s and law’s meaning. 
Scholarship in this vein has the tendency to fetishize literature as a source of humanist values, 
often going so far as to suggest that literature describes what law cannot. While I have no 
argument here about the inherent value of literature, this approach to criticism tends to preserve 
the sharp distinction between law on one hand and literature on the other. The implication thus 
reifies a treatment of law as highly specialized, suggesting that, though law may be flawed for its 
inability to explore the dark corners of the human psyche, it derives its value from a super-
cultural position of primacy and institutional authority. This approach also suggests that law is 
simultaneously self-evident and inscrutable—that it does things that literature must in turn 
describe. My work in Human Rites complicates both halves of that construction, arguing that it is 
just as possible to claim that literature does and law describes. I treat legal texts as 
simultaneously legal and literary, seeking to capture the nuance of legal language’s procedural 
and substantive effects while also applying literary analysis to legal language. My close readings 
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of legal documents thus use literary analysis to better understand the means and mechanisms by 
which law materializes and evolves. 
 In this respect, I may initially appear to more closely approximate the methodology of 
scholars working on law as literature. The “law as literature” approach treats law as a genre of 
literature and advocates for subjecting law to literary analysis. This approach, however, often 
creates a reversal of the problematic of “law in literature” scholarship. Scholars treating law as 
literature tend to focus exclusively on legal materials, and the interdisciplinarity of the approach 
derives mainly from the use of literary criticism’s “tools” as applied to those legal documents. 
Here again, the implication is that, at the level of the primary text, law and literature are so 
incompatible as to merit separate consideration. In Human Rites, on the other hand, I place law 
and literature into direct conversation with each other, troubling cultural narratives that would 
place law under the heading of “truth” and literature under the heading of “fiction.” 
 My approach to the relationship between law and literature is in dialogue with a number 
of scholars currently working at this disciplinary intersection, though these scholars often do not 
label their own work as part of the “law and literature” field. For example, in The Fugitive’s 
Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession, Stephen Best weaves together analyses of 
slavery, intellectual property, personhood, and fugitivity. Best brings these wide-ranging 
concepts together through consideration of an equally wide-ranging selection of primary sources 
that include judicial opinions, novels, and statutes, theorizing fugitivity as not only a legal, but 
also a textual condition. Though scholars often think of Best as working not in law and literature 
but in African American studies, his methodology in The Fugitive’s Properties urges a 
discipline-bending imperative that I have tried to bring to Human Rites. 
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 Best is not alone in creating a nuanced approach to law and literature studies from outside 
or adjacent to that field’s generally accepted borders. For example, in Slavery on Trial: Law, 
Abolitionism, and Print Culture, Jeannine DeLombard undertakes a material culture study of the 
circulation of law in abolitionist print culture, examining how the abolitionist press staged and 
re-staged legal dramas surrounding legalized slavery. For DeLombard, these practices of re-
printing and journalism transformed slavery as an institution into a culpable criminal on trial in 
the court of public opinion. Although Human Rites is not a print culture study, it engages with 
some of DeLombard’s methodology in Slavery on Trial, which theorizes law as something that 
can happen on the circulated page as well as in the courtroom3—DeLombard encourages us to 
take a broader view of what counts as law, and my work in the dissertation participates in a 
similar project, often building on DeLombard’s arguments.  
Finally, Colin Dayan’s work, particularly in The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals 
Make and Unmake Persons, bucks many of the features of traditional law and literature 
scholarship. Dayan takes up legal theory, history, and narrative to bring a uniquely literary 
perspective to legal rituals and legal personhood. Her examinations of civil death and law’s 
taxonomies bring many of law’s more opaque machinations into sharp relief as instruments of 
racialized violence. Here again, the yield of the scholarship is an interdisciplinary approach that 
pushes both legal studies and literary criticism, rather than privileging one over the other. For 
Dayan, legal style and flourish create the appearance of elegance and sense even as they mask 
some of law’s most vicious moves. Likewise, my work attempts to peel back this legal mask, 
refusing to take law merely at its word and pushing instead to get somehow closer to the means 																																																								
3 For a discussion of how lawyers and other legal actors staged courtroom performances in the 
antebellum South, see Ariela Gross’s work in Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the 
Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Athens, GA: U of GA P, 2006).  
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by which law “works” and the literary technologies it borrows in order to bring that work into 
fruition. 
Nineteenth-century U.S. culture is particularly hospitable to studies in law and literature, 
given the long shadow that legalized slavery cast over all manners of discursive production 
during the period and the apparent fluency of nineteenth-century writers in both legal 
developments and literary publications. It is not a coincidence that many of the scholars 
interested in the law-literature relationship have gravitated toward this period in American 
history. My work intervenes more broadly in nineteenth-century American studies, and in 
particular with literary critics and legal historians working on slavery and African American 
culture of the period. These critics, including Teresa Goddu, Ariela Gross, Saidiya Hartman, 
Daniel Sharfstein, Christopher Tomlins, Lara Langer Cohen, and Karla Holloway, engage with 
law to varying degrees in their own work. I envision Human Rites as a project that invites and 
embraces engagement with this broad range of scholarship, and I imagine law and literature 
studies as including theories of embodiment, performance, material culture, race-making, and 
legal history.  
Law 
Human Rites examines two main types of legal documents: the judicial opinion and the statute. 
As I have already suggested, my work is in part a blurring of the line between law and literature 
during the antebellum period; for that reason, though I am attentive to the nuances of my primary 
sources, I am not interested in fetishizing or over-exceptionalizing legal texts. In fact, as the 
project unfolds, I take an increasingly broad view of what counts as “law,” slowly expanding that 
circle to include non-binding documents from case files, testimony, news media, and ultimately, 
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literature. I am mindful, nevertheless, that the texts most obviously “legal”—opinions and 
statutes—may be unfamiliar to some readers and that their participation in rules of legal 
procedure requires a certain amount of parsing.  
Judges and courts produce opinions, binding decisions that are typically—though not 
always—memorialized in written text.4 The basic format of a U.S. judicial opinion is remarkably 
consistent across different courts and even across different time periods in the past two centuries. 
Most opinions begin with a brief statement of “facts” and the distillation of the legal question at 
hand. In the legal analysis that follows, a court grapples with the relevance of existing precedent, 
the competing equities of the case, and the controlling legal standards. Although judicial 
opinions often present this material as self-evident or unimpeachable, each of these sections 
actually obscures a judge’s significant editorial power: to determine what the “facts” are and 
which facts are relevant to the case, to identify which precedent should apply (judges often have 
several options on this front), and to conclude which existing law best fits the pre-determined 
facts of the present case. On the level of form, the elegance of the judicial opinion is in its ability 
to generate a holding, or legal rule, that appears, by the end of the opinion, to be utterly obvious. 
Once issued, though theoretically subject to appeal, a judicial opinion becomes binding law, not 																																																								
4 Judicial opinions issue in a variety of cases, both criminal and civil. They may adjudicate a 
person’s guilt, interpret a statute, or determine a party’s rights in a civil dispute. An opinion is 
binding within its own jurisdiction and also subject to rules of appeal and the jurisdiction of the 
relevant appellate courts. Publication of opinions typically occurs in judicial reporters—volumes 
that aggregate and publish opinions primarily for use by legal practitioners. These published 
opinions are considered “official” legal records that may be cited in future litigation. Not all 
judicial opinions are captured in written text, however, and not all written opinions are published 
in reporters. This dissertation examines written opinions, though I do not limit myself to versions 
of opinions from official reporters. For instance, in Chapter 1, I examine the sentencing of Nat 
Turner as reported in Thomas Gray’s pamphlet on Nat Turner’s confessions regarding the 
Southampton Slave Rebellion. This one example demonstrates the tendency of opinions to 
circulate in “unofficial” formats that permeate broader zones of readership, particularly during 
the nineteenth century. 
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only for the litigants in the present case but also for all future litigants who are similarly situated. 
This process of judicial decision-making generates a genealogy of legal rules that adds to the 
existing body of precedent while departing from past rulings where the facts diverge—or where 
political pressures have made existing legal rules untenable. 
 A relatively well-known line of judicial opinions offers an illustrative example of the 
evolution of precedent. Many high school civics students learn that Brown v. Board of Education 
(347 U.S. 483 (1954)) established the legal rule that effectively abolished race-based school 
segregation. That legal holding modified a long-standing legal doctrine that authorized 
segregation so long as the provided facilities met the standard of “separate but equal.” The 
“separate but equal” doctrine had legalized a host of Jim Crow-era practices such as separate 
restrooms, drinking fountains, and other facilities, and that doctrine is directly traceable to the 
1896 Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537).  
Rather than governing public school segregation, Plessy arose around the issue of railway 
car segregation. In upholding a Louisiana statute that called for “separate but equal 
accommodations for white and colored persons” (Plessy 552), the Supreme Court validated a 
legal and cultural narrative that perpetuated racial segregation in a variety of contexts. In Plessy, 
the Supreme Court (544) held that, “Laws permitting, and even requiring, [different racial 
groups’] separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily 
imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, 
recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police 
power.” Later in the opinion, the Court notes (551-52), “If the civil and political rights of both 
races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to 
the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.” 
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The Court thus claims the existence of political and civil equality by citing, curiously, the 
existence of civil and political equality—the argument here is that it is not the law, but some 
unnamed social, that is responsible for inequalities among the races. Thus, in this 1896 opinion, 
the Supreme Court not only established a holding binding on Plessy; it also established a 
narrative—what would come to be known as the “separate but equal” doctrine—that applied to 
future litigants seeking access to various public facilities from railway cars to drinking fountains 
and ultimately to public schools.  
This accrual of precedent establishes the appearance of teleology, in which later 
precedent always modifies earlier rulings. In application, however, the story is somewhat more 
complicated. Precedent looks both forward and backward, so that each decision must take into 
account the history of the legal issues in question and contemplate the future application of the 
immediate holding. Taken in isolation, each judicial opinion appears to have the final word on 
the matter—a holding, always written in the present tense, that settles the legal question with 
apparently definitive resolve. It is only upon looking at subsequent rulings and laws, however, 
that one can say finally whether the holding in any given case remains “good law”—law that has 
not been overturned by appeal, later precedent, or statute.   
This tension in law, between its apparent impenetrability and its fragility in the face of 
competing legal rulings, makes the judicial opinion especially suited to my analysis in Human 
Rites. On the one hand, judicial opinions depict the state of the law at a particular point in 
history, documenting the most persuasive and pervasive legal narratives of that moment. On the 
other hand, however, judicial opinions signify law’s habit of perpetually chasing its own tail. 
Moreover, judicial opinions tend to include extraneous matter that is not necessary to the legal 
holding in question. In the example of Plessy, the precise phrase “separate but equal” appears in 
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only one place in the decision—Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion, which was not part of the 
binding judgment. Nevertheless, that language is the phrase that took hold with such force during 
subsequent debates over Jim Crow policies. Likewise, nearly all of the language in the Dred 
Scott Decision (Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)) is dicta, which Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines as “such opinions uttered . . . not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside 
for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects.”5 In other words, judicial 
opinions often serve as touchstones that provide powerful cultural narratives even when they are 
explicitly not engaged in the process of creating binding law. Judicial opinions thus provide a 
rich source of material on the power of legal narratives and legal culture, as well as the authorial 
practices of individual judges. 
In addition to judicial opinions, the dissertation also examines other legal documents such 
as statutes. Unlike opinions, which derive from judges and courts, statutes are the product of the 
legislative process. Whether passed by city councils, state legislatures, or the U.S. Congress, 
statutes are often referred to as “codified law” because they are written laws that apply to all 
persons in the jurisdiction—by contrast, while judicial opinions do have effects on similarly 
situated litigants, a judicial opinion is technically binding on the individual parties to the case. 
Statutes, on the other hand, aim for broad coverage and applicability. Like other types of law, 																																																								
5 See “What is dictum?” The Law Dictionary, Featuring Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online 2nd 
Ed. http://thelawdictionary.org/dictum/ (internal citation omitted). In addition to these examples 
of extraneous material within judicial opinions, I also consider supporting legal documents that 
make up the complete record but are not judge-authored judicial opinions. For example, in 
Chapter 2, I examine various affidavits and testimony from several court cases concerning the 
fugitivity of the slave known as James Williams. Likewise, in Chapter 4, I discuss Jane 
Johnson’s affidavit and oral testimony in the legal proceedings against Passmore Williamson and 
William Still. Both the Williams and Johnson examples demonstrate the difficulty in drawer 
bright line borders around texts that we think of as “law.” These documents, which participate in 
law but stop short of acquiring law’s binding effect, illustrate the significant crossover during the 
antebellum period among categories of testimony, autobiography, witnessing, and protest. 
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statutes regulate both civil and criminal conduct. While judicial opinions are subject to appeal 
only by other courts, statutes are vulnerable to challenges on several fronts. Courts interpret 
statutes in the course of litigation, as with the litigation in Plessy v. Ferguson, where Plessy 
originally challenged a statute regarding public accommodations, and appellate courts may even 
overturn a statute by declaring it unconstitutional on one or more grounds. In addition to 
interpretation by courts, statutes may also be amended or abolished by subsequent statutes.  
In Human Rites, I do not grant any more or less legal “weight” to statutes as opposed to 
judicial opinions. There are, however, several significant difference between opinions and 
statutes that make the latter somewhat less amenable to literary analysis. First, statutes are 
intensely collaborative documents that almost never bear the authorial imprint of any one person. 
Even in appellate courts where decisions issue from a panel of judges, it is commonplace for a 
single judge or justice to author an opinion; in that case, other judges concur or dissent, often 
writing their own separate opinions in addition to the primary majority opinion. In statutes, on 
the other hand, lawmakers debate individual provisions, repeatedly amending language during 
the legislative process. Of course, the availability of authorial intention is hardly a prerequisite 
for literary analysis—and the pursuit of authorial intent may even impede the practice of textual 
interpretation. Moreover, many of the other materials in Human Rites are also undoubtedly the 
product of collaborative authorship, especially the slave narrative, in which the use of an 
amanuensis raises a host of far more troubling questions about authorial agency. These other 
texts with complicated authorship, however, privilege narrative in a way that statutes do not. 
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The primary goal of legislation is to establish a set of rules, usually a recitation of 
numbered sections regarding different statutory provisions. While some statutes contain 
preambles or statements of legislative intent, the language of a statute itself generally reads as a 
set of authorizations, prohibitions, and conditions with little attempt at narrative connection from 
one section to the next; on the contrary, it is typically in the best interest of a statute to limit 
narrative or editorialization so as to make the statutory provisions as unambiguous and discrete 
as possible. This formal limitation on statutes does not mean that it is impossible to interpret the 
larger cultural narratives underpinning a statute, or in which a statute participates. Rather, in 
statutory interpretation, it becomes increasingly necessary to look to additional sources to better 
determine what those narratives are6—legislative history, judicial opinions, and relevant 
statements from lawmakers may bring an entirely new context to a statute that appears on its face 
to be neutral in some respect.  
For instance, to return to the example of Jim Crow laws, many of the statutes regarding 
public accommodations appear to be interested in establishing access to facilities equal for 
people of all races. The statute at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson calls for “equal, but separate, 
accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches 
for each train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition to as to secure separate 
accommodations . . . .” (Plessy at 537). This language, to a reader in 2016, is so tinged with the 
codes of the Jim Crow South, that it signifies immediately as participating in the tradition of 
																																																								
6 Strict constructionists or originalists would beg to differ with my characterization here. 
Interpreters in this vein often call for readings of a statute’s “plain meaning,” an assertion that, 
for a literary scholar, is practically meaningless. Indeed, so-called “plain meaning” readings of 
statutory language frequently assign carefully selected meanings from among a host of plausible 
explanations, choosing to label the interpretation as “plain language” in order to obscure the very 
interpretive gestures inherent in statutory construction. 
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segregation, a practice long held to be unconstitutional racial discrimination. The plain language 
of the statute, however, sounds remarkably value-neutral. It calls for “equal” accommodations, 
though it does mandate partition or separation. There is no explanation in the statute of why 
these accommodations ought to be separate in the first place, and there is certainly no indication 
that the statute is an effort to oppress or even inconvenience non-white railway passengers. In 
fact, the underlying statute claims that the purpose of the statute is “to promote the comfort of 
passengers on railway trains.”7 The absent, but now obvious, subtext is that the statute actually 
aims to promote the comfort of white passengers on railway trains. The racist narrative 
encompassed by the statute is expressly not its stated purpose; that narrative becomes visible 
only in the broader cultural narrative that is evident from history and context. 
When statutes arise in Human Rites, they typically demonstrate a similar dissonance 
between the legislation’s stated purpose and the contextual clues that counsel in favor of an 
alternative explanation—always as a means of teasing out law’s ability to cloak oppression in 
mystifying or even disingenuous language. For example, in Chapter 1, I consider a Georgia 
statute enacted in apparent direct response to the widespread circulation of David Walker’s 1829 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World. That statute was one of several laws that 
criminalized the possession or circulation of materials that might encourage or incite slave 
rebellions—although the legislative history surrounding these statutes makes it apparent that the 
laws specifically targeted Walker’s Appeal, the statutory language entirely avoids naming 
Walker personally or any text specifically. Thus, what appears on the face of the statute to be 
content-neutral regulation actually effaces the panic and outrage sparked by Walker in 
particular—his pamphlet, which called for the immediate abolition of slavery and the admission 																																																								
7 See Louisiana Railway Accommodations Act of 1890 (Preamble). 
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of African Americans into full citizenship rights, had been mailed to lawmakers and circulated in 
urban centers throughout the South. The statutes that responded to Walker’s Appeal thus faced 
the unenviable problem of attacking an opponent that they refused to name or otherwise 
identify—as a result, legislatures were forced to develop unwieldy and overly broad language in 
order to ensure that the Appeal fell within the ambit of the statutes without appearing to be the 
sole target of the legislation. 
These statutory enactments serve as examples of law’s shortcomings, its inability to 
simply do what it wants to do without resorting to a set of textual gymnastics and obfuscations 
designed to give it the appearance of legitimacy. Walker’s Appeal in fact exposed a gap in the 
law, a crack in law’s surface through which the Appeal initially slipped—southern legislatures 
acted quickly to fill the crack, but the highly reactive nature of law in this context is ultimately a 
suggestion of law’s vulnerability and its failures as an institution. I do not mean to suggest that 
these laws, or other laws related to legalized slavery lacked teeth. On the contrary, many of the 
statutes regulating slavery were unspeakably violent, brutal, and bloody. However, by exposing 
the tensions between law’s stated aims and its contradictory position in cultural narratives, it 
becomes clear that law’s violence is possible not merely through its status as law—rather, law 
deftly marshals language that creates the justification for law’s power in the first place, often 
vanishing the names and histories that underpin individual legislation and regulation. 
Where one encounters a gap or silence in the law, the first impulse is to assume that 
lawmakers have simply erased names and events that are thus lost to history. The literary lives of 
these statutes suggest, however, that some of those silences become more complicated if we 
broaden the scope of our inquiry into what we are willing to call “law.” I argue that, for this 
reason, it is unwise to consider legal documents and pieces of legal history as though they exist 
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solely in their separate, and highly rarefied spheres. I call instead for a much broader reading of 
legal materials that takes into account their legal and literary and cultural contexts. I ultimately 
suggest that, in the antebellum period in particular, it becomes virtually impossible to determine 
with certainty where law ends and literature begins. For, whether reading an opinion, a statute, a 
confession, an affidavit, or an oral argument, law’s reach seems always to be seeping outside its 
apparent borders, making it altogether unclear which documents constitute binding law and 
which constitute description or narration. Single documents often engage in both practices, 
further complicating the question of when a legal document is executing each function. The 
question of influence and infiltration does not, however, flow in one direction alone—for its part, 
literature always seems to be intruding on law, as well. 
Literature 
Given my investment in destabilizing the boundaries around law, one might expect that my work 
in Human Rites would therefore privilege literature or claim it as a redemptive site in which to 
locate those vanished by law. My treatment of literature, however, is equally invested in 
destabilization, arguing instead that literature shares considerable terrain with law—and that it is 
often equally vexed, complex, and transdisciplinary. As with law, I argue for expanding the 
borders around what we encounter as “literary.” In order to demonstrate the porousness and 
permeability of literature, I bring various literary genres and texts into direct dialogue with 
documents that appear at least superficially to be legal. In particular, the dissertation considers 
several distinct genres of African American literature during the antebellum period: protest 
literature and related print materials, the slave narrative, and the novel. As I will explain below, 
legal documents such as affidavits, confessions, and testimony nevertheless appear with 
regularity in these apparently “literary” texts. Thus, although these literary genres may initially 
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appear to be self-evident, they become, in Human Rites, considerably more complicated, 
frequently creating friction with legal institutions and narratives, and raising challenging 
questions about the role of African American literary culture in the legal history of slavery in the 
United States. 
 One of the movements the dissertation makes is from non-fictional to fictional literature. 
For many of the literary sources in the project, the question of fictionality is an unusually 
complicated one, with slave narratives and novels frequently combining both autobiographical 
and fictional elements within a single text. Non-fiction protest literature, as in the example of 
David Walker’s Appeal, is likely the genre least susceptible to confusion over its generic 
classification. Protest literature and pamphlets thus occupy the firmly non-fictional realm, though 
they may borrow from conventions of law or literary fiction. Walker’s Appeal often stages itself 
as a re-writing of founding documents such as the Declaration of Independence or the 
Constitution, troubling the border between law and literature if not between fiction and non-
fiction.  
Even pamphlets that maintain the appearance of non-fictionality, however, have a 
tendency to push generic boundaries. For instance, although the Confessions of Nat Turner was 
published as a pamphlet, that text hardly qualifies as protest literature, unless one reads it as a 
protest of slave insurrection. The portion of the Confessions that contains Turner’s 
autobiography is arguably a form of black protest, and at the least, it refuses to assume a moral 
debt for the violence of the Southampton insurrection. The remainder of the pamphlet, however, 
combines Turner’s autobiography with judicial procedure, establishing a complicated narrative 
that both indulges Turner’s confession and attempts to purge the larger cultural narrative of the 
ways in which Turner’s testimony threatens white supremacy. The complete text, housing both 
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literary practices and legal procedure, thus becomes generically vexed, even without taking into 
account the editorial license supplied by the pamphlet’s publisher, Thomas R. Gray.  
While the Appeal and the Confessions serve as examples of how non-fiction literature 
reaches out into legal discourse and vice versa, other genres of literature make these disciplinary 
crossings even more complicated. The slave narrative is often regarded as the quintessential form 
of early African American literature, and indeed the antebellum period produced a variety of 
slave narratives, primarily through the white abolitionist print machine.8 Generally accepted 
definitions of the slave narrative locate the genre according to some of its more common 
conventions: the narration by a former slave of the conditions of slavery and his or her eventual 
escape and fugitivity. Scholars have, however, modified this definition by noting that certain 
other literary practices tend to mark slave narratives, as well. Examples include evidence of 
mistreatment and abuse at the hands of slaveholders, claims to lost personal and family histories, 
and the presence of a white amanuensis who “transcribed” the narrative with varying degrees of 
(untraceable) editorial influence. In To Tell a Free Story: The First Century of Afro-American 
Autobiography, 1760-1865, William Andrews writes (1):  
During the first half of [the nineteenth century], most Afro-
American autobiography addressed itself, directly or indirectly, to 
the proof of two propositions: (1) that the slave was, as the 
inscription of a famous antislavery medallion put it, ‘a man and a 
brother’ to whites, especially to the white reader of slave narratives; 
																																																								
8 See Teresa Goddu’s work in Selling Anti-Slavery for a fuller discussion of how white 
abolitionist networks took ownership of black literary production as part of a broader corporate 
strategy. 
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and (2) that the black narrator was, despite all prejudice and 
propaganda, a truth-teller, a reliable transcriber of the experience 
and character of black folk. 
Although Andrews speaks here to autobiography more generally, the slave narrative was of 
course the primary vehicle for African American autobiographical production in the antebellum 
period. In fact, the very use of the term “autobiography” calls attention to the slave narrative’s 
most fraught generic trait: it sits somewhat uncomfortably at the intersection of fiction and non-
fiction, explaining in part the two separate propositions that Andrews identifies.  
As Andrews notes, on the one hand, slave narratives were subject to a rigorous system of 
verification in order to establish the black narrators as “truth-tellers.” This process of fact-
checking and scrutiny claims to be invested in subverting cultural narratives that cast African 
Americans as untrustworthy and dishonest. On the other hand, as Andrews points out, the twin 
requirement of the slave narrative was to cast the narrator as a friend to white readers and whites 
more generally. If fact-checking sought to strip away or discourage racist narratives about slaves, 
this requirement rather added narrative flourish to the cold hard facts that a slave narrative 
claimed to rehearse. Not only do these twin requirements cast some light on the motives of white 
abolitionists to gloss the content of slave narratives (and the motives of the African American 
narrators to gloss their own relationship to white persons), but they also put pressure on the 
question of fictionality in the slave narrative genre.  
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As becomes apparent in Human Rites, fictionality is a particularly contentious issue with 
respect to the 1838 publication, Narrative of James Williams, an American Slave, Who Was for 
Several Years a Driver on a Cotton Plantation in Alabama. Authorized and distributed by the 
American Anti-Slavery Society, the Williams Narrative became incredibly controversial after its 
publication when pro-slavery writers challenged the veracity of its factual content. As I discuss 
in Chapter 2, the ensuing debates, scholarship, and mystery surrounding the identity and 
biography of James Williams staged some of the fact/fiction tension that Andrews alludes to in 
his characterization of the slave narrative’s twin aims. With the factual “truth” of the Williams 
Narrative in question, that text became even more difficult to locate generically—a mystification 
of fiction and non-fiction that has been profoundly de-stabilizing for literary critics as well as for 
its original audience. Despite its status as an outlier—most slave narratives were not as 
controversial as this one, nor was any other slave narrative so decried as “false”—the Williams 
Narrative actually demonstrates the pliability of the slave narrative more generally. It resists easy 
answers about authorship, authorial identity, and the presence of editorial narratives included 
more for abolitionists’ political ends rather than factual accuracy. This resistance is particularly 
useful for my work in the dissertation. It is precisely because of these texts’ porosity and fluidity 
that I am able to place “literary” texts like slave narratives alongside “legal” texts like judicial 
opinions. Thus, I am less interested in what makes a slave narrative visible as a slave narrative—
instead, I am far more interested in how and why some slave narratives participate in legal 
narratives, and vice versa.  
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Even in the dissertation’s treatment of literary fiction, it is never altogether clear for the 
reader whether the primary text is essentially “factual,” “fictional,” “legal,” or “literary.” For 
example, my final chapter considers Hannah Crafts’s novel The Bondwoman’s Narrative, which 
was written during the 1850s but remained unpublished until 2002. I use the term “novel” here 
for convenience, but in Chapter 4, I problematize that characterization of the work, suggesting 
that “fictionalized autobiography” might be a more precise label. Organized as a novel, but 
bearing many of the hallmarks of a slave narrative—including references to several verifiable 
“real” persons from the author’s life—The Bondwoman’s Narrative, like each of the other 
literary texts, occupies many different generic spaces. It variously resembles gothic fiction, the 
protest pamphlet, autobiography, and the sentimental novel. And indeed, upon unraveling some 
of the novel’s factual and historical references, it turns out also to be a cipher for a set of legal 
narratives. 
I have taken some pains in the Introduction to parse these generic differences among 
legal and literary texts. That labor appears here not because the project is deeply invested in 
these generic distinctions—on the contrary, each chapter begins from the assumption that it is 
both logical and productive to generate a dialogue out of the pairings of texts that appear to be 
generically different. This Introduction serves instead as a sort of primer for the reader, marking 
out the pliability inherent in these generic divisions from the outset, and encouraging the reader 
not to look merely for the generic differences among the texts in this dissertation. Rather, I urge 
you to note what sustains these pairings and joinders—the ways in which the borders of genre 
and form become secondary to the borrowings, takings, and re-imaginings in all of the texts, and 
the uncertainty one begins to feel about classifying anything as “legal” or “literary” in the first 
place. 
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African American Literature: Alternate Modes of Authorship 
It is a precarious thing to construct a project whose center is ceaselessly troubled, blurred, and 
mystified. The risk is that the center will drop out, or that the project will be an exercise in 
assembling and demolishing a complicated straw man. I have striven, however, to put all of the 
mystification and border-blurring to a purpose. The uncertainties I advocate about the 
distinctions between the legal and the literary proceed with the goal of a new understanding 
about modes of African American authorship and African American literature more generally. 
Faced with both the practical and political obstacles to scholarly study of early African American 
literature—not only were African Americans discouraged or prohibited from learning to read and 
write, but many of the earliest primary sources have been lost or erased—I aim to build on the 
existing archival and academic work of African American studies scholars while also searching 
for novel ways to read African American literary practices during the antebellum period. The 
juxtaposition of legal records with other types of literature shifted the landscape of authorship, 
urging me toward a broader understanding of what it means not only to be a legal or literary 
“person” but also what it means to be an author. 
 Throughout Human Rites, African American authors are writers, but they are also 
witnesses, deponents, storytellers, narrators, advocates, rebels, and fugitives. I argue that the 
construction of a persona around one’s fugitivity, enslavement, or liberation constitutes its own 
type of authorship that demands a new type of literary reading—that reading, rather than 
privileging historical accuracy or factual verification, ought to consider the authorial pressures 
on an enslaved or free African American subject and recognize authorship that arises in 
unexpected or counterintuitive places. That reading must be amenable always to the existence of 
unfamiliar new types of “texts” that linger alongside or outside “typical” literary sources such as 
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slave narratives, novels, and non-fiction pamphlets.9 Because African American authorship in the 
antebellum period was consistently and systematically suppressed or denied, it often developed 
along furtive and even clandestine pathways. The success of this authorship rested with its 
undetectability, illegibility, and even invisibility. For slaves who desired communication with 
loved ones and friends in other places, correspondence was necessarily complex, secretive, and 
dependent on false claims of illiteracy;10 for free or fugitive African Americans, publishing a text 
under one’s own name might bring slave catchers and former owners seeking retribution or 
recapture. To read and analyze clandestine works of authorship means on some level 
surrendering to the impossibility and incompleteness that this type of authorship presents. It 
means reading inconsistencies, gaps, and even silences not as fatal flaws or imperfections but as 
potential sites of African American authorship. 
 In light of these constraints on traditional authorship, Human Rites treats the construct of 
personhood as the crucible in which alternative modes of authorship emerge as cultural artifacts. 
By troubling the borders of what constitutes a legal or literary “person,” my work here suggests 
that the category of “author” is likewise more expansive and far-reaching than we might suspect. 
I consider the ways that African American writers, narrators, and witnesses envision personhood 
in subversive and deeply creative dialogue with other literary and legal texts—these 
reimaginings suggest that African American authorship arose in the practices not only of writing 
but also in the routine performances of fugitivity, enslavement, and emancipation more 
																																																								
9 In this respect, it may be useful to think of this work as grappling, in Derridean terms, with the 
supplement. While my work has taken me to the intersections among these traditional sources 
and legal history, I suspect that there are other such vertices that would expose additional 
supplements and further enrich our understanding of early African American authorship.	
10 To write a letter to a relative meant that a slave risked exposing his or her ability to read and 
write. 
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generally. African American authorship, then, is less contingent on its legibility as or in 
traditional literary texts than it is on its relentless and necessary subversion of those genres, 
modes, and practices of writing that maintained such historical intimacy with whiteness and 
institutions of white supremacy.  
Legal and Literary Personhood 
In a 1928 Yale Law Journal article, Bryant Smith writes (283), “To be a legal person is to be the 
subject of rights and duties.” Sounding nearly too broad to be useful, this definition nevertheless 
makes plain why personhood, of all legal theories, was in such contention during the antebellum 
period in the United States. The existence of legal slavery produced a version of legal personality 
that Colin Dayan has described (xii) as “negative personhood”—slaves occupied a vexed place 
in law, subject to countless duties and few, if any, rights. It might be most accurate to 
characterize slaves as legal persons but not judicial ones. In the broadest sense, law did not deny 
that slaves were human beings, or “persons” in the colloquial sense of the word.  On the other 
hand, however, law consistently refused to extend the rights and privileges of personhood to 
slaves. As a general matter and at least in theory, slaves could not vote, hold property, bring 
lawsuits as plaintiffs, or testify as witnesses in court. In many places, slaves were also forbidden 
from learning to read and write. They could not travel freely. They could not offer or withhold 
consent when their owners raped them. Though persons in fact, their legal personhood was 
constantly denied, undermined, and refused. 
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 Many scholars have theorized the denial of legal personhood as constituting civil or 
social death,11 offering helpful frameworks for understanding legal personhood as a kind of 
authorizing gesture that welcomes individuals into a social network, a state, or a nation. Death is 
undeniably present in my own consideration of legal personhood—in several instances, the texts 
I read generate intense overkill of black bodies, juxtaposing the deadness of a corpse with the 
deadness of a living slave. Rather than focusing on social or civil death, however, my work in 
Human Rites takes me to the unexpected ways that personhood is narrated by legal and literary 
texts. The problem of slaves’ legal personhood tends to create discursive stumbling blocks—
often, these stumbling blocks coalesce around a problem of naming. The very gesture of naming 
a person—as demonstrated by the police report of Michael Brown’s death—establishes a person 
as an agent of the narrative in question. It comes as no surprise, then, that legal institutions 
pursuing an agenda of oppression and enslavement frequently refuse to name individual slaves, 
obscuring their individuality and keeping them as unrecognizably human as possible.  
 The politics of naming arise in other, more “literary” texts as well, where individual 
authors generate new names for themselves—sometimes many names in succession, as is the 
case with the slave known as James Williams. Personhood in this context becomes shockingly 
fluid, adaptable, and also incoherent. As readers, we are accustomed to identifying persons by 
what remains static about their identities—their names and, more broadly, what we might call 
their personalities. But for slaves, and particularly fugitive slaves—for whom identification is 
often the equivalent of capture and death—personhood is marked not by stasis but by motion, 
																																																								
11 See Colin Dayan’s work on civil death in The Law is a White Dog. Both Orlando Patterson 
(Slavery and Social Death) and Russ Castronovo (Necro Citizenship) have considered the 
possibilities of social death and dead citizenship as possible frameworks for understanding the 
legal personhood of slaves and former slaves. 
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interruption, and incommensurability. In the case of fugitive slaves, as I explore in Chapter 3, 
legal personhood and literary personhood are inextricably linked, inseparable, and maddeningly 
elusive. 
 If legal personhood is marked by “rights and duties,” I mean something quite different 
when I use the term “literary personhood.” It would be most convenient to equate literary 
personhood with the status of being a “character” in a text. While I invite that association on 
some level, I also want to suggest that literary personhood is something other than mere 
characterization—I mean “literary personhood” as a signifier not necessarily of intense or 
prolonged characterization, but of a person’s textual visibility as a subject. Even brief literary 
references to characters, such as Hannah Crafts’s passing references to Jane Johnson in The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative, may nevertheless constitute an assertion or critique of a person’s right 
to legal personhood. Conversely, a judicial opinion—as in the consideration of petitions for 
freedom in Chapter 3—may, through specific literary practices, develop a slave’s literary 
personhood in ways that nevertheless support the denial of legal personhood to that same slave. 
 Rather than marking out the distinct differences between legal and literary personhood, 
however, I want to put these terms into play as a means of extending my earlier arguments about 
the porosity of legal and literary texts. As the dissertation ultimately argues, these various 
discursive models of personhood reference and encode each other in ways that urge not only the 
fictionality of law, but also an understanding of literature, and particularly literary fiction, as 
inherently legal. The terms “legal personhood” and “literary personhood” ultimately call 
attention to the discursive efforts to narrate personhood in a meaningful coh erent way, to the 
possibility for alternate modes of African American authorship—and to the impossibility of 
enslaved personhood to be adequately accommodated by these discursive efforts. 
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Chapter Summaries 
The dissertation moves simultaneously in two directions. First, it is organized more or less 
chronologically, beginning in the late 1820s and ending in the late 1850s. Second, the project 
begins in the realm of what we might comfortably call “non-fiction” and moves toward 
increasingly fictional texts as the chapters progress. In addition to the cumulative focus on 
fictionality in texts, the dissertation slowly turns its attention to fictionalization as a discursive 
practice that animates law and literature, often with different purposes and to different ends. The 
presence and nature of fiction in each of the chapters acquires different meaning. In Chapter 1, 
fictionality is evidence of law’s violence, whereas Chapter 2 reads fictionality as evidence of 
law’s vulnerability but also as suggesting new possibilities for fugitive authorship. Chapter 3 
examines the legal fiction as a device of law that creates both micro- and macro-narratives about 
the nature of enslavement and American legal mythology more generally. Finally, in Chapter 4, I 
theorize fictionality as a process of encryption and suggest that fictionality does not “belong” to 
either law or literature—rather, it is a product of their intersection. 
 The dissertation unfolds in two parts. Part I, “Death, Silence, and Disruptive Personae,” 
considers the complicity of legal and literary institutions, tracing their shared projects in limiting 
or obscuring the nuances of black personhood in service of institutional (white) supremacy. In 
Part I, I analyze the disruptive potential of black protest and rebellion from within the legal and 
cultural constraints of legalized slavery and white supremacy. This section of the dissertation 
examines how legal institutions and abolitionist networks, despite often claiming deeply 
divergent political and ethical imperatives, nevertheless participate in a shared project of 
reducing enslaved persons to blunt binaries or erasing their identities from textual histories. This 
cooperation, I argue, is at once chillingly efficient and also deeply unsuccessful. I demonstrate 
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how these efforts at erasure and suppression tend to over-represent the very persons that law and 
literature seem intent on disappearing. 
 In Chapter 1, “’Dead! Dead! Dead!’: David Walker, Nat Turner, and Law’s Consuming 
Violence,” I consider the legal and literary contexts surrounding David Walker’s 1829 Appeal to 
the Coloured Citizens of the World and the 1831 pamphlet circulated by Thomas R. Gray entitled 
The Confessions of Nat Turner, the Leader of the Late Insurrection in Southampton, Va. Both 
texts deal explicitly in revolutionary and rebellious rhetoric. In considering Walker’s Appeal, I 
close read his text and argue for its self-consciously legal presentation—Walker uses familiar 
legal forms and documents such as the Declaration of Independence in his call for the immediate 
abolition of slavery and admission of African Americans into the full privileges of citizenship. I 
also consider the reactive lawmaking that occurred in response to circulation of the Appeal; I 
argue that Walker and his Appeal, though unnamed in the state statutes that criminalized 
possession of the pamphlet, might be properly considered as structuring those laws. Thus, what 
initially appears as a silence in the legal record is actually evidence of Walker’s centrality to law 
and the legislative process—the content of the Appeal becomes a primer for lawmakers who then 
attempt to suppress it. 
 In considering The Confessions of Nat Turner, I turn my attention primarily to the 
sentencing of Nat Turner as reported in Thomas R. Gray’s pamphlet. Taken in the context of 
Turner’s intensely supernatural and highly spiritual confessions of slave insurrection and 
rebellion, his sentencing and execution engage in a series of moves that both insist on his 
deadness and, perversely, seem to suggest that he is incapable of being killed. The Confessions is 
explicitly both legal and literary, a collection of autobiography as well as legal procedure; rather 
than vanishing Turner, simply killing him, or stripping him of his mythic status as a rebellion 
	 31	
leader, the text instead reveals law as imperfect, insufficient, and strange. At the conclusion of 
the text, and in particular at the conclusion of the judicial sentencing, Turner has become 
somehow more dead but also more threatening as a consequence of law’s violence.   
 While Chapter 1 examines these battles over silencing, vanishing, and destruction, 
Chapter 2 examines the unexpected productivity that proceeds from the intersection of literary 
networks and legal history, particularly with respect to fugitive slaves. In “Negative Proofs and 
Proliferating Personae: James Williams and the Complicity of Law and Literature,” I trace 
several related arguments. First, in considering the publication history of the Narrative of James 
Williams, I explore the extent to which the goals of the abolitionist print network—in particular 
the American Anti-Slavery Society—align with the apparent goals of the laws of slavery. Both 
institutional apparatuses focus on constructions of slave subjectivity around reductive binaries: 
law insists on figuring slaves as either criminals or property, while abolitionist networks focus on 
the binary of honesty and mendacity. In the face of claims to factual inaccuracy in the Williams 
Narrative, the abolitionist press, in cooperation with the pro-slavery print machine, moved with 
alacrity to maintain the honest/mendacious binary while also adopting law’s binary—the 
resulting journalistic coverage of the Williams Narrative stages a criminal trial against the man 
known as Williams as a means of first discrediting and ultimately disavowing the man himself, 
though he had already disappeared from the public eye, apparently of his own will. 
 Second, in pushing the legal and literary complicity first suggested in Chapter 1, I move 
in Chapter 2 to consider how fugitivity imbues this complicity with different stakes and how 
performances of selfhood by fugitive slaves force institutions into mimetic responses that grapple 
awkwardly with how best to name or identify fugitive slaves in the first place. The texts I close 
read in Chapter 2 include the Williams Narrative and several legal opinions that document 
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Williams at various points in his fugitivity; however, the primary texts in Chapter 2 are the 
numerous personae that the man known as James Williams created and deployed. His 
performances as James Williams, Shadrach Wilkins, and Jim Thornton urge a reading of his 
fugitivity as its own type of authorship, a creative and highly productive practice in which a 
fugitive slave generates numerous alternative personae, none of which are easily combined or re-
assembled into anything resembling a unified, coherent, or whole subject.  
The stakes of these personae’s existence leave confounding traces in the legal and literary 
materials of the man I refer to not as simply “James Williams” but as 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. Unlike the legal materials in Chapter 1, which appear intent on 
merely vanishing or erasing their African American targets, the comparable legal materials in 
Chapter 2 struggle to capture or fix Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s identity—a rhetorical posture 
that mimics his previous owner’s pursuit of him after his flight from slavery. Here again, despite 
law’s characterization of itself as powerful, stable, and certain, the proliferating personae of a 
fugitive slave place law into a wildly reactive posture that fails to settle even on a name for the 
fugitive slave in question—in the end, law must resort to negative proofs and substitutions, 
making identifications primarily through negation, naming someone according to who or what he 
is not. This chapter thus reframes questions about what constitutes legible personhood, whether 
in a legal or a literary context. Further, it suggests reading the generation and deployment of 
fugitive personae as another kind of black authorship during the antebellum period—one which 
is profoundly disruptive to accepted legal and literary generic classifications, marked by a legal 
consciousness, and yet resolute in its refusal to declare itself subservient to legal or literary 
institutions. 
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In raising questions of fictionality versus factual “truth,” Chapter 2 also serves as a hinge 
that opens out onto Part II of Human Rites, “Borrowings and Takings: Fictionality in Law and 
the Legality of Fiction.” In this second half of the dissertation, I explore the specific technologies 
by which both legal and literary texts move outside their own apparent borders and the extent to 
which these extra-disciplinary gestures actually animate the rhetorical and cultural power of the 
resulting narratives. In short, I take fiction seriously as a device of both law and literature; I do 
not merely suggest that “all texts are fictions,” but I do explore what it is about fiction in 
particular that can on the one hand supply law with institutional and rhetorical force and, on the 
other hand, dismantle or at least critique law’s operation. The result is a reading of fictionality as 
a powerful political and rhetorical strategy, as a practice that extends well beyond creative or 
artistic labor and structures the undeniably “real” conditions of expression and oppression. Thus, 
the fictionalization of various legal narratives underscores what is authorial about the work of 
African American commentators, writers, and witnesses during the antebellum period. 
Witnessing occurs not merely as an exercise in “truth-telling” but also as an opportunity to 
reimagine existing narratives and doctrines. Moreover, fictionality emerges as a source of 
complicated citations, encryptions, and allusions that exceed what we might otherwise call 
intertextuality; not only are legal and literary texts mutually constitutive, I argue, but they are 
extensions of one another. 
In Chapter 3, “’Not Intended to Deceive’: Legal Fictions, the Transhistorical Slave, and 
the Mythology of American Law,” I consider the nature and application of legal fictions, 
particularly in the context of adjudications of slaves’ rights to freedom. My primary sources in 
this chapter come entirely from the world of judicial and statutory documents, and court opinions 
in particular; after developing a working definition of the legal fiction, I examine a range of 
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specific legal fictions around the legal personality of slaves. Law has variously regarded slaves 
as chattels, real estate, paupers, and other quasi-persons. Adjudications of a slave’s right to 
freedom tend to put particular pressure on these unwieldy and bizarre legal fictions, making 
visible how the fictionality of legal enslavement is highly contingent on a set of other legal 
procedural factors as well as pervasive cultural mythologies about the nature and supposed 
invulnerability of American law. Chapter 3 takes seriously the use of fiction as a technology of 
law and the necessity of legal fictions in service of a nascent legal culture in the United States 
during the antebellum period. By close reading the language of several specific legal documents, 
I demonstrate how fiction in law creates a complicated set of analogies and substitutions that 
enable the figuration of slaves as paupers, criminals, property, and at times, legal persons. 
 These analogies and metaphors, however, often take place in a terrain bounded not only 
by specific legal rules but also by temporal demands. A secondary argument of Chapter 3 is that 
legal time is counterintuitively flexible and even polytemporal or transhistorical. In particular, 
the temporal conditions and contingencies around legal fictions of slavery have the tendency to 
figure slaves as transhistorical subjects that populate the landscape of American legal history. 
This transhistorical characterization is certainly not part of an intentional project to endow slaves 
with agency or institutional power. Nevertheless, the treatment of slaves as historical objects and 
transhistorical subjects underscores the potential for reimagining the limits of black authorship, 
and it suggests that the act of legal interpretation has the potential not only to disrupt legal 
narratives but also to infuse literary production. 
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 Chapter 4 takes up this connection between legal and literary fiction to consider the 
relationship between Hannah Crafts’s novel The Bondwoman’s Narrative and the legal history 
surrounding one of that novel’s minor characters, Jane—an escaped slave whose actual full name 
was Jane Johnson. In the novel, the character of “Jane” is so minor as to merit only a few 
paragraphs and the briefest attention in a text of several hundred pages. In “Ciphers, Citations, 
and Encryptions: The Bondwoman’s Narrative and the Case of Jane Johnson,” I pursue a 
comparative reading of the novel alongside the judicial record of Jane Johnson’s escape and the 
subsequent trials of the abolitionists who allegedly assisted her. Building on Nicole Aljoe’s work 
on slave narratives “embedded” within legal and other materials, I argue for the potential of 
literary fiction not merely to embed but to encode complicated sets of legal narratives—legal 
narratives that, in turn, encode additional literary narratives, and so on and so forth. While Aljoe 
argues for the recovery of testimonial slave narratives from unexpected textual sites, I argue 
instead that fiction and law do not conceal recoverable slave testimony so much as they encrypt 
competing narratives that move back and forth across and among genres and disciplines. In 
African American fiction, I argue, literary characters and legal subjects are often fundamentally 
indistinguishable. The resulting process of encryption and complex citation situates The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative as a vantage point from which to critique and even re-write law. 
 In the course of the chapter, I analyze critical differences between Crafts’s novel and the 
legal records of Jane Johnson, differences that suggest Crafts’s specific critique of the hypocrisy 
inherent in a democratic republic that tolerates and promotes legalized slavery. The novel 
incorporates legal actors and recasts them as literary characters as a means of mounting this 
critique and re-writing the dominant legal philosophy. This re-imagination takes place against a 
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literary backdrop that is thick with law, making frequent legal references and even engaging at 
times in the reproduction of legal language and legal form. 
 The literarization of law, however, is not an unreciprocated endeavor. The legal record, 
considered alongside Crafts’s novel, also emerges as a site of encryption and fictionalization—it 
too narrates Jane Johnson as a character, ultimately offering an alternative account to the one 
provided by The Bondwoman’s Narrative. Moreover, both the novel and the legal record appear 
at times to mimic the conventions of the slave narrative, each modifying that genre in its own 
way. The result is that the literary fiction and the legal history are locked in orbit around each 
other, each encrypting the other and supplying narrative detail unavailable to or unwanted by its 
counterpart. Literary characters temporarily inhabit legal worlds, and legal narratives occupy 
fictional spaces, leaving the reader at a loss to state firmly whether we are firmly inside either 
law or literature at any given moment. 
 Chapter 4 marks an appropriate culmination of the dissertation because of its engagement 
in the potential of fiction as a device of both law and literature, demonstrating the discursive, 
cultural, and historical yield of scholarship that places both types of text in dialogue with each 
other. However, Chapter 4 also rehearses many of the arguments made in earlier chapters of 
Human Rites, as well: it explicitly engages and develops the theories of fiction first identified in 
Chapter 3; it takes up questions of fugitivity and persona and thus deepens my arguments from 
Chapter 2; and it even rehearses another iteration of a tripartite condemnation to death in 
conversation with Nat Turner’s sentencing from Chapter 1. These crossings may be more 
fortuitous than anything else, and I certainly do not mean to suggest that the telos of the 
dissertation is “the novel.” By contrast, my arguments in Chapter 4 are possible by virtue of the 
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work in the first three chapters. It may be most accurate to say that the first three chapters of the 
dissertation develop a multi-faceted methodology that Chapter 4 can finally bring to bear. 
* * * 
 When I began the dissertation, I suspected that some of law’s violence might be 
reclaimed or redressed in the pages of black authors. As my research unfolded, I was forced to 
confront several difficult realizations and adjust my conclusions about the relationship between 
the laws of slavery and black literary production in the nineteenth century. It is of course the case 
that African American literature often opens up legal narratives, casting new light where law has 
left shadows. But I confess that I began this project in the misguided belief that the literature 
might also reveal some core truths about the subjectivity of enslaved persons. Instead, what I 
found at each turn was incommensurability and incoherence; African American literary 
practices—even where apparently unmediated by white editors or amanuenses—participated in, 
repeated, or exposed many of the very same tensions and gaps that existed in law. It became 
apparent that literature was not merely an alternative site of legal discourse, nor a reaction to 
legal narratives—it had far too much in common with legal discourse, and as I have already 
described, law was in a reactive posture at least as often as literature was. What emerged instead 
was an understanding of law and literature as complicit and mutually constitutive even as they 
appeared to diverge or challenge one another. My focus shifted to explore how and where these 
interdisciplinary collisions occurred, how both law and African American literature reached 
similar impasses and had similar failings (often for radically different reasons), how literature 
itself might be inherently “legal,” and how African American literature might be found in 
unexpected places. Both law and African American literature repeatedly fail to narrate 
enslavement coherently, and in particular they fail to figure enslaved persons as coherent or 
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unified subjects. If law and literature are not opposite ends of an imaginary binary, but are 
instead extensions of one another, these narrative “failures” accrue increased significance where 
they occur. This dissertation cannot credibly claim to have solved the problem of language’s 
inability to fully capture the nature of personhood. It can, however, call our attention to how and 
why language falls short—and it can urge us toward an understanding of personhood that does 
not demand or depend on a fantasy of a coherent, intact, or even whole subject. 
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PART I:  
DEATH, SILENCE, AND DISRUPTIVE PERSONAE 
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Chapter 1 
 
“Dead! Dead! Dead!”: David Walker, Nat Turner, and Law’s Consuming Violence  
 
This is a chapter about what happens when black resistance confronts law. It is about how law 
uses the most violent and insidious means—both in language and in deed—to silence protest 
from disenfranchised persons. Most especially, this chapter is about two black men ghosted, 
pathologized, and killed by law. These men lived and wrote in the late 1820s and early 1830s; to 
understand their relationship to law, first consider the nature of law in the United States during 
that period. 
In the 1820s, barely forty years after the drafting of the Constitution, the Republic had 
achieved a fragile version of national unity; state and local practices remained crucial to the 
management of government, and states were primarily responsible for the regulation of slavery. 
Fundamental constitutional rights were more limited in scope in the 1820s, as well. It was not as 
simple as the fact that black persons lacked citizenship; the Bill of Rights would not even apply 
to state governments for another forty years until the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. State and local governments wielded tremendous power in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, and the result was a messy and uncertain map of human rights across the 
country. 
The Missouri Compromise of 1820 sought to balance the admission of slaveholding and 
non-slaveholding states (Missouri and Maine, respectively), marking the extent to which local 
practices stirred national political and rights-based discourse. Within individual states, laws 
varied widely and changed constantly. For instance, on one end of the spectrum, Pennsylvania 
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passed an 1826 law prohibiting the kidnapping of free blacks; on the other end of the spectrum, 
in 1820, South Carolina law required first slaves and then free blacks to wear identifying tags. It 
was a dangerous and uncertain time for a black person (slave or free) to travel, and threats of 
kidnapping, enslavement, and violence were hardly absent even in the so-called “free” states of 
the North.  
 While state laws and practices curtailed the movement of bodies—and in particular, of 
black bodies—ideas and texts circulated promiscuously during the same period. Newspapers, 
magazines, and pamphlets introduced a culture of reprinting12 that enabled the widespread 
circulation of numerous texts including news, fiction, editorial/opinion pieces, and ideological 
advocacy. The anti-slavery press took advantage of print’s portability and propensity for travel; 
both black and white anti-slavery materials emerged in the 1820s and early 1830s. Newspapers 
in particular became a forum for anti-slavery discourse, with several early newspapers setting the 
stage for the print wars of the later antebellum period in the 1840s and 1850s. Freedom’s 
Journal, the first black anti-slavery periodical, was founded in 1827; The Liberator, William 
Lloyd Garrison’s newspaper and the emblem of so-called Garrisonian abolitionism, was founded 
in 1831. In the 1820s and 1830s, anti-slavery journalism placed into the repository of print the 
most current legal or political developments and debates around the country; through print, anti-
slavery publishers were able to repackage and disseminate that information beyond state and 
																																																								
12 See Meredith McGill, American Literature and the Culture of Reprinting, 1834-1853 
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2003). 
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local borders.13 Pro-slavery culture also took notice of print culture’s efficacy: as early as 1820, 
South Carolina introduced legal bans on importation of anti-slavery materials to the state. 
 Both law and periodical culture in this period registered anxiety about black bodies; 
periodicals registered that anxiety through debate, while law turned to regulation. Law sought to 
limit the mobility not just of bodies, but of ideas, setting prohibitions on how and where certain 
texts could travel.14 These legal restrictions on mobility—whether physical or discursive—
enabled the fantasy of law’s cultural supremacy. Individual human bodies and their language 
were mobile, fleshly, threatening, and unpredictable. By contrast, law appeared fixed, 
disembodied, reliable, even super-cultural.  
 In this chapter, I examine the confrontations that occur when law contends with 
unexpected or unwanted mobility. I am particularly interested in the ability of black writers and 
subjects to hover inside or above law even while they inhabit it. I consider two texts in which the 
black subjects perform this spectral tenancy of law under very different conditions and with very 
different results. In 1829, black abolitionist David Walker published his Appeal to the Coloured 
Citizens of the World, a rallying cry for people throughout the world to unite in opposition to 
slavery. Two years later, Nat Turner led the Southampton Slave Revolt in southern Virginia. 
Turner’s 1831 confession—made to Thomas Gray, a local lawyer—circulated widely as a 
pamphlet that included an excerpt from Turner’s trial and sentencing.  
																																																								
13 For a discussion of the importance of geography to antislavery publishing practices, see Trish 
Loughran, The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-1870 
(Columbia UP, 2007). 
14 For a discussion of the legal culture of travel, see Edlie Wong, Neither Fugitive Nor Free: 
Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel (NYU P, 2009). 
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There are some obvious reasons, such as the language of resistance and revolt, to join 
Walker and Turner. I am more interested, however, in the ways that they disrupt or shape the 
expected legal narratives that they inhabit. Both Walker and Turner tend toward duality, toward 
an ability to be both inside and outside law even as law grapples with how to structure them as 
subjects. But Walker and Turner each confronted law in drastically different ways: Walker as an 
unnamed subject of several subsequent laws and as a shadow-lawyer drafting alternative legal 
histories, and Turner as a notorious criminal defendant. Despite the difference in their legal 
postures, both Walker and Turner make legible how the law of slavery extended well beyond the 
regulation of bodies. The regulation of language and text demonstrate law’s uncanny ability to 
manifest the very things it then denies, prohibits, or criminalizes. 
 Although I work with two specific texts—the Appeal and the Confessions—I strive for a 
richer and more nuanced understanding of law and literature in their generic contexts. Much 
existing scholarship remains invested in the disciplinary and discursive differences between the 
two genres,15 often by structuring law and literature work within the binary of “law in literature” 
or “law as literature.” My work resists that binary. Instead, I apply pressure to the relationship 
between law and literature, since, in the early 1830s, these disciplinary divisions were inchoate 
or undefined. Indeed, law and literature operated in service of each other. Though I borrow some 
of the language of print culture—such as circulation—throughout the chapter for its applicability 
to discussions of movement and travel, my project here is ultimately an investigation of what 
happens when transgressive subjects approach or encroach upon law’s domain. 
																																																								
15 See, for instance, Gregg Crane’s work in Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature 
(Cambridge UP, 2002), which traces the influence on literature of various natural law paradigms. 
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 I am not interested in changing the way that we read either the Appeal or the Confessions 
as individual texts. Rather, I am building on the work of scholars such as Christopher Tomlins, 
Peter Hinks, and William Andrews, who have offered nuanced readings of both the Appeal and 
the Confessions. Instead, in order to glean a new perspective on the relationship between law and 
literature in the early 1830s, I offer a historicized analysis of these texts’ circulation as legal and 
literary objects. I argue that the circulation histories of Walker and Turner expose law’s tendency 
toward the unnatural, how it thrives on the tension between uncommon and ordinary to enact 
literal and symbolic violence through language, repetition, and ritual.  
* * * 
David Walker—a black abolitionist, subscription agent for Freedom’s Journal, and 
Boston shop owner—mounts a series of legal arguments through his Appeal to the Coloured 
Citizens of the World (1829), an anti-slavery pamphlet published in three separate editions 
between 1829 and 1830 and distributed throughout the United States.16 Between 1829 and 1831, 
the Appeal traveled to North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts. Publications ranging from The Liberator to the southern Statesman and Patriot 
also reprinted excerpts of the Appeal and published commentary on it.17 The circulation of the 
Appeal throughout the South appears to have followed a relatively predictable format: Walker 
shipped a number of pamphlets to individual citizens in southern cities—sometimes with their 
																																																								
16 See Hinks’s Introduction to the Appeal at xlv. 
17 See Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, at 124. Here Hinks notes that Elijah Burritt, the 
publisher of the Statesman and Patriot, reprinted a Boston Centinel column that included 
excerpts from Walker’s Appeal. As Hinks notes, “Such excerpting of the Appeal was extremely 
rare in the South primarily because it could contribute to the circulation of ideas among African 
Americans.” 
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knowledge, and sometimes without—with instructions for distribution.18 Thus, the Appeal 
infiltrated the South, producing intense curiosity and anxiety wherever the pamphlet appeared. 
It is hardly a mystery why the proliferation of the Appeal produced this reaction. The 
Appeal calls for “coloured citizens of the world” to reject slavery and to resist slave culture in all 
of its forms. This term of address suggests on one hand that Walker situated his text within Pan-
Africanist discourse; he refers not simply to the United States, but to “the world.” Given that 
repatriation to Liberia was then a matter of public debate, it might make sense to read Walker as 
merely participating in that conversation.19 However, the use of “citizens” further complicates 
Walker’s address; by referring to “citizens of the world,” Walker subverts and mystifies the 
common understanding of citizenship as an indicator of national belonging. “Citizens of the 
world” may refer to national citizens around the world, or it may refer instead to a new category 
of “world citizenship.” By invoking world citizenship, Walker draws on the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen—which hinged on national citizenship—but ultimately 
rehearses a rhetoric of fundamental human rights independent of national citizenship that would 
not be codified until the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Walker not only complicates the meaning of “citizenship” but also that of “coloured.” For 
much of his pamphlet, Walker addresses African Americans. But Walker also addresses white 
Americans throughout the text, sliding back and forth between the language of “us” and the 
language of “you,” self-consciously engaging with the very legal institutions he challenges. He 
organizes the Appeal as a preamble and four articles, a format that recalls statutes in general and 
																																																								18	See Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, at 124 et seq.	
19 In fact, in Article IV, “Our Wretchedness in Consequence of the Colonizing Plan,” Walker 
writes, “Will any of us leave our homes and go to Africa? I hope not” (67). 
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the Constitution in particular.  His familiarity with legislative construction is most obvious in 
Article IV of the Appeal, where he quotes the Declaration of Independence20 and implores white 
Americans, “Do you understand your own language?  Hear your language, proclaimed to the 
world, July 4, 1776—‘We hold these truths to be self-evident—that ALL MEN ARE CREATED 
EQUAL!! that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . . . .’” (78-79) 
(emphasis in original).  Walker’s emphasis calls attention to specific language in the Declaration 
of Independence that he construes as conferring citizenship rights upon African Americans. 
Walker continues his address of white Americans by explicitly linking American colonial 
resistance to black slave resistance: “Now, Americans! I ask you candidly, was your sufferings 
under Great Britain, one hundredth part as cruel and tyrannical as you have rendered ours under 
you? Some of you, no doubt, believe that we will never throw off your murderous government 
and ‘provide new guards for our future security’” (79).  
His argument is one of statutory interpretation and analysis; his construction of the U.S. 
founding documents would not take legal effect until decades later with the ratification of the 
13th, 14th, and 15th Constitutional Amendments.21 By suggesting that white Americans do not 
“understand [their] own language,” Walker establishes himself as a more skilled reader, statutory 
interpreter, and historian than his white counterparts. That he addresses white Americans at all, 
however, suggests that white Americans too belong in his category of “coloured citizens of the 
world.” 
																																																								
20 Although the Declaration of Independence is not a statute, Walker’s reading of the text is one 
of legislative or statutory construction. 
21 As noted above, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an even later example of 
international law codifying Walker’s conception of world citizenship. 
	 47	
Thus, the classification “coloured citizens of the world,” which initially appears to be a 
discrete and specific grouping, actually emerges as a capacious category that includes everyone. 
Walker’s nimble use of language in the titling of his Appeal is emblematic of the duality that 
characterizes the text as a whole. At once specific and general, inciting and condemning, the 
Appeal moves back and forth in its engagement with, and resistance to, prevailing law. He argues 
that the “almost universal ignorance among us” (35) is the result of laws and customs that 
prevent the education of African Americans. In this context, Walker’s distribution scheme is 
legible as part of the Appeal’s project of educating and organizing black Americans around the 
call for resistance. But his use of legal argument is also a direct engagement with white 
lawmakers.  
Walker’s use of the Appeal as a textual emissary to the most dangerous corners of the 
South exposes an activist disposition that is not only aware of, but also manipulates and subverts 
laws and institutions. The text, which could travel promiscuously where Walker could not, 
becomes a proxy for the author himself.22  Taken in conjunction with his shipments of the 
Appeal to white, as well as black recipients, Walker’s discursive work is hardly pure subterfuge. 
Rather than driving his pamphlet underground and concealing it from slavers, Walker sends it to 
places where pro-slavery forces are most likely to discover it, and he addresses white Americans 
																																																								
22 Hinks asserts that Walker “relied on several sources to introduce the work to the South; the 
most important were sailors, overland travelers, and the U.S. Postal Service to deliver the work 
individuals Walker had decided would be receptive to its message” (see Appeal, Appendix, 
Document III). Hinks is less definitive in To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, grappling instead 
with the uncertainty of how or why Walker selected the southern recipients of the Appeal, noting 
that Walker “may have pinpointed figures . . . to receive the Appeal for several reasons” (130). 	
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directly. This rhetorical shift, the move from “us” to “you,” suggests the text’s dual purpose—
appeal and indictment. 
The differing natures of appeals and indictments inform what is so subversive about 
Walker’s text. A legal appeal is a plea for reconsideration of a lower court judgment; the appeal 
is made to a higher court with the authority to overturn (or affirm) that judgment. By naming his 
text an “appeal,” Walker trades in both the common and legal meanings of that term. In the 
commonsense meaning of the word, Walker appeals to—or requests—the attention of his 
audience. In the legal meaning of “appeal,” however, Walker figures his audience as a higher 
authority capable of judicial review. Given the breadth of the audience—the “coloured citizens 
of the world”—there are numerous possibilities for how Walker defines his higher legal 
authority. He writes, “I appeal and ask every citizen of these United States and of the world, both 
white and black . . . to answer the Lord, who sees the secrets of our hearts” (52). In 
contemplating both black and white “citizens,” Walker’s plea suggests the radical possibility that 
African Americans are part of the higher legal authority worthy of weighing his claims. The 
rhetoric of “us” throughout the Appeal—each of the Articles is titled as “Our Wretchedness in 
Consequence of” various forms of oppression—supplies not only the pattern of grievances that 
form the basis of the Appeal but also a rhetorical substitution in which the addressees of his 
claim become the authority capable of redressing those grievances. 
By contrast, an indictment is a document of criminal law that sets forth the charges 
against a defendant. Despite framing his text as an Appeal, Walker embeds within it an 
indictment of the institutions, practices, and people responsible for the oppression of African 
Americans. In the rhetoric of “you,” Walker manipulates the framework of an appeal—a legal 
document that, on its face at least, keeps Walker in the “safe” position of supplicant pleading for 
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justice. Rather than following the expected format of an appeal, which consists only of prayers 
for relief, Walker shifts his posture to accusation, installing himself as the legal authority entitled 
to mete out punishment. In Article III (44), Walker turns the language of culpability directly onto 
white oppressors, writing, “Have you not . . . entered among us, and learnt us the art of throat-
cutting, by setting us to fight, one against another, to take each other as prisoners of war, and sell 
to you for small bits of calicoes, old swords, knives, &c. to make slaves for you and your 
children?” Walker thus traces a chain of responsibility. He assigns not only blame but guilt, 
unpacking a logic of culpability that explains black violence under a new theory of criminal 
liability: white Americans, through example and manipulation, are responsible for the black 
violence that they then use to justify continued oppression. Walker assigns ownership to white 
Americans in the one way they do not wish to assert it—at a time when pro-slavery arguments 
insisted on slavery as the natural consequence of perceived racial inferiority, Walker gives white 
Americans ownership of the mechanism by which slavery is manufactured.  
Walker’s legal arguments therefore cannot be mere mimesis, but something closer to the 
mimicry that Homi Bhabha describes as “a form of colonial discourse that is uttered inter dicta: a 
discourse at the crossroads of what is known and Permissible and that which though known must 
be kept concealed; a discourse uttered between the lines and as such both against the rules and 
within them.”23 Walker moves within the rules insofar as he follows certain discursive forms 
recognizable as “legal.” To the extent that he resists law through subversion and substitution, 
however, Walker is quite clearly outside or against “the rules.” Walker’s Appeal does not simply 
rehearse legal form, it also prefigures and anticipates a proliferation of laws written in direct 
																																																								
23 See “Of Mimicry and Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse,” in The Location of 
Culture, 128. 
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response to it. Once the pamphlet began circulating, it aroused the attention of many legal 
institutions and legislatures that became determined to criminalize the distribution or possession 
of the Appeal. 
State legislatures in a number of southern states took nearly immediate legislative action 
in response to Walker’s text.24  For example, Hasan Crockett identifies a Georgia statute that 
created a ban on texts written “for the purpose of exciting to insurrection, conspiracy, or 
resistance among the slaves, negroes, or free persons of color” (Crockett 311, quoting the 1829 
Georgia statute).  This legislative response to the Appeal brings Walker’s text into law on several 
different levels.  Crockett produces considerable legislative history showing that this statute—
which does not explicitly name Walker’s text—was enacted in direct response to the Appeal.  
The silence of the statute on Walker’s specific text, however, is a moment of legislative silence 
that reveals the thing it erases; without the Appeal, there would literally be no statute. Despite the 
fact that the Appeal exists only as an anonymous trace in the legislative language as enacted, 
Walker’s Appeal becomes a haunt, a phantom text constituting the very law that seeks to silence 
it. The resulting tension produces literal and symbolic violence: the legislative hysteria imposed 
serious penalties on those contributing to the Appeal’s circulation, and it also worked symbolic 
violence on Walker, himself, by rendering him an unnatural and unnamed subject of the law.  
 
 
																																																								
24 In his introduction to Walker’s Appeal, Peter Hinks makes the same observation (xl-xli).  
Dwight McBride (78) also associates the circulation of Walker’s Appeal with intensification of 
“the policy against teaching slaves to write or read.” 
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 Georgia was not the only state to pass legislation in response to the circulation of 
Walker’s Appeal. In 1830, Louisiana passed a prohibition—punishable by life imprisonment or 
death—for “writ[ing], print[ing], publish[ing] or distribut[ing] any thing having a tendency to 
create discontent among the free coloured population of [the] state, or insubordination among the 
slaves therein.”25 The Louisiana legislature passed this legislation in March of that year, on the 
heels of the discovery (and arrest) of four men in possession of the Appeal.26 The breadth of the 
statutory language speaks to the same practice of textual ghosting that occurred in the Georgia 
statute. The absence of Walker’s name is ostensibly designed to make room for the 
criminalization of texts other than the Appeal; more importantly, however, the statute engages in 
the very abstracting move that made possible countless other forms of legalized violence against 
African-Americans. The Appeal and other forms of protest literature are at the heart of the law 
itself, and yet the law’s insistence on erasing that discourse arguably has the unexpected effect of 
over-representing Walker and other anti-slavery authors.  
The silence of the statute in this respect is deafening. The law’s de-personalized 
prohibition on author-less texts marks out the contours of the absences it imposes; the statute 
even substitutes “thing” for “document” or “text,” mimicking the general thingliness of slaves as 
living property. The statutory language makes up for the absence of author by deploying the 
broadest possible characterizations of inflammatory texts, criminalizing the distribution of 
anything that has “a tendency to create discontent . . . or insubordination.” The omission of 
standards for determining which texts have such a tendency implies that texts subject to the 
statute are self-evident—or that the drafters had specific texts, like the Appeal, in mind when 
																																																								
25 See Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, at 150. 
26 Id. at 149. 
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enacting the legislation. Here again, Walker’s presence in the statutory language is 
simultaneously prominent and unnamed. The violence against Walker thus acquires a symbolic, 
even fictional nature, as the statute punishes him only through implication, inference, and 
prohibition. This legislative de-naturing of Walker as author enables him to hover as a ghostly 
figure at the heart of the law and as a peripheral figure outside the law’s reach (Walker lived in 
Boston). 
 The legal response to Walker’s Appeal was much more diverse than the mere passage of 
statutes banning its circulation. Legislatively, states passed laws that not only targeted the 
circulation of incendiary materials but also strengthened broader prohibitions on slave literacy 
and education. These laws were not toothless or mere symbolic proclamations—the enforcement 
of the post-Appeal hysteria resulted in numerous arrests. The response to Walker’s text 
demonstrates a rhetoric of contagion and contamination—an inherently embodied analogy that 
speaks an anxiety about law’s ability as disembodied agent of power—channeled through a 
totalitarian police force designed to stem the flow of ideas at any cost. The result is a response 
that mimics public health monitoring: authorities established notification procedures to report on 
the Appeal’s appearance and contain its movement.27 In its tendency to de-nature anti-slavery 
authors, law pathologizes Walker’s rhetoric into contagion so that quarantine and elimination 
appear as the only rational and necessary responses.  
 
																																																								
27 See note 17, discussing the unlikely excerpting of the Appeal in the South, where even a 
portion of it was thought to be a public danger. 
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 This outsized legislative reaction is all the more noticeable in light of the fact that, despite 
the Appeal’s extensive geographic travel, there were never more than a few dozen pamphlets 
unearthed in any one place at any time. Treating even a single pamphlet as a concentrated source 
of possible insurrection, officials reacted with swift and certain containment wherever the 
pamphlet appeared. For example, after police seized 60 copies of the pamphlet from a Savannah 
preacher in 1829, Savannah mayor W.T. Williams notified the Georgia governor: 
“As attempts to introduce into the ports of the South similar dangerous 
publications will no doubt be made, and there is every probability that their 
dissemination through the State may be effected, I have deemed it my duty 
to communicate to you the facts in my possession that you may adopt such 
measures as you may deem necessary to detect or defeat these destructive 
efforts.”28 
Williams’s language identifies the vulnerability of southern ports to pamphlets such as the 
Appeal, suggesting that the text’s route through ports will initiate an uncontrollable outbreak of 
dissemination onshore. Despite the fact that the Georgia governor then contacted the mayor of 
Boston to inquire about Walker,29 Walker remained out of reach of Georgia law. Unable to arrest 
Walker, Georgia instead enacted violence on Walker’s Appeal and anyone who attempted to 
circulate it. 
 
																																																								
28 Dec. 26, 1829 letter from W.T. Williams to George Gilmer. Appeal, Appendix, Document IV. 
Original letter held by Georgia Historical Society. 
29 See Feb. 10, 1830 letter from George Gilmer to H.G. Otis. Appeal, Appendix, Document VI. 
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This gap between Walker and law exposes a lack of potency in legal rules. Law relies on 
its disembodied authority as a source for its cultural power, as a force that is able to permeate 
absolutely everything precisely because it is unbound by fleshly limits. However, law’s inability 
to reach Walker demonstrates the ineffectuality of regulation. By offering his resistance in an 
already disembodied format—as text—Walker personally managed to elude law’s reach. 
Engaging with law in its self-proclaimed space of intellectual and discursive debate, Walker 
skates back and forth between inside and outside. 
Though most scholars, including Hinks, continue to characterize the circulation of the 
Appeal as furtive and clandestine, doing so risks participating in the same ghosting of Walker 
that occurred in the legislative response to the Appeal. Not only did Walker explicitly address 
white pro-slavery advocates and apologists in the Appeal, but he also established a paper trail in 
his publication and distribution of the text. For example, in sending the pamphlets to Virginia, 
Walker wrote to the recipient: “Having written an Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World 
it is now ready to be submitted for inspection, of which, I here with send you 30c which Sir, your 
Hon, will be please to sell, among the Coloured people. The price of these Books is Twelve cents 
pr [sic] Book,--to those who can pay for them,--and if there are any who, cannot pay for a Book 
give them Books for nothing . . . .”30 In distributing the Appeal, Walker firmly establishes his 
authorship, his circulation goals, and even his contact information. He did not write under a 
pseudonym, nor did he send his pamphlet to the South through anonymous or untraceable 
channels.  
																																																								
30 Dec. 8, 1829 letter from David Walker to Thomas Lewis. Appeal, Appendix, Document III. 
Original letter held by Virginia State Library. 
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Rather than reading Walker as an always-peripheral or underground figure, I suggest 
instead that he only became a peripheral figure through the legal and cultural narratives that have 
sprung up around the history of his Appeal. In addition to calling for action from fellow African 
Americans, Walker installed his Appeal in white discourse—and specifically in white legal 
discourse. The subsequent legislative response engaged with Walker’s Appeal, though it did so 
paradoxically by insisting that it was a regulator of the text rather than an audience for it. 
Unwilling to acknowledge Walker’s subjectivity and unable to reach him jurisdictionally, the 
law consumed and eroded the Appeal, de-personalizing Walker and absorbing him in order to 
supply a justification for the creation of more law.  
* * * 
 Where the circulation of Walker’s Appeal exposes law’s discursive power to enact 
violence even in the absence of jurisdictional reach, the circulation history of The Confessions of 
Nat Turner exposes a different aspect of law’s power in the 1830s: its ability to re-enact violence 
through discursive excess. In 1831, two years after publication of Walker’s Appeal, Virginia 
slave Nat Turner led the infamous Southampton Slave Rebellion. In August of that year, Turner 
and a small group of fellow slaves and freedmen moved from plantation to plantation, killing 
slaveowners and their families; by the time the rebellion was suppressed, more than fifty people 
had been killed. In the wake of the insurrection, Turner and his co-conspirators faced trials in 
Virginia. By November 1831, Turner and most of those accused with him were executed, 
although the full scope of retaliation was much larger; throughout the South, reports circulated 
that hundreds of slaves were murdered in the panicked aftermath of the insurrection.31 Even by 
																																																								
31 Although this narrative of widespread killing has become part of the enduring Turner 
mythology, the prevalence of violence has likely been overstated against African Americans who 
	 56	
the admission of some of the government officials who presided over this violence, many—if not 
most—of the murdered slaves were killed despite a total lack of evidence that they were engaged 
in or planning insurrections. 
 The Virginia political climate at the time of the Turner rebellion had, if anything, 
intensified from the culture in place when Walker published his 1829 Appeal. In January 1830, a 
freedman in Richmond had been arrested for possession of Walker’s Appeal.32 And just before 
the Turner insurrection, the Virginia legislature had passed a bill that criminalized the education 
of blacks (whether slave or free) and established surveillance procedures over freed slaves who 
failed to leave Virginia within twelve months of their manumission (French 26). In Nat Turner 
(2), Eric Foner has also identified shifting economic conditions in Virginia during this period 
related to declining tobacco crops and the subsequent division of large farming estates into 
smaller parcels. The resulting economic anxieties around property, as well as the legal tensions 
regarding black literacy, fomented a particularly volatile environment in which law stood ready 
to extinguish inflammatory rhetoric and exterminate anyone suspected of insurrection. 
Although the connection between slave literacy and land division may not be 
immediately apparent, place yourself for an uncomfortable moment in the position of a Virginia 
plantation owner in the early 1830s. Declining crop production over the past few years has 
threatened your bottom line. Perhaps you were forced to subdivide your family’s plantation, 
selling off parcels to smaller farmers you once dominated, even selling some of your slaves to 
those same farmers. Your way of life, the comfortable existence you have built on the backs of 
																																																								
did not play a role in the insurrection itself. See David Allmendinger, Nat Turner and the Rising 
in Southampton County (Johns Hopkins UP, 2014) at 203 et seq. for a fuller discussion of the 
rumors of widespread retaliatory violence. 32	See Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, at 134-35.	
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your slave laborers, seems to be under attack. You discover that your slaves are learning to read 
and write, and you wonder if they will follow the poor whites in moving in to claim a piece of 
the privilege over which you have exercised exclusive domain. In this context, the 
criminalization of slave education is a logical response to the perceived threat, and the intensified 
regulation of antislavery rhetoric is part and parcel of the larger project of protecting white land 
ownership.  
 Unlike Walker, who confronted such laws by challenging them in print, Nat Turner 
encountered law as a criminal defendant. The difference in subject position speaks to the 
different manners in which law responded to each man. Both Walker and Turner confronted and 
resisted law, one through discourse and the other primarily through overt rebellion. Walker’s sly 
engagement with law—undertaken at a remove—spared him from incarceration or execution, 
while Turner’s physical violence brought him, literally, into the courtroom. Virginia legal 
institutions, which had been forced to regulate Walker’s conduct via generalizations and 
abstractions, had full jurisdiction over Turner’s physical body.   
Turner’s textual legacy emerges through his criminal confessions, which he offered to 
local attorney Thomas Ruffin Gray. Though Gray is sometimes described as Turner’s court-
appointed lawyer, he had no attorney-client relationship with Turner.33 Gray did represent one of 
Turner’s co-defendants, however, and he was one of three local lawyers—including Colonel 
Trezvant, the magistrate who read Turner’s confession into the court record—who had “worked 
																																																								
33 Turner’s lawyer was William C. Parker. James Strange French, who represented a number of 
Turner’s co-conspirators was also an author who had studied at the University of Virginia 
alongside Edgar Allan Poe, who later reviewed—unfavorably—French’s novel Elkswatawa in 
the August 1836 issue of Southern Literary Messenger. This odd coincidence, while largely 
irrelevant to my work here, marks the proximity in the antebellum period of legal and literary 
networks. 
	 58	
unofficially” on the rebellion from its outset, according to David Allmendinger, Jr. (25).34 
Allmendinger writes that Gray and his associates “began their own inquiry into the rebellion . . . . 
They worked unofficially, since the court neither called for their inquiry nor appointed them to 
the task” (25).35 Gray’s participation as rebellion enthusiast, erstwhile lawyer, and amanuensis 
for Turner’s confessions reveals the incestuous community of Southampton lawyers and 
judges—more a function of the rural location of the region than anything else. The overlaps and 
intimacy of this network, however, suggests unsurprisingly that the post-insurrection trials were 
conducted more as a matter of procedure than anything else. 
 Caught in the legal machinery, Turner nevertheless produced, through his criminal 
confession, a text that acquired an intense and sustained afterlife. Part-autobiography, part-slave 
narrative, the published confession consisted of several parts: Turner’s narration of his past and 
his part in the insurrection, an excerpted transcript of his trial proceedings and sentencing, and 
appendices that identified the participants in the insurrection as well as the victims of it. Because 
Gray acted as Turner’s amanuensis, questions of agency and authorship inhere along the lines of 
many similarly mediated slave narratives.36 The result is a collection of narrative voices in the 
																																																								
34 This citation refers to Allmendinger’s chapter in Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and 
Memory, ed. Kenneth S. Greenberg. That chapter is entitled “The Construction of The 
Confessions of Nat Turner,” hereafter “Construction.”   
35 Id. 
36 In In the Shadow of the Gallows (31-32), Jeannine DeLombard discusses this particular 
problematic of black criminal confessions (the mediation by interested parties and legal entities): 
“ . . . the published confessions attributed to condemned black criminals are noteworthy less for 
their authenticity or their dissent than for the way in which they formalized, publicized, and thus 
politicized individual black speech (incriminating though it may have been). That the voice 
attributed to the convict was rarely a critical one on par with that of David Walker or Frederick 
Douglass does not eliminate its political significance.” Also in that book (164-65), DeLombard 
connects the publication of Turner’s confession explicitly to the imminent rise of the slave 
narrative. For a more general discussion of the mediation inherent in slave narratives, see 
William Andrews’s work in, To Tell a Free Story.  
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published Confessions—Turner, Gray, Trezvant, and Cobb, the sentencing judge. Ultimately, 
Gray curated these voices in the published pamphlet, which was then distributed in record time. 
He took Turner’s confession from prison in the days preceding his November 5, 1831 trial; Gray 
filed his copy of the full pamphlet on November 10, the day before Turner was hanged. 
 The circulation of the Confessions was much more widespread than Walker’s Appeal, 
owing arguably not only to the sensational news coverage of the insurrection but also to the fact 
that the text was produced by a white author.37 Excerpts from the Confessions appeared in 
publications as diverse as the New-York Spectator,38 the Macon Telegraph (Georgia),39 and of 
course William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator.40 Treatment of the Confessions, particularly by 
The Liberator, is complicated. In the December 17, 1831 edition of The Liberator, the excerpt 
from the Confessions is prefaced by a stern, if not perhaps sarcastic, disapproval of Gray’s 
pamphlet:  
An edition of 50,000 copies has been printed in Baltimore, which 
will only serve to rouse up other leaders and cause other 
insurrections by creating among the blacks admiration for the 
character of Nat, and a deep, undying sympathy for his fate. We 
advise the Grand Juries in the several slave states to indict Mr Gray 
and the printers of the pamphlet forthwith; and the legislative bodies 
at the south to offer a large reward for their apprehension. 
 																																																								
37 50,000 copies of the Confessions were printed (see Higginson at 319). 
38 See “The Confessions of Nat Turner,” 13 Dec. 1831. 
39 See “The Confessions of Nat Turner,” 10 Dec. 1831, Issue 49.	
40 See “Confessions of Nat Turner,” 17 Dec. 1831, Issue 51. 
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The Liberator thus serves up the Confessions as a mark not merely of Turner’s criminality, but 
also of Gray’s. In a logic of culpability that initially resembles Walker’s indictment of white 
Americans for creating and continuing black violence, The Liberator nevertheless re-affirms the 
logic of contagion that drove the response to Walker’s Appeal throughout the South.  
In fact, several months earlier, in September 1831, Garrison had commented on the 
Turner rebellion as the culmination of abolitionists’ prophecy: “The first step of the earthquake, 
which is ultimately to shake down the fabric of oppression, leaving not one stone upon the other, 
has been made. The first drops of blood, which are but the prelude to a deluge from the gathering 
clouds, have fallen . . . . Read the account of the insurrection in Virginia, and say whether our 
prophecy be not fulfilled . . . .”41 Thus, before the capture of Turner and the publication of the 
Confessions, Garrison himself deployed the language of prophecy, destiny, and Biblical 
preordination to explain the insurrection. Once the Confessions were published, however—and 
importantly, once Turner became legible as a self-avowed prophet—Garrison’s rhetoric shifted. 
His earlier tactic of grounding the insurrection in prophecy became inflammatory and dangerous 
rhetoric once Gray’s pamphlet acknowledged Turner as a source of that prophecy. 
 These complex interactions with the Confessions have persisted well beyond its 
immediate publication and distribution. In 1967, William Styron published The Confessions of 
Nat Turner, a Pulitzer Prize-winning novel written from Turner’s perspective. Styron’s apparent 
goal was to re-imagine Turner’s confessions without Gray’s mediation—in writing it, however, 
Styron engaged in additional ventriloquism, replacing one version of a white amanuensis with 
another. In describing Styron’s work, Charles Joyner describes it as “a pastiche of the slave 
																																																								
41 “The Insurrection,” 3 Sept. 1831. 
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narrative genre” (181). In fact, Styron’s own account of his writing process reveals the deeply 
troubling ethics underlying his project: “Very few people know anything about slavery and 
Negro history, and I don’t know of any modern work of fiction that has touched on the problem. 
Writers have been intimidated by the sheer, awesome fact of what it must have been to be a 
slave. I just had to seize the bull by the horns and become one.”42 Putting aside for a moment the 
simply outrageous aspects of his claims, what most stands out is Styron’s feeling of entitlement 
to inhabit Turner’s consciousness and “become” a slave. What, one wonders, did Styron envision 
when he set out to “become” Turner? By what process does a white man in the 1960s possibly 
inhabit the consciousness of a slave? 
These very questions of occupation, possession, and inhabitation always seem somehow 
to be at the heart of Turner’s engagement with law; contested claims of tenancy infuse nearly 
every aspect of his legal proceedings and the publication of the Confessions. On one hand, 
Turner revolts by asserting his right to occupy the status of aggressor. Once Turner is caught in 
the legal process, however, both Gray and the Virginia legal institutions strive to inhabit Turner’s 
language, his body, and his legacy. Gray’s framing and ventriloquism of Turner insist on a white 
presence to translate and render Turner’s claims for readers, while the court proceedings 
ultimately demand possession over Turner’s body.43  
 
																																																								
42 See Joyner at 186, quoting Styron’s interview with Phyllis Meras for the Saturday Review. 
43 Though this chapter does not engage with it, there is also a complex, and contested history of 
what happened to Turner’s body after his execution. While the historical record is uncertain, it 
appears likely that parts of his body were retained as relics by various individuals and institutions 
around the country. 
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 In order to pursue the nuances of Turner’s inhabitation of and by law, I focus on the 
entirety of the Confessions as published by Gray (rather than on Turner’s narrative voice). The 
choice is a conscious one, proceeding from an intention to avoid further marginalization, 
ventriloquism, and discursive violence against Turner. My purpose is not to tease out Turner’s 
biography, but to examine more fully the way that literature and law have continued to kill him 
since 1831. Other, gifted scholars have long devoted the full measure of their attention to 
Turner’s biography, religious zeal, and prophetic claims from the published Confessions; the 
result is a wealth of scholarship regarding Turner’s subjectivity within the Confessions and as a 
criminal defendant. My work, however, considers the published pamphlet in its entirety as an 
object that is both legal and literary. In particular, the in-court sentencing of Turner—and the 
subsequent circulation of that transcript as part of the published Confessions—discloses the 
vexed intersection of law and literature around Turner’s criminalized body. The published 
Confessions marries documentary literature with legal discourse in ways that trouble our twenty-
first century constructions of imagined divisions between the two disciplines; the afterlife of that 
text in the 1830s cultural imagination further muddies those divisions and urges a reading of 
antebellum law as a very public, and literary enterprise deeply indebted to discursive ritual. 
 In his preamble to the Confessions, “TO THE PUBLIC,” Gray writes, “The late 
insurrection in Southampton has greatly excited the public mind, and led to a thousand idle, 
exaggerated, and mischievous reports.” Gray’s reference to “the public mind” is striking for the 
way it orients the text that follows; the public, rather than a swarming mob of people, is 
characterized as a “mind,” a space of ideas and discourse. In reality, what was excited by the 
Southampton insurrection was not just the public mind, but also the public militia; the rebellion 
led to a thousand “idle reports” and also to the rumored murders of hundreds of slaves. 
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Nevertheless, it is to the public mind that Gray submits the Confessions, explicitly delivering his 
text into the realm of discourse and debate rather than police power. That he orients the reader 
toward the intellectualization of Turner is a bit disingenuous, as Turner’s confessions were first 
read in-court in support of his conviction and execution.44 By offering Turner’s story once 
removed from his in-court appearance—the published confession was accompanied by the 
transcript of that court session—Gray offers a repetitious accounting of Turner. First, in taking 
his confession, Gray produced a literary document replete with the narration of Turner’s early 
life, which ostensibly had no legal relevance to the criminal charges against him. Second, in 
publishing the Confessions, Gray repackages Turner’s story yet again; he extracts it from its 
legal context and reproduces it, along with the court transcript, as a born-again literary text for 
public consumption. 
 
 
																																																								
44 Although Turner’s confessions were undoubtedly introduced into the record in some fashion, it 
is highly unlikely that, as the pamphlet suggests, the Gray-authored account was the confession 
that the judges heard. There has been some debate among scholars about the accuracy of the trial 
events as reported in Gray’s pamphlet more generally. While Caleb Smith (The Oracle and the 
Curse: A Poetics of Justice from the Revolution to the Civil War) argues that the specific 
language of Turner’s sentencing was likely the product of Gray’s embellishment, Christopher 
Tomlins (“Demonic Ambiguities”) favors the general accuracy of Judge Cobb’s language as 
reported in the Confessions. Though I tend to agree with Tomlins’s conclusions, my analysis 
here does not depend on a definitive answer about the specifics of the trial record—the official 
record, it should be noted, does not settle the matter one way or the other. Rather, I focus on the 
Confessions as a trace of that record; it was, after all, the Confessions and not the official 
transcript that best brought Turner’s trial into the public imagination. 
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 This tripling of Turner’s criminal confession is a symptom of the excess that defines the 
law’s general engagement with Turner. Despite this discursive layering, Gray further claims that 
Turner’s account: 
is submitted to the public, without comment. It reads an awful, and 
it is hoped, a useful lesson, as to the operations of a mind like his, 
endeavoring to grapple with things beyond its reach. How it first 
became bewildered and confounded, and finally corrupted and led 
to the conception and perpetration of the most heart-rending deeds. 
It is calculated also to demonstrate the policy [of] our laws in 
restraint of this class of our population, and to induce all those 
entrusted with their execution, as well as our citizens generally, to 
see that they are strictly and rigidly enforced . . . . It will be long 
remembered in the annals of our country, and many a mother as she 
presses her infant darling to her bosom, will shudder at the 
recollection of Nat Turner, and his band of ferocious miscreants. 
Believing the following narrative, by removing doubts and 
conjectures from the public mind which otherwise must have 
remained, would give general satisfaction, it is respectfully 
submitted to the public by their ob’t sv’t, T.R. Gray. 
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Even as he supplies commentary—and even though the text itself contains some dialogue 
between Turner and Gray—Gray insists that Turner’s confession appears “without comment.”45 
Moreover, this conclusion to the preamble of the Confessions further complicates the numerous 
valences of “law” in the text. On the one hand, Gray submits that Turner’s confession will serve 
to “satisfy” the curiosity of the public mind; on the other hand, he urges lawmakers to “strictly 
and rigidly enforce[]” slave laws. Gray’s status as a lawyer representing another defendant in the 
case appears nowhere in his prefatory remarks, eliding his occupation of legal infrastructure even 
as he urges the intensification of law’s enforcement of slavery. 
 Gray’s treatment of Turner in this prologue slips back and forth between aggrandizement 
and contempt. He allows for Turner’s interiority, speculating as to the workings of his mind—
resisting a characterization of Turner as mere meat or property. Gray is, however, quick to place 
limitations on that interiority, asserting that Turner’s major failing was in attempting to 
understand things “beyond his reach.” The prevalence of the word “it” in this passage further 
mystifies the division between Turner and the text that renders his story. After using the word 
“it” to refer to Turner’s mind, the subsequent sentence reads, “It is calculated also to demonstrate 
the policy [of] our laws . . . .” While this latter “it” presumably refers to the Confessions, and not 
to Turner’s mind, the slippage is suggestive of Turner’s fraught location within the discursive 
representation of him. Later, when Gray refers to the likelihood of the insurrection living on “in 
the annals of our country,” he deliberately shifts the textual focus from an account of an 
historical event to the establishment of a collective cultural encounter that he projects forward 
																																																								
45 This disavowal of authorial or editorial influence is also a convention favored by white 
amanuenses who “transcribed” the narratives of former slaves for publication.  
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into the annals of history. Through the Confessions, Gray engages in memorialization that is 
oriented as much toward the future as toward the past. 
 I offer this reading of Gray’s preamble as a means of teasing out the layers of audience 
and context at work in the Confessions. By framing Turner’s confession in this manner, Gray 
establishes a discursive context that simultaneously brings the audience into the law and the law 
into the public. His emphasis on the mind—of the public, of Turner—exposes the intensely 
intellectual nature of a document that relies on a highly embodied account of physical violence 
and precedes the physical violence of Turner’s execution. In fact, it is the circulation of the 
printed Confessions that produces for readers a white fantasy of Turner’s materiality by 
bookending the confession with narration by two white male lawyers. 
 While Gray’s commentary opens the Confessions, the text concludes—excluding the 
appendices—with the pronouncement of Turner’s sentence by Judge Cobb. Gray produces a case 
of the trial proceedings to document the sentencing and appends it to Turner’s confession.46 The 
excerpt is relevant for several reasons. First, it self-reflexively incorporates the Gray-authored 
Confessions as though the pamphlet itself had been admitted and read into the court record—in 
fact, it was Colonel Trezvant who narrated Turner’s confessions in court, and Gray merely 
equates his pamphlet with the confessions reported by and to Trezvant. Trezvant’s narration of 
Turner’s confession follows certain norms in that it produces a criminal confession that furnishes 
the basis for a conviction. However, the Turner confession did not come into the courtroom as 
live testimony but as recorded language. It is also manifestly unclear on what authority Gray 
collected Turner’s confession; he was neither law enforcement nor judge, and though he 
																																																								
46 See my earlier discussion of the scholarly debate surrounding the accuracy of the transcript in 
Gray’s account. 
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represented another defendant, he had no attorney-client relationship with Turner. The Gray-
mediated confession nevertheless entered the record via ventriloquism by Colonel Trezvant, the 
presiding magistrate. These multiple removals reveal the symbolic distance between Turner and 
the law even during his physical encounter with it. 
 Following the rehearsal of Turner’s confession, Judge Jeremiah Cobb briefly questioned 
Turner, who replied, “I have made a full confession to Mr. Gray, and I have nothing more to 
say.” At this point, Cobb commenced with the formal sentencing. In pronouncing Turner’s fate, 
Cobb acknowledged that Turner’s only plausible defense was misguided fanaticism. Cobb’s 
consideration of this hypothetical defense follows:  
If this be true, from my soul I pity you; and while you have my 
sympathies, I am, nevertheless, called upon to pass the sentence of 
the court. The time between this and your execution will be very 
short; and your only hope must be in another world. The judgment of 
the court is, that you be taken hence to the jail from whence you 
came, thence to the place of execution, and on Friday next, between 
the hours of 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. be hung by the neck until you are 
dead! dead! dead and may the Lord have mercy upon your soul. 
In certain respects, Cobb’s sentencing of Turner follows familiar legal forms. For one thing, 
notice the distinction Cobb makes between his personal feelings, and his obligations as an officer 
of the court: “from my soul I pity you; and while you have my sympathies, I am nevertheless, 
called upon to pass the sentence of the court” (emphasis added). The rhetorical shift of 
ownership here—from the emotions that belong to Cobb, to the sentence that belongs to the 
	 68	
court—is a version of what Robert Cover, in Justice Accused, describes as “the judicial ‘can’t.’” 
Cover uses the judicial can’t to describe moments where a judge professes a personal 
disagreement with the law but declares himself or herself “bound to apply the law, immoral as it 
may be” (119).   
Here, Cobb stops short of characterizing his feelings as disagreement with the law; he 
does, however, make the typical disclaimer of ownership over the decision. All official speech 
acts—the rendering of the verdict, the sentencing—must come from the disembodied “court” 
rather than the judge as an individual. This reliance on a distinction between the personal and the 
court invokes what Caleb Smith (162) describes as Cobb’s “own conversion into the oracle of a 
law that comes from beyond himself.” Cobb reinforces this premise later; rather than 
announcing, “You are sentenced to death,” he frames the official act with the court as the subject 
and Turner as the object: “The judgment of the court is, that you . . . be hung by the neck.” This 
dual shift—from personal to “court” and from Turner as subject to Turner as object—reveals the 
mechanism by which legal language enacts violence. While discussing his personal feelings, 
Cobb allows Turner to exist as a subject (“you have my sympathies”). It is only after shifting 
from the personal to the rhetoric of “the court” that Cobb transforms Turner into the de-natured 
object (“hung by the neck until dead! dead! dead!”) that law is determined to produce and 
execute. 
 The violence of law comes into sharper relief in Cobb’s tripling of Turner’s eventual 
death. This striking moment of the opinion departs from typical judicial protocol, and it also 
creates a fissure in the rhetorical work Cobb has just done in shifting the burden of Turner’s 
death onto the institution of law: “The judgment of the court is, that you . . . be hung by the neck 
until you are dead! dead! dead and may the Lord have mercy upon your soul.” Rather than 
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expressing the cool, formal posture of the “court,” Cobb is unable to resist killing Turner a total 
of three times in the single judgment. This rhetorical “overkill” of Turner’s body not only enacts 
a legal ritual but also produces an excess that sets the stage for that ritual’s repetition through the 
circulation of the Confessions. Cobb’s tripartite announcement of Turner’s imminent death 
reveals a ritualized aspect of the sentencing that transforms it from secular court action to 
vanishing ritual—a ritual occasioned precisely by the intensely spiritual language of Turner’s 
confession, his claims of religious visions, revelations, and astrological messages. By insisting 
three times on Turner’s death, Cobb seems to engage in a superstitious purge of any supernatural 
qualities Turner may possess.  
As much as Cobb relies on characterizations of Turner as delusional and fanatical, this 
tripartite condemnation evinces a tacit acceptance of Turner as possessing supernatural force. He 
deliberately tries to de-nature Turner and empty out any possibility of his divinity. The 
sentencing evacuates Turner’s claims of prophecy and supernatural ability47 in favor of bare 
materiality—Turner becomes simply a body to be hung by the neck and killed. The use of 
“hung” as opposed to “hanged” only underscores the de-personalizing gesture of the sentencing: 
people are hanged, while objects are hung. This unfleshing exemplifies what Colin Dayan (12) 
describes as “the occult revelations of law’s rituals.”48 The very thing that enables law’s sacred 
status is its ability to produce unnatural effects from within a secular space. 
																																																								
47 See Tomlins, “The Demonic Ambiguities,” for a discussion of the religious language inherent 
in Turner’s confession. Scot French, in The Rebellious Slave, also notes that Turner’s reputation 
among slaves was as “Prophet Nat” or “Preacher Nat” (40). 
48 In The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons, Dayan offers a 
complex and rich accounting of law’s propensity to engage unwelcome subjects in violent legal 
rituals that put pressure on our understanding of the human, and of “civilization.” Chapter 2 of 
that book, “Civil Death,” deals with “how law materializes dispossession” (40); I argue here that 
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 This tension between secular and sacred makes legible the extent to which Turner 
threatens law by asserting his own sacred value—a claim that, if allowed, would displace the 
culturally sacred position of the law. In Turner’s sentencing, Cobb insists that the court—the 
disembodied institution that retains the power to kill, through execution—is the only permissible 
source of the sacred or the divine. The sentencing language thus follows what Roy Rappaport in 
“The Obvious Aspects of Ritual” describes as ritual’s purpose of invoking “the concept of the 
sacred, the notion of the divine, and even a paradigm of creation . . . .” (174). For Cobb, the court 
alone passes judgment, and it is through the court that Turner must be killed. Alluding to 
Turner’s presumed return to his creator, however, Cobb uses the “paradigm of creation” to 
support the legalized violence he activates. Law stands in as the divine or sacred authority that 
facilitates Turner’s “return,” through death, to natural law.  
Embedded within the ritual of sentencing is also the ritual of execution. Cobb’s 
description of how, where, and when the execution will occur announces that the killing of 
Turner will perform a second ritual; while the sentencing is a discursive ritual that takes place in 
the courtroom, the killing is a physical ritual that must, of necessity, occur outside the courtroom. 
The distinction between in-court and out-of-court ritual here is critical in that it protects what is 
culturally sacred about the law. Despite having the power to set the killing in motion, the 
courtroom space thus preserves the fiction of “clean hands”; the courtroom is reserved for 
discursive violence alone, while the messy business of execution occurs on a different day, in a 
different location, and obviously at the hands of someone other than a judge. Cobb merely 
prefigures the ritualized killing of Turner, prescribing the physical path his body will take from 
																																																								
as law dispossesses Turner of his body, one of the material residues of that dispossession is The 
Confessions of Nat Turner. 
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courtroom to prison and eventually to the site of his execution, as well as the manner in which 
his body will cease to live (“hung by the neck until dead! dead! dead”). The repetition of “dead” 
in this context calls attention to the ritual and announces that the ritual is capable of being carried 
out more than once—discursively and intellectually, as well as literally.  
 And yet, that tripling of “dead! dead! dead” seems to be speaking Cobb’s desire to 
participate in the out-of-court physical violence. Unable to limit himself to killing Turner once, 
Cobb’s repetition also suggests that Turner may be somehow impervious to death. Readers thus 
feel Turner’s deadness even while they continue to be haunted by/terrified of slave revolt. It is 
through the Confessions that Cobb’s tripling enters the cultural imagination; the official court 
record of the sentencing excludes the verbatim transcript, noting instead simply that the court 
ordered Turner’s execution.49 By including Cobb’s frenetic language in the Confessions, the 
ritual enters the public domain, inviting a further layer of participation in ritualized killing. 
Because the language of court opinions is always in the present tense, the reader experiences the 
sentencing as though it occurs in “real time.” As each reader comes upon that language— “The 
judgment of the court is, that you . . . be hung by the neck until you are dead! dead! dead and 
may the Lord have mercy upon your soul”—the ritual is re-enacted many times over. This 
accumulation of discursive violence allows the reader to participate in the condemnation of 
Turner’s criminal confession even after his body has been killed. For readers, the text of Turner’s 
confession thus becomes the thing to be killed—rather than, or in addition to, his physical body. 
 
																																																								
49 See Alfred Brophy, “The Nat Turner Trials,” 91 N.C. L.Rev. 1817 (2013); also The 
Southampton Slave Revolt of 1831: A Compilation of Source Material ed. Henry Irving Tragle 
(Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1971). 
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This fantasy of killing Turner (or his confession) moves the reader from vicarious to 
actual participation. By prefacing the sentencing with Turner’s confession, the reader is primed 
to put himself or herself in the place of judge; having “heard,” or read Turner’s confession, the 
reader then becomes capable of passing judgment and participating in Turner’s sentencing and 
execution. And though the text insists on Turner’s uncommonness, its circulation renders 
Turner’s killing practically routine. Although the reader feels a sense of participation in Turner’s 
sentencing, the remove offered by the text nevertheless absolves the reader of any meaningful 
responsibility for Turner’s death. Turner’s actual killing becomes bureaucratic chaff, a 
consequence of the de-personalized legal ritual that passes judgment and disposes of cases, and 
bodies, accordingly. The publishing of that ritual in familiar pamphlet form re-packages the 
violence yet again as “literature.” By the time the reader arrives at Turner’s sentencing, Turner 
has already been killed so many times that one more instance of discursive violence hardly 
seems to matter. 
What happens to Turner in this context is a vexed and mysterious question. Much like the 
unintended results of the laws that responded to Walker’s Appeal, the circulation of the 
Confessions has the paradoxical effect of refusing to allow Turner to be fully killed. If it is 
possible to re-enact his killing with each reading, the need for Cobb’s three exclamations of 
“dead” becomes apparent. Cobb’s pronouncement discloses both the discursive need to kill 
Turner and also the awareness that killing Turner is somehow impossible—he will always be 
simultaneously dead and capable of being killed. The routinization of these multiple killings is 
ostensibly a source of comfort for the reader—Gray’s mother clutching her child to her bosom as 
she shudders at the thought of Turner and his compatriots. And yet, the profoundly unnatural 
result exposes the insufficiencies lurking behind law’s powerful veneer. 
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* * * 
 In both the Appeal and the Confessions, these tensions between power and impotence 
manifest in the ways that Walker and Turner—as authors, as humans, and as legal subjects—
move throughout the cultural imaginary. Law’s insistence on de-naturing and de-personalizing 
Walker and Turner in each case opens up the possibility that law’s culturally sacred power 
actually depends deeply on the people and things it says it must extinguish. The law of slavery is 
a site across which this battle is fought; through legalized slavery, law has put itself in the 
precarious position of engaging with people and things that it says do not and must not exist. At 
this moment in legal history, Walker and Turner present as especially threatening figures, and 
not merely for their advocacy of revolt. Walker, a free man beyond the reach of the southern 
courts, becomes a problematic source of law—courts must ban the circulation of his ideas even 
as they refuse to engage with his address. Turner, a slave and criminal defendant caught squarely 
within the arm of the law, must be dealt with as both common and uncommon—uncommon in 
his spirituality, zeal, and violence, and common in his mortality. Despite providing ready 
solutions to the “problems” of Walker and Turner, law is unable to ever fully deliver on its 
promises. Walker’s text continued to circulate and leave traces, regardless of the regulations that 
sought to eradicate it. And despite Turner’s execution—and the repetitious discursive violence 
against him—his textual afterlife always revives him, if only to make him available once more 
for execution. 
 It is not a coincidence that these fissures, or limits of law’s power to control slave bodies, 
become apparent through literature. The presence of Walker and Turner through literary 
circulation operates both in service and subversion of law. On the one hand, their literary 
presence undergirds the enactment of law’s passage, while on the other hand, that same literary 
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presence threatens constantly to expose law’s failures and insufficiencies. These inconsistencies 
and ambiguities reveal a tense and developing relationship between the law and literature of 
slavery in the 1830s. Unable to fully manage either the discursive or physical movement of 
bodies and ideas, law leaches out into literature even as literature drives the formation of law.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Negative Proofs and Proliferating Personae:  
James Williams and the Complicity of Law and Literature 
 
“Where is James Williams? Can he not be found and cross examined?” 
      —Lydia Maria Child50 
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated law’s capacity to silence and vanish black persons, while Chapter 2 asks 
what happens when literature and law struggle to represent a slave who appears not as a single, 
coherent subjectivity, but as a series of contradictory personae scattered across legal, literary, and 
journalistic texts. Unlike the texts in Chapter 1, which threaten repeatedly to disappear or erase 
their African American targets, the legal and literary documents in this chapter are concerned 
primarily with pursuit. In both chapters, institutions of law and literature emerge as complicit in 
their treatment of slaves and African Americans more generally. Chapter 2, however, examines 
how the condition of fugitivity alters the stakes of this complicity. I argue ultimately in this 
chapter that fugitive personhood can generate an alternative form of authorship, one which 
consistently disrupts the discursive networks in which it appears. 
 
 
																																																								
50 1838 Letter to Angelina Grimke. Quoted in Ann Fabian, The Unvarnished Truth: Personal 
Narratives in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley: U of California P, 2000), 93. 
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An Argument for Unwieldy Critique: Unconventional Methodologies and Personae as 
Texts 
Most famous as the source of his discredited 1838 slave narrative, “James Williams” 
entered the cultural imagination as a suspected impostor accused of inventing of a fictional 
autobiography. Recent archival work, however, has demonstrated that “James Williams” was in 
all likelihood a fugitive slave known by numerous aliases. These aliases appear in collateral texts 
ranging from runaway slave ads to legal cases, and where they appear, they consistently 
destabilize white institutional power. As Williams’ textual presence demonstrates, flight from 
slavery also produces a flight from language. In response to the havoc wrought by this series of 
aliases, legal and literary networks struggle to represent a thoroughly unknowable and 
unspeakable figure of fugitive personhood. This chapter seeks, first, to lift the veil on the 
complicity of law and literature—a complicity so pervasive that it becomes impossible at some 
point to draw generic distinctions among the texts that record Williams and his other personae. In 
short, when reading the slave we know as James Williams, the reader no longer feels with 
certainty whether the textual traces of him are legal or literary in nature. In this respect, the 
chapter picks up where Chapter 1 left off, applying additional pressure to ostensible institutional 
and disciplinary boundaries. 
The second aim of this chapter is to argue that the creation of fugitive personae 
constitutes an authorial practice. Indeed, the context surrounding the slave known as James 
Williams must acknowledge his creation of at least three various personae: James Williams, Jim 
Thornton, and Shadrach Wilkins. My work in this chapter is unconventional in the sense that my 
core primary “texts” are these three personae, rather than the printed texts that often contain 
traces of each identity. Each of these personae emerges and subsequently vanishes from the 
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textual record, sometimes through radical self-erasure and sometimes through the violence of 
institutional language. The three personae leave traces in, among other things, an 1841 Louisiana 
judicial opinion, a series of newspaper articles, runaway slave ads, and of course the infamous 
slave narrative attributed to James Williams. I read the personae as texts in and of themselves, 
which may be slightly disorienting for my readers—by treating these personae as examples of 
fugitive authorship, my readings of other more conventional printed texts unfold in service to my 
interpretation of the personae themselves. While I treat the personae as my major primary 
sources, I also examine the personae’s appearances as traces in legal and literary documents; 
these traces, I argue, reveal an authorial practice of repeated generation and self-erasure or 
absenting, as well as a response from law and literature that mimics these same strategies. In the 
hands of the fugitive, these strategies of evasion productively facilitate the slave’s continued 
fugitivity; in the hands of law and print more generally, the same tactics are shortcomings that 
add to the burdens of representation. 
These printed texts record Williams, Thornton, and Wilkins in ways that demonstrate 
law’s intense entanglement with literature, and the appearances of the personae in printed text 
tend to re-enact the condition of fugitivity in the first place. Each persona is maddeningly 
elusive, often disappearing when an institution of power most “needs” him. Printed texts are in 
constant pursuit of the fugitive, a rhetorical posture that doubles the physical pursuit by his 
former owner. The final purpose of the chapter concerns these rhetorical moments of mimesis 
and doubling. Attempts to record the personae in print often operate as ineffectual “captures”—
in response to the personae’s absences and refusals, I argue that legal and literary institutions 
eventually adopt a mimetic strategy of representation that borrows the fugitive’s own tactics of 
substitution and negation. To offer a somewhat crude summary, the fugitive absents himself 
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from language, moving on to inhabit another persona. A court then seeks to describe the fugitive 
but, uncertain which name to use, resorts to similar strategies of negation and flight, identifying 
the slave by who or what he is not, where he is not, and what name he is not currently using. 
The resulting tension—between the productive proliferation of personae on one hand and 
acts of textual suppression on the other—underscores that the shared project of literature and law 
involves a relentless return to figurations of slaves as dead or destroyed. It is tempting to 
acquiesce to these pressures and to read absence and incompletion as a kind of death. Instead, I 
suggest a version of fugitive personhood that rests in its capacity to reiterate, reproduce, and 
generate multiple personae that disrupt and dislodge the logics of institutional power. 51 The 
persistence of these personae in the face of discursive violence exposes the shortcomings of the 
legal-literary project; it is hardly, however, an unequivocal victory of the slave over the 
institutions that pursue him. The recursive deployment of personae necessitates a continual 
process of creation and erasure, perhaps best exemplified in one of the relevant judicial texts 
that, unable to manage the appearance of multiple personae at once, represents the slave as 
“James Shadrach.”52  
 
																																																								
51 The resonance here with Stephen Best’s work, The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics 
of Possession (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2004), is obvious. In that work, Best focuses on the 
poetics of possession as represented through the figure of the fugitive slave. Here, I focus instead 
on the fugitive as a site of proliferating subjectivities that dislodge the logics of law and 
literature.  52	Affidavit of Caleb Tate, 16 October 1835, reproduced in Appendix D of Hank Trent’s 
Narrative of James Williams, An American Slave: Annotated Edition (Baton Rouge: LSU P, 
2013).	
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This problem of naming is a symptom of language’s inadequacy to represent fugitive 
personhood. The judicial strikethrough, reminiscent of Derrida’s “sous rature” or “under-
erasure” is “the mark of the absence of a presence.”53 The proliferation of personae produces a 
series of under-erasures that nevertheless leave the remaining personae visible in their absence; 
this chapter is also a symptomatic text in this regard. Given that I posit a messy version of 
personhood that is visible—if at all—in the intersections and gaps among the various personae, I 
refer to “James Williams” in my broader analysis as Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. The chapter 
contains separate sections for each of these personae, and in those sections I refer to him by the 
individual name under consideration. While this naming convention may prove unwieldy for 
reader and writer alike, the work of this chapter demands an engagement with the unwieldy and 
often unmanageable dimensions of fugitive personhood.  
Perhaps most importantly, I am committed to the constant visual reminder of the ways in 
which Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s fugitivity produces disruptions in language and in power. 
By unpacking these various aliases, I not only read his numerous legal and literary personalities, 
but I also look for the spaces between them, reading those spaces as silences that affirm, rather 
than debilitate, his personhood. Rather than merely applauding Williams/Thornton/Wilkins for 
his clever tactics, I examine the authorial potential of his fugitivity to create evanescent, and at 
times incoherent, personae that appear variously to double or erase the mythical “original” 
subject.  
 
																																																								
53 See Gayatri Spivak’s Preface to Of Grammatology at xvii. 
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For the fugitive slave, nineteenth-century law attempted to circumscribe the boundaries 
and conditions of slaves’ legal personhood as either non-existent (property) or culpable 
(criminality).54 The case of Williams/Thornton/Wilkins throws both of these legal options into 
sharp relief—the legal materials I examine treat Shadrach Wilkins alternately as property and 
suspected criminal. While law struggled to render slaves as anything other than property or 
criminals, literature suffered from a related burden—its difficulty in reading or figuring slaves 
outside the binary of honesty and mendacity. The antebellum slave narrative, dedicated almost 
by definition to the representation of fugitive slaves, depended entirely upon the verification of 
slaves’ histories as a means of establishing that the authors of slave narratives fell on the 
“correct” side of the honest/mendacious binary. The troubling of “James Williams’s” position on 
that binary demonstrates, as I discuss below, just how invested white abolitionist networks were 
in controlling the characterization of slaves. As a result, the slave narrative genre—essentially an 
arm of the white abolitionist print machine55—frequently failed to figure slaves as agents of their 
own autobiographies, opting instead to construe slaves as trusted witnesses to the horrors of 
slavery.  
 
																																																								
54 In The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 2011), Colin Dayan elucidates the hazy categories between personhood and 
property through the figure of the deodand (180-81; 195-96), the “cursed object” once legally 
capable of criminal culpability. For Dayan, the deodand’s capability of mens rea, or a guilty 
mind, demonstrates the power of criminal law to define subjectivity in the language of those who 
control it, “the judges whose linguistic maneuvering has lethal effects on those whose lives 
depend on their words.” The legal existence of the deodand thus signals the problematics of 
locating or evacuating subjectivity for people and things who fall outside law’s limited 
taxonomies of “personhood,” particularly in the nineteenth century. 
55 Teresa Goddu, who theorizes white abolition as a corporate entity, might characterize slave 
narrative publishing as a subsidiary of white abolitionists’ broader corporate agenda. 
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Law and literature therefore both struggled to narrate personhood for slaves in general, 
and particularly for fugitive slaves. As Stephen Best argues in The Fugitive’s Properties: Law 
and the Poetics of Possession, nineteenth-century law understood slaves as having “two 
bodies”—one mortal and one immortal (4). For Best, this dual conception of slaves is the 
mechanism underlying the familiar claim that the slave’s existence constitutes a “legal fiction” 
that both acknowledges and denies the slave’s interiority and agency.56 Discussing the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850 in particular, Best (9) identifies the fugitive as: 
two persons in one [‘pilfered property and indebted person, object 
of property and subject of contract’], and as a matter of nineteenth-
century jurisprudence and legal procedure, few forms of legal 
personhood rival the fugitive for its ability to incite a crisis in (and 
provisional resolution of) the tenets and practices of the law. 
Though the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 postdates the events I consider in this chapter, law’s 
terror of the fugitive was undeniably and demonstrably present during the 1830s and 1840s. 
Best’s characterization of the fugitive’s disruptive effect on law holds true as well to the legal 
texts that purport to represent Williams/Thornton/Wilkins.57 
																																																								
56 In Chapter 3, I explore the nature of legal fictions in greater detail, arguing that the various 
legal fictions applied to slaves offer an example of how fictionality is at times an attempt to give 
legalized slavery the appearance of legitimacy in American legal history. In that Chapter, I also 
consider how legal fictions of slavery participate in larger narratives of personhood. 
57 Best’s work in The Fugitive’s Properties offers a rich account of law’s figuration of fugitivity, 
particularly in the latter nineteenth century, and with particular attention to the relationship 
between legal representations of fugitivity and early conceptions of intellectual property law. 
Thus, Best focuses mainly on how law manages the figure of the fugitive. While the project is 
closely related to my work in this chapter, I focus instead on the relationship of law to literature 
in managing fugitive figures—and I ultimately explore the possibilities for the fugitive to 
manage both of these institutions through alternative authorial practices. 
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Because of this disruptive tendency, the personae of Williams, Thornton, and Wilkins do 
not rest neatly in separate texts. On the contrary, multiple personae frequently appear within a 
single text either explicitly or as implicit haunts. Each persona uniquely demonstrates the 
collaboration of law and literature but also reveals Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s frictional, 
authorial inhabitation of these institutions that would incarcerate him. Wilkins, as the subject of 
law, is lost or destroyed property walking through the world under a new name. As a literary 
figure, Wilkins is a persona characterized primarily through his disappearance and negation. In 
both law and literature, Thornton and Williams are criminal impostors. Thornton’s strategic 
performance of servitude enables him to pass through slave jurisdictions, largely unrecognizable 
as a fugitive slave. Williams performs servitude of another kind, aligning himself with northern 
abolitionists who appropriate his enslaved status to their own ends.  
These three personae travel back and forth across texts, genres, and geographic 
jurisdictions. Williams/Thornton/Wilkins repeatedly vanishes himself and creates himself anew; 
this recursive strategy slips in and out of reach, with personae erupting into new contexts 
unexpectedly and vanishing as quickly. Beyond exposing the inability of law and literature to 
accurately record these eruptions, the legal and literary texts that pursue him eventually adopt 
similar practices of vanishing and re-writing. The result is a bizarre pursuit in which descriptions 
of Williams/Thornton/Wilkins become mimetic replications of his own evasive strategies; in 
attempting to capture, or pin down the fugitive, law and literature reproduce the fugitive’s 
negations and re-fashionings. In each of the sections that follow, I too become a reluctant pursuer 
of the fugitive slave, mining the depths of each persona to better understand its disruptive 
potential as a version of fugitive authorship. 
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Historical Background and Recent Archival Discoveries 
In order to critically explore these personae, it is necessary to understand the historical 
and critical context surrounding Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. In 1838, the American Anti-
Slavery Society (AASS) published the Narrative of James Williams, An American Slave, Who 
was for Several Years a Driver on a Cotton Plantation in Alabama.58 The narrative, including a 
preface by the poet and amanuensis John Greenleaf Whittier, became a touchstone and source of 
pride for the AASS. Although several slave autobiographies had already been published in the 
United States—including Thomas Gray’s publication of Nat Turner’s criminal confession—the 
anti-slavery press was just gaining traction in the late 1830s.59  
             Publishers and authors on both sides of the Atlantic shared a growing fascination in the 
1830s with slave autobiographies, most of which were written with the “assistance” of white 
amanuenses whose voices bled into the narratives, obscuring or erasing the possibility of 
ascertaining the extent of the slaves’ actual authorial agency. In the 1830s, a total of nine slave 
autobiographies were published; by contrast, 25 narratives were published during the 1840s, and 
30 during the 1850s.60 Thus, when the AASS published James Williams’s Narrative in 1838, the 
slave narrative genre was in the early part of its trajectory toward greater popularity in the later 
antebellum period. 
 
																																																								
58 Hereinafter, Narrative. 
59 For a discussion of the corporatization of the anti-slavery press, see Teresa Goddu’s work in 
Selling Anti-Slavery. 
60 “North American Slave Narratives,” Documenting the American South, 
http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/chronautobio.html (accessed 27 April 2015).	
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While the James Williams Narrative marked the AASS’s inaugural publication of a slave 
narrative, that organization would not publish another one for seven years. The seven-year delay 
resulted at least partially because James William’s Narrative was mired in controversy 
immediately after its publication. Believing that the AASS was sitting on a goldmine with 
Williams’s story of cruel enslavement and eventual escape, Whittier and other abolitionists—
namely, Emmor Kimber and Lewis Tappan—had rushed to distribute the Narrative as widely as 
possible. That circulation, which included free copies for each Member of Congress, caught the 
disapproving attention of John Rittenhouse at the Alabama Beacon. Rittenhouse almost 
immediately questioned the plausibility of Williams’s Narrative, and there ensued a series of 
volleys in the pages of the Beacon and the abolitionist newspaper The Emancipator.  
Ultimately, the controversy resulted in the formation of an AASS investigative committee 
to determine the accuracy of the facts included in Williams’s autobiography. Unable to locate 
Williams himself in England—rather than requesting any money for his story, Williams had 
made passage to Liverpool the sole condition of his participation61—the AASS had no means of 
verifying Williams’s identity or background, and the scant information available cast doubts on 
the Narrative’s authenticity. In October 1838, Birney and Tappan announced the following 
resolution in The Emancipator on behalf of the AASS Executive Committee: “That the said 
special committee prepare, as soon as may be, a statement in relation to said narrative, to be 
inserted in the Emancipator; and that the publishing agent be directed to discontinue the sale of 
the work.”62  
																																																								
61 See Hank Trent, Narrative of James Williams, An American Slave, Annotated Edition. (Baton 
Rouge: LSU P, 2013). Introduction. E-book. (Hereinafter “Annotated Narrative”). 
62 James Birney and Lewis Tappan, “Narrative of James Williams,” The Emancipator (New 
York, NY), 25 October 1838.  
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 With that resolution, sale of the Narrative ceased, and Williams became a notorious 
footnote in the larger AASS publishing strategy. The critical conversation around James 
Williams has, until recently, largely followed suit. While critics such as Lara Langer Cohen have 
attempted to parse the factuality of Williams’s Narrative63, the central critical question about the 
text has focused primarily on genre: Should the Narrative be classified as a slave narrative or as 
a work of fiction?64 If a slave narrative, was it a fraudulent one? If a work of fiction, was it 
evidence of literary genius? This question of generic classification conceals another, murkier 
question: Was James Williams a “real” person? If so, what kind of person was he—a clever con 
artist, an earnest fugitive slave, or an unsung literary master? The critical preoccupation with 
these questions has often seemed intent on fitting Williams into legible, but one-dimensional, 
categories of personhood.  
Hank Trent’s recent archival work supplies answers to some of these questions. Trent 
demonstrates that the Narrative was largely factually “true,” albeit with apparently deliberate 
alterations to certain names, geographical locations, and timelines. 65 These alterations were 
presumably part of Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s strategic means of evading re-capture—
																																																								
63 See Cohen, The Fabrication of American Literature: Fraudulence and Antebellum Print 
Culture (U of Pennsylvania P, 2012). 
64 See, e.g., Augusta Rohrbach, Truth Stranger than Fiction: Race, Realism, and the U.S. 
Literary Marketplace (Palgrave, 2002). Rohrbach argues that Williams’s Narrative was actually 
a novel published as a slave narrative.  
65 I am able to enter the critical conversation in this posture primarily because of the impressive 
and compelling archival work that Hank Trent presents in his 2013 Annotated Narrative. Many 
of the collateral sources I read in this chapter are from Trent’s annotated edition, and his archival 
work is fundamental to my critical intervention. Trent demonstrates that James Williams was 
indeed a slave who had been born with the name Shadrach Wilkins. Trent’s evidence is highly 
persuasive and includes documentation that Shadrach Wilkins was the subject of at least one 
court case—where his owner sought to recover lost property damages following his escape—and 
tangentially involved in a second, more salacious plot to poison slaveowners.  	
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something he may have especially feared given his earlier suspected involvement in a conspiracy 
to poison a slaveholder. In the introduction to the Annotated Narrative, Trent writes, “Williams 
was a genuine freedom seeker and a skilled narrator, able to shape his own real life into a 
cohesive, romanticized story.”66 While I agree with the first half of Trent’s formulation, I intend 
to abandon this impulse to read Williams/Thornton/Wilkins as offering a “cohesive,” much less 
“romanticized” story. Rather, I consider Williams/Thornton/Wilkins to be the author not simply 
of the Narrative, but also of these three personae. The personae—Shadrach Wilkins, Jim 
Thornton, James Williams—suggest a complex human author whose varied identities ultimately 
resist any easy congregation. Williams/Thornton/Wilkins thus emerges not as a single authentic 
subject, but as a person whose authenticity lives in its multiplicity, incoherence, and complexity. 
These aliases and identities mark the intricate terrain of what it meant to be 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins, a terrain that itself is contradictory and irreconcilable. 
Shadrach Wilkins: Literary Substitutions and the Negative Proof of Slatter v. Holton 
It is tempting to look to Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s birth name, Shadrach Wilkins, as a source 
of authenticity and identity. However, even from the first, his naming is itself a discursive 
gesture that suggests a paradoxical combination of multiplicity and absence. In his Narrative (3), 
“James Williams” claims to have a twin brother named Meshech [Meshach].67 Given that his 
birth name was Shadrach Wilkins, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his twin brother’s 
name. The name also makes logical sense, as the figures of Shadrach and Meshach appear 
together in a story from the Book of Daniel. In that story, Shadrach and Meshach refuse to 
worship an idol, and the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar orders them cast into a massive 
																																																								
66 Annotated Narrative, Introduction. 
67 Narrative of James Williams. (American Anti-Slavery Society, 1838).  
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furnace to be burned alive. In light of their faith, God delivers them unharmed; a stunned 
Nebuchadnezzar sees them walking about in the fire, calls them out of the furnace, and promotes 
them to esteemed positions in Babylon.68  
 That Shadrach was a character in a story of Biblical deliverance is at the least an uncanny 
foreshadowing of Wilkins’s later freedom—and it may simply reflect the longing of a mother to 
see her newborn children be delivered from the earthly misery of slavery. Through naming her 
children after these particular Biblical figures, Williams’s mother called her sons explicitly into 
deliverance. However, in naming two boys Shadrach and Meshach, their mother not only speaks 
them into that narrative but also registers the absence of at least one other person. In Daniel, the 
Babylonian deliverance saves not two, but three men: Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego. 
Moreover, when Nebuchadnezzar peers into the furnace, he also sees a fourth unnamed figure, 
saying, “Did not we cast three men bound into the midst of the fire”? When his guards affirm the 
question, Nebuchadnezzar exclaims, “Lo, I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the fire, 
and they have no hurt; and the form of the fourth is like the Son of God”!69 Despite the 
appearance of a fourth form, only the three named men emerge from the fire, and there is no 
other mention in Daniel of that fourth figure. 
 This Biblical tale depicts three recipients of deliverance—Shadrach, Meshach, and 
Abednego—even as a fourth unnamed figure haunts the story as an uncertain member of their 
group. The act of naming twins after two of these figures therefore makes visible the absence of 
the third and fourth members, without whom the tale of deliverance is less complete (though not 
altogether unreadable)—another example of “under-erasure.” Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s birth 
																																																								
68 Daniel 3:24-30 (King James Bible). 
69 Id. at 24-25. 
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as Shadrach thus locates him immediately in an apparatus that depends both on multiplicity and 
conspicuous absences. His name acts as a sign for multiple iterations, alter egos, and shadow 
figures. It also suggests one who transcends, or at least resists, death. 
 Despite the provocative Biblical connotations of his birth name, the persona of Shadrach 
Wilkins was hardly the most renowned in Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s repertoire. He never 
published under the name Shadrach, and in fact “Shadrach Wilkins” ultimately exists as a textual 
trace of Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s criminality, fugitivity, and status as property. In recorded 
memory, Wilkins is perhaps most conspicuous as the subject of the 1841 Louisiana court case, 
Slatter v. Holton (No. 3894, 19 La. 39). That opinion describes “Shadrack [sic] Wilkins” as “the 
property of the Plaintiff,” marking law’s characterization of Wilkins not as property, but as 
something owned by H.H. Slatter.  When Wilkins disappeared during Slatter’s attempt to 
transport him to Louisville, Slatter then sued Holton, the captain of the Henry Clay, “to recover 
the value of . . . Shadrack,” alleging that Holton had failed to properly maintain custody of 
Wilkins.70 By identifying “Shadrack” as lost property, Slatter’s suit further participates in the 
legal narrative of Wilkins not as a legal person but a bundle of fungible goods.  
 Slatter v. Holton is not an influential opinion in Louisiana or elsewhere; it offers minor 
precedent on a single point of law regarding the admissibility of negative testimony, an example 
of the way in which the legal narrative of Wilkins consistently begets additional negations and 
absences. The crux of the dispute in Slatter v. Holton concerned whether Slatter could prove that 
Shadrach Wilkins had ever boarded the Henry Clay. Slatter argued that a black man traveling by 
																																																								
70	The case is complicated by the fact that it also marks the appearance of the “Jim Thornton” 
persona, under which Williams/Thornton/Wilkins managed to escape to the second ship. I 
discuss Jim Thornton later in the chapter, focusing here on Shadrach Wilkins.  
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himself should have been obvious to Holton as a fugitive slave; for his part, Holton argued that 
there was no proof that Wilkins ever boarded the Henry Clay, and thus that he had no duty to 
detain Wilkins as a fugitive slave. To support this argument, Holton presented testimony from 
several witnesses who testified that they never observed Shadrach Wilkins on the Henry Clay—
this testimony that they did not see Wilkins was the negative testimony at the heart of the 
opinion.   
The court held that this negative testimony was insufficient to overcome testimony from 
other witnesses who claimed that they saw a servant aboard the ship—“Jim Thornton”—who 
proved to be Shadrach Wilkins. The court reasoned, “However strong may appear the negative 
proof resulting from the declarations of several witnesses that they did not see the plaintiff’s boy 
on board the Henry Clay during her voyage from New Orleans to Louisville, it cannot destroy 
the positive testimony in the record showing that during the trip the boy was acting on board as 
one of the servants of the boat under the name of Jim Thornton.” On the basis of this legal rule, 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana entered judgment in favor of Slatter, holding that he was entitled 
to $1600 in damages for the loss of Shadrach Wilkins. 
 The holding in Slatter v. Holton is an unsatisfying text if we read it looking for Wilkins’s 
agency. When not persistently referring to him as a “boy,” the court construes Wilkins as chattel; 
the construction is so blatant as to contain a dollar amount ($1600) for the loss to Slatter of 
Wilkins’s body. On its face, the opinion appears to offer a clear example of law’s well-known 
treatment of slaves as property, or chattel. But the holding of the opinion also reveals how law 
reads the slave—and in particular the fugitive slave—through negation and evacuation. The 
opinion’s language uses a triple negative: that “negative proof” that witnesses “did not see” 
Wilkins “cannot destroy positive testimony.” This accumulation of negatives renders the holding 
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practically indecipherable, amassing an unmanageable collection of negations to articulate an 
otherwise straightforward legal rule: that positive testimony is more persuasive than negative 
testimony. The grammatical construction of this holding makes “negative proof” the subject of 
the sentence, a choice that complicates the modifiers and the predicate into a nearly 
incomprehensible entanglement. The literal subjectivity of “negative proof” thus mirrors 
Wilkins’s subjectivity as a fugitive slave. At the moment when the court most requires Wilkins’s 
presence—in order to redress Slatter’s claim for the loss of his property—Wilkins is nowhere to 
be found. The language of the holding resorts to a correlative posture, in which the presence of a 
fairly simple legal rule is visible only through a series of denials and negations. 
Like the “negative proof,” which is unpacked through a series of additional negations—
including the language of destruction—Wilkins’s legal subjectivity is similarly fraught and 
illegible. As Stephen Best (87) writes: “The law knows the fugitive as a nondescript.” Wilkins, I 
argue, exists within the language of the court opinion as a series of negations and substitutions, 
what Best might call a “nondescript”: a boy rather than a man, a vanished slave rather than 
property in custody, Jim Thornton rather than Shadrach Wilkins, $1600 rather than flesh and 
blood. Law’s difficulty in managing Wilkins’s personhood—needing on the one hand to flatten 
him into property while on the other hand being forced to contend with his free will and agency 
in escaping from his owner—seems to bleed through into the legal holding itself. This tension 
demonstrates the possibility of an opinion to grant a slave literary personhood while denying his 
legal personhood. Wilkins is certainly literarily visible as a persona in the opinion; his legal 
personhood, on the other hand, is never contemplated, much less adopted. 
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Slatter v. Holton is not the only textual trace of Shadrach Wilkins, however. Though 
unmentioned in the Narrative itself, the name Shadrach Wilkins appears in the literary history 
surrounding the Williams Narrative as early as 1838, as part of the public debate staged in The 
Emancipator and the Alabama Beacon. As part of the investigation into the Narrative, many 
readers submitted letters claiming to support or refute the text’s veracity. One such letter from 
George Larimer claimed to recognize James Williams as “Shadrack Wilkins,” his mother-in-
law’s former slave “who was sold by her in consequence of his having been detected in 
connexion with others in attempting to poison [a neighboring slaveholder] and his family . . . .”71 
Birney and Tappan immediately dismissed Larimer’s testimony, writing, “Of this letter but little 
need be said—it being clear that Geo. T.F. Larimer, by whom it purports to have been written, is 
not the person referred to in the Narrative.”72 This textual trace of Wilkins offers additional 
information about him, but it also refuses any information that would generate a narrative that 
neatly connects the steamboat escapee with the poisoning conspirator. It does, however, encode 
the Wilkins persona with enduring rebellion. His escape from the steamboat, which seems in 
isolation to be merely an act of flight, acquires a different connotation considered alongside the 
information from the Larimer letter—reading the two items together suggests Wilkins’ refusal to 
surrender to slavery as part of a longer history that includes the willingness to poison and kill 
someone else’s owner.  
 
																																																								
71 James Birney and Lewis Tappan, “Alabama Beacon versus James Williams,” The 
Emancipator (New York, NY), 30 August 1838. Their automatic rejection of Larimer’s claim 
hinged on his location in Essex County; in the Narrative, Williams claims to have been the slave 
of a Larrimore family in Powhatan County. 
72 Id.	
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It was not until 2013 that Hank Trent took seriously the Larimer letter, finally making 
clear that “James Williams” was indeed Shadrach Wilkins, a conclusion that he reached by 
surmising that “James Williams” had changed the name of the county in his Narrative.73 By 
itself, this re-naming does not necessarily imply that the remaining substance of the Narrative 
was inaccurate. Birney’s and Tappan’s response, however, reveals more than a case of mere 
mistaken identity. Given that the white abolitionists were prepared to accept a number of other 
factual errors in the Narrative, the geographic discrepancy alone could not account for their 
ready dismissal of a connection to Shadrach Wilkins.  
Rather, their language suggests that the problem of recognition rests in their construction 
of personhood. When they write that Larimer “is not the person referred to in the Narrative,” 
they presumably intend to write that Larimer is not “the person referred to as Larrimore in the 
Narrative.” However, their grammatical construction curiously suggests instead that the 
Narrative as a whole refers only to one person: Larrimore. If Larrimore is the only person to 
appear in the Narrative, then “James Williams” himself must therefore not be a “person,” 
whether in factual truth or legal rule. This implication, combined with their emphasis on the 
phrase “the person,” draws attention to the fact that personhood as a category remained available 
only to white subjects.74  
 
																																																								
73 Note that the substitution of one county name for another rehearses 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s practice of repeatedly re-naming himself. 
74 Here again is a fraught intersection of legal and literary personhood. Birney and Tappan, in the 
context of the ostensibly journalistic literary text, appear to offer a construction of personhood as 
a category of law, custom, and language. 
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While Birney and Tappan might not consciously be drawing attention to the difference 
between personhood as a legal category and personhood as an existential condition, their striking 
choice of language suggests the burden they felt in classifying the man they knew as James 
Williams. They register an impossibility of connection between James Williams and Shadrach 
Wilkins, underscoring their understanding of black personhood as rooted in binaries that failed to 
fully account for the complexities and nuances of fugitive identity. For these abolitionists, in 
spite of their opposition to legalized slavery, the well-spoken and well-mannered author they 
knew as James Williams simply could not be a suspected criminal who had fooled them into 
publishing a “false” story.75  
Whereas law balances the status of personhood against the status of property, Birney and 
Tappan balance honesty against mendacity when determining how to properly classify a slave. In 
the debate with the Alabama Beacon, the abolitionists of The Emancipator focus entirely on the 
credibility of the man they know as James Williams. Unable to confidently apply the label of 
																																																								75	Of course, Birney and Tappan likely also intended to distance the Narrative from Shadrach 
Wilkins’s sketchy involvement in a poisoning plot. As Hank Trent notes (“Introduction”), 
Wilkins was arrested in connection with the case but never prosecuted (two other slaves were 
tried and convicted). Because he was not tried, there is little textual evidence from the legal 
record to identify him, though Larimer does claim that, “Had Shadrack been tried, there is 
scarcely a doubt, but that he would have been hanged . . . .” (Trent, “Alabama Beacon Versus 
James Williams”). Thus, these early textual traces of Shadrach Wilkins, though not self-
authored, do establish him as defiant, crafty, and social—the former two categories being ready 
stereotypical tropes for slaves. Whether he used his wits to escape trial is unclear, but he appears 
to have been acting in concert with several other slaves to rebel by killing the neighboring 
slaveholder with hemlock. It is unclear why Williams was not prosecuted, but his owner did sell 
him, his wife, and their son immediately to Caleb Tate in Alabama—the owner of the cotton 
plantation alluded to in the Narrative’s title, the place where Williams worked as a driver over 
his fellow slaves. He was sold to Tate in 1833, and Williams made several attempts to escape 
from Caleb Tate’s plantation with his family.  
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either “true” or “false” to the contents of the Narrative, Birney and Tappan cannot offer or 
imagine an alternative framework. The Emancipator is thus inadequate to narrate any meaningful 
version of fugitive personhood, other than to bemoan the difficulty of locating and capturing the 
fugitive slave in question.  
The textual appearances of the Shadrach Wilkins persona make visible these failures of 
law and literature—each of which fumbles the attempt to describe Wilkins in satisfying, or even 
certain, terms. Both law and abolitionist literature resort instead to constructions of Wilkins that 
depend on substitutions, absences, and negations. Wilkins ultimately must be described in terms 
of what he is not—not money, not a stowaway, not present, not the same slave George Larimer 
identifies. Although the Wilkins persona offers scant information about how the slave read 
himself within institutions of power, this persona instead nuances the institutional landscape that 
the fugitive confronts. It is in the latter two personae of Jim Thornton and James Williams that 
the conditions of fugitive personhood become more visible. I argue that it is in the creation and 
deployment of these two personae that Williams/Thornton/Wilkins manifests his canny 
exploitation of law’s and literature’s failings.  
Jim Thornton: Servitude and the Strategic Inhabitation of Slavery’s Codes 
In 1833, the Larimer family sold Wilkins, along with his wife and son, to Caleb Tate in 
Alabama. From Tate’s plantation, Wilkins made numerous attempts at escape with and without 
his family; following one of his solo escapes, he even managed to remain a fugitive for nearly 
eight months before being recaptured.76 Upon his eventual capture in Baltimore, Tate sold 
																																																								
76 The fact that an owner would pursue a missing slave for eight months underscores the stakes 
of fugitivity and the necessity for the creation of personae that could sustain not only the 
immediate escape but many months or years of possible pursuit. 
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Wilkins to Shadrach Slatter, from whose custody Wilkins staged the escape that occasioned the 
Slatter v. Holton litigation.77 Unlike the Wilkins persona, however, the creation of the Jim 
Thornton persona reveals a great deal more about how Williams/Thornton/Wilkins manifested a 
complex version of fugitive personhood. A strategic performance of servitude, his identity as Jim 
Thornton was a conscious act of self-disappearance and re-fashioning rehearsed from outside or 
in between between the existing legal and literary apparatuses—that elusive, but persistent claim 
to selfhood was effective precisely because it traded on the failures of both law and print. 
 Because Slatter v. Holton ultimately litigates the status of Shadrach Wilkins, the persona 
of Jim Thornton enters the case record in glancing references at each stage of the litigation. In 
the trial court opinion from the Parish Court for the Parish and City of New Orleans, the name 
Jim Thornton does not appear at all; that court merely held “that the Pltf’s slave was on board the 
Henry Clay, the defendant’s boat waiting at table, which fact cannot be considered as 
contradicted . . .”78 The Supreme Court of Louisiana tends to treat “Jim Thornton” as a mere 
alias, holding that witness testimony proved that Wilkins “was acting on board as one of the 
servants [on the Henry Clay] under the name of Jim Thornton” (19 La. 39). That opinion also 
references the name Jim Thornton in three other instances. The opinion refers to Wilkins as “the 
boy Shadrack, or Jim Thornton,” and twice it describes a witness’s role in identifying Thornton. 
The witness, Mr. Peterson, “instantly recognized Jim Thornton as [Wilkins]”; Peterson also 
																																																								
77 I have already alluded to the fact that Wilkins accomplished this escape by using the name Jim 
Thornton, a persona that—like Shadrach Wilkins—appears in the record of Slatter v. Holton.	
78 That opinion was issued May 10, 1839, signed by Judge Charles Maurian (as included in 
Trent’s annotated edition of the Williams Narrative). 
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testified that he had notified a ship’s captain “that the boy passing by the name of Jim Thornton 
belonged to S.F. Slatter, of New Orleans . . . .”79  
In each of these examples from the judicial opinion, the persona of Jim Thornton appears 
as an alias or alter ego that merely substitutes for, or is interchangeable with, the name Shadrach 
Wilkins. In the most generous reading, there is at least literary personhood inherent in the phrase 
“the boy passing by the name of Jim Thornton.” That statement makes Thornton visible as an 
actual person, but it falls short of establishing legal personhood because it refers to him as “the 
boy,” a phrase that suggests either youth or, more likely, his status as African American. This 
characterization also implies the strategic use of the Thornton name as a tool of deceit that 
allowed Wilkins to “pass” for free. The construction endows Wilkins with enough agency at 
least to strategize a false identity.80 This marginal agency is nevertheless subsumed by the legal 
construction of slave as a lying criminal—for a slave to “pass” for a free person is fraudulent and 
criminal.81  
 The opinion’s gloss on Jim Thornton, however, obscures a much richer portrait that 
emerges in the opinion’s supporting materials—namely, additional interrogatory responses from 
witnesses and arguments offered by counsel. The witnesses who actually encountered Jim 
Thornton offered accounts that have much more to say about how Williams/Thornton/Wilkins 
re-fashioned himself in his fugitivity. For instance, William McBride (the pilot of the second 
ship where Thornton escaped after leaving the Henry Clay) gave a deposition in which he offers 
																																																								79	Statement of Henry F. Peterson, 3 August 1837, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841).	
80 Slatter’s counsel also seized upon Patterson’s use of the word “passing” in summarizing the 
witness testimony for his legal argument. Statement of George Strawbridge, Slatter v. Holton, 19 
La. 39 (1841). 
81 Here again the deodand stands as an historical example of how law managed subjectivity from 
objects unreadable as civil subjects.  
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this description of Jim Thornton: “rather tall . . . about 5 feet 9 or 10 of a copper color wore his 
hair well combed back from his face & was remarked on board the Wave for his neatness & 
activity in acting as a Waiter.”82 The description characterizes Thornton as respectable, a loaded 
term that evokes the tendency of white people to congratulate certain types of blackness. Indeed, 
McBride engages in this version of respectability politics, praising Thornton for the neatness of 
his hair and eagerness to please the passengers. 
Compare this description with the fugitive slave advertisement that Tate placed in 1835: 
“SHADRICK, a yellow complected, likely fellow bold and impudent look, about 5 feet 10 inches 
high 26 years old, wears his hair roached, eyes of a yellowish cast, and wore a white hat.”83 
Tate’s description bears the bias of a furious slave owner whose property has vanished. 
Nevertheless, the difference in described physicality is stark, apart from an apparent agreement 
about height. While Tate focuses on roached hair, yellowish eyes, and a “bold and impudent 
look,” McBride describes a well-groomed and neat waiter whose execution of servitude 
apparently earned the admiration of the ship’s passengers. Setting aside the expected pitfalls of 
discrepant eyewitness testimony and Tate’s racist rhetoric, these two descriptions are largely 
incompatible—an example of the incommensurability of the various personae with each other. 
Based on the divergent descriptions, how unlike Shadrick is the polite waiter known as Jim 
Thornton. The apparent coherence of Thornton’s persona contrasts sharply with the incoherence 
that results when one attempts to reconcile Wilkins with Thornton. 
 
																																																								
82 Statement of William M’Bride, 11 Jan. 1839, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841). 
83 “Fifty Dollars Reward,” Alabama Intelligencer and State Rights Expositor, 29 August 1835. 
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 It is tempting to conclude that Wilkins was such a gifted performer that his 
transformation into Jim Thornton merely reflects the effectiveness of his performances and 
disguises.84 Jim Thornton, however, was more than a series of garments or a change in 
hairstyle—the persona of Jim Thornton deftly navigated social codes that had trained others to 
encounter his body as one of labor and servitude. Thus, Shadrach Wilkins did not transform into 
Jim Thornton at all—rather, the persona of Jim Thornton was deployed when the need for him 
arose. Williams/Thornton/Wilkins pursued liberty not merely through self-representation, but 
through the creation of Jim Thornton. To deploy the persona of Jim Thornton, it was necessary 
only to present a public identity that would align with the social expectations projected onto his 
body. 
The man who called himself Jim Thornton “passed” for a waiter, trading forced labor for 
voluntary service, deploying the persona of Jim Thornton as an authorial strategy of fugitive 
personhood—the descriptions of Thornton as “passing” conjure associations with a number of 
other fugitive practices. According to the ship’s passengers, his performance as a waiter was 
convincing. Even Thornton’s transfer to a second boat apparently occurred by virtue of his 
exemplary conduct as a waiter—when the Henry Clay encountered ice that blocked its passage, 
the Wave took some of the Clay’s passengers and also some of its staff, including Jim Thornton. 
Captain Spalding (Wave) testified: “[T]here was a coloured boy that passed by the name of Jim 
Thornton from steamboat Henry Clay together with some others of his cabin boys who captain 
Holton requested me to let such as I should need work their passage the rest pay, this Jim 
Thornton being very active about the table and my Steward being sick at the time I let him work 																																																								
84 For a fuller discussion on the dimensions of racialized performances and performative self-
actualization, see Daphne Brooks’s work in Bodies in Dissent: Spectacular Performances of 
Race and Freedom, 1850-1910 (Duke UP, 2006).	
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his passage above Flint Island, where I discharged him . . . .”85 The double use of both “passed” 
and “passage” draws certain rhetorical connections between Thornton’s specific persona and the 
terrain of fugitive personhood. As a strategy of survival, the fugitive must “pass” for a member 
of a group to which he ought not—according to prevailing legal and cultural narratives—belong. 
The successful “passing” as a waiter then ensures several other passages: from one steamboat to 
another, from South to North, from slavery to freedom. For the fugitive, however, the project of 
“passing” is never truly complete. The fugitive slave laws during the antebellum period, which 
frequently authorized re-capture even from free jurisdictions, recast passing not as a temporary 
strategy, but as a permanent condition of fugitivity.86 Captain Spalding’s description of Thornton 
perhaps unwittingly reinforces the numerous dimensions of “passing” inherent in Thornton’s 
performance as a waiter.  
The other passengers corroborate Spalding’s characterization of Thornton, while 
nuancing Spalding’s emphasis on passing. For example, after offering a physical description of 
Thornton, McBride testifies that Thornton was “very active in bringing the baggage from the 
Henry Clay to the Wave.”87 Finally, the boat’s clerk, Erasmus Plastridge, testifies that he “saw 
Jim Thornton waiting on the passengers who were at Supper in the cabin, & afterwards aiding to 
carry the passengers [sic] baggage on board the Wave from the Henry.”88 Each description of 
																																																								
85 Statement of Ulysses Spalding, 15 June 1838, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841). Note the 
double meaning of the word “passed” in the first sentence of this quote. While Spalding 
presumably intended merely to suggest that the waiter used the name Thornton, the word 
“passed” also evokes the practice of passing for a member of a group to which one does not 
belong—many fugitive slaves escaped North by passing for white, or by passing for a different 
gender.	
86 See Daniel Sharfstein’s work in The Invisible Line for a fuller history of passing in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
87 Statement of William M’Bride, 11 January 1839, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841). 
88 Statement of Erasmus D. Plastridge, 30 November 1837, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841). 
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Thornton focuses almost exclusively on his body and its movement, supplying a fuller 
description of how specifically Thornton accomplished his many passages. Their focus on his 
movement and industry evinces the social codes that these passengers were conditioned to 
recognize from a young African American man aboard their ship. His quick actions and attentive 
devotion to the passengers marked him for these passengers as an “acceptable” kind of black 
man—subservient, hard-working, and available to cater to the needs of white passengers.  
 Thornton’s visibility exploited the categories of personhood that hovered around his 
body. Only in certain narrow contexts did his blackness render him legible and, paradoxically, 
thus safely invisible. Apart from depicting Thornton as highly “active,” the testimony in Slatter 
v. Holton is notable for where it depicts him—at table. The persona of Jim Thornton was thus 
legible in the context of servitude, and only servitude. There are no descriptions of him 
elsewhere aboard the boat, nor any accounts of him engaged in any activity but waiting at table 
or assisting with baggage. It is impossible to know what happened to Jim Thornton during 
moments away from the labor he performed as a crew member. There is no testimony from other 
waiters or stewards, no suggestion of Thornton’s social existence. Rather, the testimony suggests 
that Jim Thornton did not exist in any other context aboard the ship. While this cannot be 
logically true—he must have taken breaks, he most likely spoke to other crew members at some 
point, etc.—his appearance as a phantom waiter comports with the legal texts that represent him. 
Thornton’s ability to hide in plain sight among the passengers offers a counterpoint to the 
elusiveness of Shadrach Wilkins from the judicial record. Wilkins was absent or lost during a 
time of white institutional need; by contrast, Thornton was exceptionally present for the white 
passengers on the ship. Thornton’s presence in this context was safe precisely because the need 
he filled, while also in service of white supremacist customs, did not depend on his specific 
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persona—any other waiter, black or white, could have easily replaced him. In short, when the 
passengers onboard required a waiter, no one was searching for “Jim Thornton” in particular. 
And in any case, his readiness to be of service ensured that he always appeared before his 
presence could be called into question. 
Henry Peterson, who had seen Wilkins on several occasions, was the sole passenger with 
reason to suspect that Thornton was a runaway slave. In fact, Peterson readily recognized the 
waiter as Shadrach Wilkins and alerted Captain Spalding immediately to Thornton’s identity as a 
runaway slave. Spalding declined to arrest Thornton—whether because he truly could not 
reconcile this polite waiter with a fugitive slave or because he secretly harbored anti-slavery 
sympathies. In any case, it appears that, apart from the neatly combed hair, Jim Thornton more or 
less resembled Shadrach Wilkins to someone who had met both men—that Jim Thornton was not 
merely a physical disguise but an uncanny iteration of the fugitive slave known variously by both 
of these names.  
Jim Thornton so fully inhabited this persona that, when Peterson recognized him, he 
insisted “that his name was Jim Thornton.”89 To identify himself to Peterson as Jim Thornton is a 
radical act of self-disappearance, a denial of access to Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s self-
conception, and an insistence instead on the lie of the substitution. Even as he seeks his own 
liberty, the conditions of his fugitivity refuse him a version of selfhood that acknowledges his 
past—Shadrach Wilkins is not entitled to freedom, but Jim Thornton is. Thus, when Peterson 
asks his name, the only possible response is “Jim Thornton.” He does not insist on his innate 
right to liberty, but he claims another persona that does have such a right. In her work on legal 
																																																								
89 Statement of Henry F. Peterson, 3 August 1837, Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. 39 (1841). 
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ritual, Colin Dayan uses the categories of “legal slave” and “civil body” to “suggest that potent 
image of a servile body can be perpetually reinvented. In this ritual, both legal slave and civil 
body are sacrificed to the civil order” (White Dog 41). In Jim Thornton’s case, his servile body is 
reinvented into a steamboat waiter through rituals that appear to manage both his status as legal 
slave and his assertion of civil body. The performance of Jim Thornton’s persona, and the claim 
to that name, suggest a complete evacuation of Shadrach Wilkins—a disavowal of the legal 
slave, Wilkins, in favor of a claim to Thornton’s civil body. The emergence of Jim Thornton thus 
occurs in unison with the social death or negative personhood of Shadrach Wilkins. 
It is no surprise, then, that Slatter v. Holton expends little effort to plumb the depths of 
“Jim Thornton.” That litigation has no interest in Thornton, who merely haunts the case materials 
to interrupt the trajectory of Shadrach Wilkins, slave and property. Just as Jim Thornton jettisons 
Shadrach Wilkins in order to avoid jurisdictional claims over his body, the legal opinion must 
jettison Thornton’s presence by “returning” him to classification as Wilkins, who is then 
“returned” into the condition of enslavement and valued at $1600. In the very first sentence of 
the opinion, the trial court holds “That the testimony produced by the plaintiff clearly establishes 
the fact that the Pltf’s slave was on board the Henry Clay, the defendant’s boat waiting at 
table.”90 In fact, this holding completely contradicts the testimony, which almost universally 
identifies Jim Thornton as the waiter in question. By issuing the holding that the plaintiff’s slave 
was on board the Henry Clay, the court collapses Thornton and Wilkins together in order to 
produce a legally readable person: the slave. The appellate court offers slightly more nuance, 
holding that Wilkins “was acting on board as one of the servants of the boat under the name of 
																																																								
90 Judgment, Slatter v. Holton, State of Louisiana Parish Court for the Parish and City of New 
Orleans, 10 May 1839. 
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Jim Thornton.”91 Even here, however, Thornton is merely a name to be applied over Wilkins, 
suggesting that the name Jim Thornton was an alter ego or mask that disguised the real person 
(Wilkins) beneath it. The court thus pretends that Wilkins and Thornton are equivalents, or that 
Thornton is a mere name rather than a personality. By adjudicating Thornton’s presence on the 
Henry Clay, the court adjudicates Wilkins’s disappearance from his owner. 
The opinion thus produces a strange result wherein Thornton’s existence constitutes the 
vanishing of Wilkins that entitles Slatter to damages for the loss of his property. In reaching this 
result, the court makes Slatter whole by ordering that he be compensated for Wilkins’s value of 
$1600, making the disappearance of Shadrach Wilkins a matter of law. This legal fiction 
operates despite the court’s knowledge that the man known as Jim Thornton walked off the ship 
and presumably lives elsewhere under that or another name. Lacking a framework of discourse 
or compensation that would recognize this persistence, law can only adjudicate Shadrach 
Wilkins who is now, for all intents and purposes, dead or destroyed. The judgment for $1600 is a 
bizarre form of emancipation that un-couples Wilkins from Slatter, though there is no available 
legal language to describe it in those terms—nor does law have any interest in framing it 
accordingly.  
But it is too simple to read Jim Thornton as Shadrach Wilkins’s emancipator. For one 
thing, that emancipation occurred only through radical self-disappearance and law’s inadequacy 
to register the complexities of Shadrach Wilkins’s subjectivity. The context that produces Jim 
Thornton also differs sharply from the context that produces Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s other 
																																																								
91 Slatter v. Holton, 19 La. at 39. 
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personae. In the case of the James Williams persona, the act of self-disappearance manifests 
along entirely different lines.  
James Williams: The Fugitive and the Criminal in the Abolitionist Context 
The persona of James Williams is perhaps the most difficult to parse, as it appears to promise 
some insight—through his self-authored slave narrative—into Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s self-
realized subjectivity. Having authored the Narrative with the mediation of abolitionists John 
Greenleaf Whittier, James Birney, Emmor Kimber, and Lewis Tappan, James Williams offers 
readers the fantasy of that text as a more authentic rendering of his personhood as a fugitive. The 
abolitionists who published the text appear to have been likewise seduced.  
In his 2013 annotated edition, Hank Trent describes the process of authentication and 
vetting that the abolitionists deployed regarding the veracity of Williams’s Narrative. From the 
beginning, according to Trent, Kimber crafted an outline that would serve as the basis for 
investigation—Williams’s initial story would ultimately be verified, cross-examined, and 
subjected to scrutiny from every direction. Trent writes of the process in his Introduction: 
“Abolitionists peppered him with questions, then huddled secretly to compare their notes with 
Kimber’s letter and to pore over maps of the South, checking towns and distances. They 
observed the scars on his back.”92 This conflation of psychological, cognitive, and physical 
inspection suggests an intimacy between the legal personhood of a fugitive slave and the literary 
personhood available to that slave within white abolitionist print networks. While the 
abolitionists claimed an investment in the liberation of slaves, these rituals of scrutiny conjure 
																																																								92	The abolitionists’ process of authentication would later become a familiar trope in the 
circulation of slave narratives, with physical wounds and marks standing in as witnesses to 
corroborate the underlying narratives of escaped slaves.	
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associations with buyers inspecting slaves on the auction block, suggesting an affinity between 
rituals that deny legal personhood and those that claim to affirm literary personhood. 
That this process framed and dictated the publication history of the Narrative suggests 
the terms on which these abolitionists read James Williams’s persona—terms that depended on 
his honesty or lack thereof. The resonance with law is apparent: Williams is either honest 
(innocent) or dishonest (criminal). The substitution of this binary for law’s dichotomy of 
property/criminal nevertheless denies Williams the potential for civil personhood. If determined 
to be essentially honest, Williams is not a criminal—but he is also certainly not a citizen or civil 
person. Instead, the threat of criminality remains even after the abolitionists rewrite law’s binary 
in different terms. Thus, from the first, James Williams’s persona was filtered through a process 
of detection intended to extract, through rigorous inspection, the true account of his life as a 
slave. 
I have already alluded to the disruption this account produced both in the initial print 
debates with the Alabama Beacon and also in the critical scholarship on James Williams among 
contemporary scholars. Since 1838, one question has consistently preoccupied literary critics and 
historians: Was James Williams a “real” person? The Narrative actually constructs Williams 
around the terms of that question. It is replete with data points that appear to be consistent with 
the world from which he fled: names of people and places, timelines, and other details that 
document the existence of a person within various bureaucratic and geographical boundaries. 
The Narrative marshals the ephemera of James Williams’s history to produce a legible telos that 
begins with his trustworthiness and the injustice of slavery and ends with freedom—precisely the 
telos that abolitionist readers were capable of comprehending.  
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What it explicitly does not do is afford access to the subjectivity or selfhood of the man 
who created the James Williams persona. Instead, it denies any connection whatsoever to that 
man, the person I have been referring to as Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. The Narrative is 
perfectly content to accept Williams on these terms—as a collection of biographical and 
historical data—so long as Williams remains a trustworthy and honest narrator. The moment that 
Williams’s credibility is in doubt, however, the rhetoric surrounding the Narrative shifts 
dramatically, moving from a posture of recordation to one of trial and judgment. This shift 
illustrates the means by which literature and law collaborate to register fugitive slaves in only the 
narrowest of terms. 
 Throughout the Narrative, Williams calls attention to the “dark reality of evil” (29)93 that 
persists in slavery. For the most part, however, he stops short of overtly calling for slavery’s 
abolition or for insurrection. Where the language of revolt does arise, it is through the 
ventriloquism of Williams’s brother, a preacher who has secretly learned to read and write. 
Williams (26) writes that, when a local church routinely removed black worshippers from their 
seats to make room for white churchgoers, his brother “on one occasion preached a sermon from 
a text, showing that all are of one blood. Some of the whites who heard it said that such 
preaching would raise an insurrection among the negroes.” Williams later says (27), “Since the 
insurrection of Nat. Turner [his brother] has not been allowed to preach at all.” This description 
of Williams’s brother appears on the second and third pages of his Narrative, establishing, along 
with Williams’s genealogical history, the governing logic of black representation in the text. By 
deploying the story about his brother, the literate preacher silenced by a white audience, 																																																								
93 Page references to the Narrative refer to the 1838 edition, Narrative of James Williams, an 
American Slave, Who Was for Several Years a Driver on a Cotton Plantation in Alabama 
(American Anti-Slavery Society, 1838). 
	 107	
Williams frames the Narrative as occupying the razor’s edge between language and silence. First 
by substituting his brother for himself, and then by referencing the equivalency between speech 
and insurrection in the white imagination, Williams displaces his own subjectivity in favor of a 
framing genealogy that explicitly tests the boundaries of the abolitionists recording his story. The 
association with Nat Turner also marks a sharp contrast with the presences and absences of the 
Williams, Thornton, and Wilkins personae. Turner’s confessions to Thomas R. Gray created 
Turner’s rather outsized textual presence in the materials that recorded him. That intense textual 
presence was in fact the occasion for Judge Cobb’s rhetorical overkill of Turner’s body. By 
contrast, the discourse of rebellion in Williams’s Narrative absents Williams from the text, 
speaking discourse instead through the ventriloquism of Williams’s brother. 
If Williams’s opening gambit suggests a healthy awareness of the propensity of black 
speech to incite white terror, a passage near the end of the Narrative suggests a practice that may 
have informed Williams’s rhetorical strategy for evading capture. As Williams narrates his flight 
from the Alabama plantation where he had labored as a slave driver, he describes the 
bloodhounds that pursued him. As was customary on the plantation—the Narrative contains 
descriptions of how the hounds were used to capture and kill other runaway slaves—and 
elsewhere throughout the South, the bloodhounds had been set on Williams’s scent. Exhausted 
after nearly drowning during his flight, Williams describes the moment of his surrender to the 
dogs’ inevitable arrival. He writes (85-86): 
Here, panting and exhausted, I stood waiting for the dogs. The woods 
seemed full of them. I heard a bell tinkle, and a moment after, our old 
hound Venus came bounding through the cane, dripping wet from the 
creek. As the old hound came towards me, I called to her as I used to 
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do when out hunting with her. She stopped suddenly, looked up at 
me, and then came wagging her tail and fawning around me. A 
moment after the other dogs came up hot in the chase, and with their 
noses to the ground. I called to them, but they did not look up, just 
came yelling on. I was just about to spring into the tree to avoid them, 
when Venus, the old hound, met them, and stopped them. Then they 
all came, fawning and playing and jumping about me. The very 
creatures whom a moment before I had feared would tear me limb 
from limb, were now leaping and licking my hands, and rolling on 
the leaves around me. 
In this striking passage, the dogs move from pursuers to allies, from captors to companions. 
Williams, knowing that the dogs will do what they have been trained to do—to capture and 
dismember him—chooses to greet and entice them rather than to flee from them. As much as his 
pursuers have activated the dogs’ instinctual impulse to hunt him, the dogs also know Williams 
as a hunting companion. By calling to Venus in the familiar fashion she will recognize, Williams 
transforms her from an agent of his enslavement to an agent of his fugitivity. Williams is 
rewarded in this story by behavior that he repeatedly refers to as “fawning.” The dogs not only 
spare his life but fawn about him and become his companions until he later sets them off to chase 
a deer. 
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 It is difficult not to see the parallel in this anecdote to Williams’s engagement with the 
abolitionists publishing his Narrative. Though the Narrative itself does not explicitly register the 
abolitionists’ engagement with Williams, John Greenleaf Whittier’s Preface barely contains the 
pleasure it evidently takes in producing Williams’s autobiography—with all of the horrors it 
describes. Whittier writes:  
The following pages contain the simple and unvarnished story of an 
AMERICAN SLAVE,--of one whose situation, in the first place, as 
a favorite servant in an aristocratic family in Virginia, and afterwards 
as the sole and confidential driver on a large plantation in Alabama, 
afforded him rare and peculiar advantages for accurate observation 
of the practical workings on the system. His intelligence, evident 
candor, and grateful remembrance of those kindnesses which in a 
land of slavery made his cup of suffering less bitter; the perfect 
accordance of his statements (made at different times and to different 
individuals) one with another, as well as those statements themselves, 
all afford strong confirmation of the truth and accuracy of his story.94 
This language from the Preface reveals the aggrandizing narrative gestures that participate 
uncomfortably in some of the trappings of slavery—the satisfaction taken in Williams’s 
ownership by an “aristocratic” family in Virginia as though the association renders Williams 
himself aristocratic, the treatment of Williams’s time as a slave driver with pride rather than 
horror, the evident savoring of what is described as Williams’s “cup of bitterness.” As when 
																																																								
94 “Preface,” Narrative at xvii-xviii. 
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Williams greets the hounds with apparent affection and gratitude, he becomes the object of 
fawning by the abolitionists for his apparent willingness to indulge them in the gruesome details 
of his enslavement. This Preface, in its fawning over Williams and his horrific history, 
demonstrates all of the shortcomings of abolitionist print in reading the fugitive slave. Here, as in 
the newspaper accounts that followed the Narrative’s scandal, Williams registers as an 
instrument rather than a fully realized subject; rather than grappling with the complexities of his 
status as a fugitive or former slave, the Preface can only understand Williams first by who owned 
him, then by the events he witnessed, and finally by his rigorously tested truthfulness.  
 As tempting as it is to read this flattening only in the Preface, the Narrative itself is at 
pains to account for the depths of Williams’s personality—another self-induced narrative 
absence that occurs either because Williams was a persona rather than a person, or because 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins deliberately obfuscated Williams’s history as part of his ongoing 
fugitivity and evasion. Hank Trent capably demonstrates the extent to which Williams’s 
Narrative appears to intentionally alter the names of people and places, even as it contains a 
bevy of factual information that is otherwise consistent with what we know about the slave born 
Shadrach Wilkins.95 But the linguistic and narrative moves that Williams makes reveal the 
context in which this persona arises in the first place. In addition to demonstrating an awareness 
of the propensity of white readers to be either terrified or enticed, the Narrative also announces 
its governing narrative logic in other ways.  
																																																								
95 See Trent’s Introduction to his 2013 annotated edition of the Narrative for a fuller accounting 
of the factual inconsistencies and manipulations in the Narrative. I have no reason to contest his 
findings, nor do the specific alterations to names and dates affect my	larger arguments here about 
the ways that the James Williams manifests in the Narrative and elsewhere.	
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For instance, Williams writes (52-53), “It is not in my power to give a narrative of the 
daily occurrences on the plantation. The history of one day was that of all.” Here, in addition to 
underscoring the perpetual horror inherent in slavery, Williams trades on the same logic of 
substitution at work in the legal and literary texts that purport to represent slaves—a single day 
can stand in for the entire history of life on the plantation, a single chain of events can stand in 
for an escaped slave’s life story. In offering this announcement, Williams makes no effort to hew 
too closely to a temporal or historical accounting of what “happened” to him on the Alabama 
plantation. Rather, the anecdotes he chooses to repeat are metonyms for the larger and longer 
“history of life on the plantation.” In this sense, “the plantation” that he lived on in Alabama 
becomes a metonym for plantation life in general.  
 Despite his promise not to merely narrate daily occurrences on the plantation, Williams 
proceeds to do exactly that. The Narrative admits relatively little in the way of his own feelings 
or reactions, favoring instead to tell James Williams’s history primarily through acts of 
witnessing the behavior of others. While Williams occasionally acknowledges feelings of dread 
or fear, he reserves his attention to detail mainly for descriptions of physical violation or to build 
a fuller picture of owners and other slaves. For example, when describing the whipping he 
received at the hands of Huckstep, the abusive overseer on the plantation, Williams writes (67):  
A moment after I felt the first blow of the overseer’s whip across my 
shoulders. It seemed to cut into my very heart. I felt the blood gush 
and run down my back. I fainted at length under the torture, and on 
being taken down my shoes were filled with the blood which ran 
from the gashes in my back. The skin was worn off from my breast, 
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arms, and thighs, against the rough bark of the tree. I was sick and 
feverish, and in great pain, for three weeks afterwards . . . . 
This level of detail offers a chilling account of the physical degradations and torture techniques 
at work on the plantation. Williams is willing to be gruesomely specific about the physical 
wounds he suffers; when it comes to psychological suffering, he is far less forthcoming, tending 
to rely on summative, rather than descriptive language.  
For instance, upon realizing that his owner intended to leave him in Alabama for a 
decade—separated from his wife and children in Virginia—Williams (69) says simply, “I now 
saw that my destiny was fixed, and that I was to spend my days in Alabama, and I retired to my 
bed that evening with a heavy heart.” While admitting to mental anguish, he nevertheless sums 
up the entirety of his pain with the phrase “a heavy heart.” Despite the agony that must have 
accompanied the revelation of his permanent separation from his wife and children, absent is 
anything approaching the level of detail that characterizes Williams’s physical suffering when 
Huckstep whips him. Instead, Williams offers almost no clarifying information to represent his 
emotional pain for the reader. The denial of readerly access to Williams’s interior self is another 
instance of his refusal to engage with white institutions of power and print. The abolitionists’ 
apparent intention in publishing his Narrative is to grant white readers intimate access to the 
conditions of enslavement and fugitivity—Whittier’s Preface promises an accurate rendition of 
these conditions, and Williams’s “cup of bitterness” is a thinly veiled solicitation of sympathy 
from the AASS’s audience. Williams nevertheless consistently withholds information while 
appearing to reward the abolitionists with the details that would support their project. For each 
moment of proffered information, there is a correlative act of self-erasure or sublimation. 
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 These descriptive gaps—in which Williams reserves the greatest level of detail for events 
and physical sensations rather than emotions—also tend to expose the abolitionists’ blind spots. 
According to Whittier’s Preface, Williams had “rare and peculiar advantages for accurate 
observation of the practical workings on the system” (Narrative xvii) 96, but even that prefatory 
language seems unable to conceive of Williams within that system as an object of it. Just as law 
can only read the slave as a piece of property or a guilty criminal, Whittier’s Preface registers the 
slave as either a voiceless object to be observed within the system, or a trusted outside witness to 
that system—there is no mechanism to represent a slave who occupies both positions at once. In 
this context, Williams’s relative silence on the emotional and psychological dimensions of his 
torture obeys the logic of the text: to delve too deeply into his own subjectivity would violate the 
narrative distance required for him to objectively witness the workings of slavery. 
 Literature’s proximity to law comes into sharpest relief, however, during the newspaper 
coverage that followed the Narrative’s publication. Almost immediately after the AASS had 
published the Narrative, southern slavery advocates used print to attack the Narrative’s factual 
accuracy. One newspaper in particular, the Alabama Beacon, published a series of pieces 
denouncing James Williams, the AASS, and the Narrative as a whole, arguing that the text was 
factually impossible. After undertaking an internal investigation, the AASS disclaimed the 
Narrative and withdrew it from circulation in October 1838. Before ultimately halting 
publication, however, the AASS published a large feature in its newspaper, The Emancipator, 
																																																								
96 Because of the fraught questions of authorship that arise during the use of an amanuensis, it is 
unclear whether this absence emotional description was the result of Williams’s decision to 
withhold personal information, the AASS’s choice to present Williams as a resilient victim of 
physical pain rather than emotional abuse, or some combination of these factors. 
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entitled “Alabama Beacon versus James Williams.”97 That feature purported to document all 
available sources regarding James Williams, his history, and his Narrative.  
Among the materials included in the newspaper feature are letters from those claiming to 
know Williams (including the letter from George Larimer), those claiming to have proof that his 
story was fake, and the AASS’s own history of the steps it took to procure and verify Williams’s 
original story. At each turn, this feature collapses print coverage into legal language, subsuming 
the controversy beneath the institutional force and procedure of law. In Slavery on Trial: Law, 
Abolitionism, and Print Culture, Jeannine DeLombard offers compelling examples of the anti-
slavery movement’s deft print campaigns to put the institution of slavery on trial in the pages of 
periodicals and pamphlets.98 DeLombard unpacks the means by which abolitionists used print 
culture to witness the horrors of slavery and stage a public trial designed to expose its injustices. 
In “Alabama Beacon versus James Williams,” however, the AASS harnesses the power of the 
printed word to place James Williams on trial. 
 The titling of the feature marks an obvious framing of the investigation in legal terms, 
mirroring the captioning of legal cases and establishing James Williams as the defendant in these 
quasi-judicial criminal proceedings. The feature in The Emancipator presents the relevant 
sources in a format that also recalls trial proceedings: after first offering its own version of 
opening remarks that contextualize the dispute, The Emancipator presents letters as testimony in 
the manner of depositions or written affidavits. The resonance with law’s machinations is 
evident—James Williams has been transformed from author to criminal. What little agency he 
gains from existing as a party to the case—an upgrade from Slatter v. Holton, where he appears 
																																																								
97 The Emancipator, 30 August 1838. 
98 See Slavery on Trial (U of North Carolina P, 2007). 
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as the property in dispute—occurs only at the price of reading him in the register of criminality. 
If the feature figures the Alabama Beacon as the plaintiff and James Williams as the defendant, 
The Emancipator appears to figure itself as judge and jury—it sets the terms on which the 
investigation will occur, but it also positions itself as the finder of facts. In any event, The 
Emancipator and the AASS hardly appear as advocates for James Williams, despite their 
assertions of due diligence in securing Williams’s autobiography. 
 The AASS even calls for Williams’s extradition so that he might answer the claims 
against him. Noting that Williams was last seen bound for Liverpool, the AASS writes, “If we 
could have satisfactory assurance that he would be safe, as a freeman, in New York, from the 
claims of the Slaveholder, the Executive Committee ought to proceed to make inquiry for the 
place of his residence, that he might be brought back and subjected to the most rigid cross-
examination that those who dispute his story could impose.”99 Notice the sleight-of-hand that the 
AASS demonstrates here, calling at once for the subjection of Williams “to the most rigid cross-
examination” and simultaneously suggesting that it is not necessarily the AASS, but a collection 
of shadowy unnamed detractors, who would be responsible for imposing this violence on 
Williams. All the while, the AASS keeps law at the forefront, using the language of cross-
examination to articulate the process at hand and thus underscoring the need to treat Williams as 
a criminal defendant.100 This language also explicitly imports the concept of “subjection,” to 
figure Williams as an object, or specifically as the object of rigid cross-examination. The AASS 
																																																								
99 “Alabama Beacon versus James Williams,” 73. Given the unlikelihood that Williams’s owner 
would agree to such conditions, this offer probably represents disingenuous posturing rather than 
genuine negotiation. 
100 Though any witness is theoretically subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel, the 
context here (“the most rigid cross-examination”) implies that Williams is suspected of lying, 
that his truthfulness is in dispute, and therefore that it is Williams himself who is being tried. 
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makes these discursive moves beneath the veneer of anti-slavery benevolence, framing this 
remarkable call for Williams’s violent subjection within a half-hearted plea for assurance of 
Williams’s safety as a freeman. 
 The abolitionist press thus reveals its complicity with law. Satisfied, like the hounds, to 
fawn over James Williams while he appeals to its fantasy of a trustworthy slave narrator, the 
AASS goes for blood almost from the moment that Williams’s honesty is placed in question. In 
addition to glorifying Williams, Whittier’s Preface to the Narrative actually opens by 
denouncing the laws of slavery. Whittier (iv) writes, “It was reserved for American slave-holders 
to present to the world the hideous anomaly of a code of laws, beginning with the emphatic 
declaration of inalienable rights of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and 
closing with a deliberate and systematic denial of those rights, in respect to a large portion of 
their countrymen.” By pointing out the same hypocrisy that David Walker identifies in his 
Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, Whittier skewers American law as fundamentally 
indefensible in its denial of rights to slaves. The Whittier Preface even reproduces 
advertisements for runaway slaves as examples of law’s inhumane treatment of fugitive 
slaves,101 presenting these ads as evidence for its conclusions about the injustice of slavery as an 
institution.102  
 
																																																								
101 See Preface at xii-xiv. 
102 In this section of the Preface, Whittier also mirrors legal language to a lesser degree, couching 
the factual conclusions as proceeding from the “testimony” of slaves. It is not, however, until 
The Emancipator publishes “Alabama Beacon versus James Williams” that the AASS’s adoption 
of legal procedure becomes explicit. 
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And yet, it is to law that the AASS immediately returns in evaluating the veracity of the 
Narrative, shifting scrutiny and judgment from the institution of slavery onto the individual 
known as James Williams. Unable or unwilling to account for the incoherence in Williams’s 
persona, the AASS resorts to legal procedure to re-enact law’s criminalization of the slave—the 
very same procedure that the AASS denounces in the Preface to the Narrative. The narrative 
gaps that arise in the conditions of Williams’s fugitivity, thoroughly unreadable in the AASS’s 
white fantasy of black subjectivity, become fodder for his literary trial and conviction. 
 As with Jim Thornton, the existence of James Williams’s persona necessitates a series of 
radical acts of self-disappearance, as well as institutional acts of erasure. James Williams 
inhabits his persona so fully that even when Shadrach Wilkins appears in the letter to The 
Emancipator, no one—for nearly two hundred years—imagined that Wilkins and Williams 
might be the same person. But the most blatant version of James Williams’s erasure and 
substitution occurs through an 1835 legal document that predates the Narrative by several years. 
While still on Caleb Tate’s plantation in Alabama, Williams/Thornton/Wilkins made several 
unsuccessful attempts to escape, one of which resulted in a six-month stint posing as the slave, 
“James Williams,” of a man named James White. The two men traveled from Alabama to 
Baltimore, according to Hank Trent, by repeatedly enacting the same con: White “sold” 
Williams to a new owner, then surreptitiously “rescued” Williams, and the two moved on to the 
next town and the next unwitting purchaser.  
When finally captured in Baltimore, Caleb Tate appeared before a County Court judge in 
Montgomery County, Alabama to submit an affidavit in support of his efforts to recapture his 
escaped slave—who was then calling himself James Williams. The affidavit records Tate’s claim 
that White “is guilty of stealing from [Tate’s] possession in the County of his residence 
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aforesaid, his negro man, James Shadrach.”103 This strikethrough, or what Derrida would refer to 
as “under-erasure,” simultaneously evacuates the persona of James even as it leaves a visible 
sign of James’s “absence.” James has been erased, but not erased so fully as to be invisible. In 
affirming the presence of Shadrach’s persona, the court thus permits the residue of James to 
continue inhabiting the text. This process of striking and re-writing personae is a mimetic 
replication of the process that Williams/Thornton/Wilkins deploys in his fugitivity. Just as 
Shadrach Wilkins disappears in order to make room for Jim Thornton, so does the court strike 
out the name James in order to accommodate Shadrach. Confronted by a fugitive slave who 
repeatedly erases and re-writes himself, the court adopts an identical rhetorical strategy—the 
effect of which, however, leaves a visual and textual trace that the practice of fugitive authorship 
tends to resist. 
 This 1835 appearance of the Williams persona stifles any temptation to read 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins as the mere sum of his personae, or as representing any clear linear 
progression from one persona to the next. James Williams’s emergence in 1835 predates the 
emergence of Jim Thornton aboard the Henry Clay, making clear that these personae were 
deployed, abandoned, and recycled as their contexts made necessary and appropriate. Therefore, 
one act of vanishing does not preclude the vanished persona from returning in future. At the 
most, the discursive representations of each persona appear as versions of the strikethrough in 
Tate’s affidavit—vanished for now, but perhaps more accurately described as “dormant.” 
Though the textual representations only permit one persona to be represented at a time, the 
																																																								
103 Affidavit of Caleb Tate, 16 October 1835, reproduced in Appendix D of Trent’s Narrative of 
James Williams, An American Slave: Annotated Edition (2013). 
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strikethrough suggests that fugitive personhood, if it is to be read at all, must be read in the gaps, 
absences, substitutions, and deletions that punctuate the appearances of these multiple personae. 
* * * 
While I critically consider these multiple personae—Shadrach Wilkins, Jim Thornton, 
and James Williams—I ultimately argue that they cannot merely be aggregated to form a single, 
coherent, unified person. Instead, the personae inhabit various discursive territories, each of 
which is inadequate to fully contain Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s complexity and rich identity. 
If it is dangerous to read the Wilkins, Thornton, and Williams personae as parts of a coherent 
whole, it is equally dangerous, however, to read them as merely wounded or traumatized quasi-
persons. To do so would be to resort to the same gestures that law and literature make—to accept 
the fantasy of readable, white subjectivity as the only model for a fully realized nineteenth-
century subject. Instead, we must accept the unknowability and incoherence of 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. To engage meaningfully with fugitive personhood, then, we must 
accept each of these personae as both fully realized subject and as unreadable on account of that 
subject’s condition as a fugitive. The proliferation of fugitive personae does not mark the 
inadequacy or incompleteness of the subject himself or herself—instead, it records the subjective 
space that neither law nor literature cannot represent. Both law and literature, faced with a failure 
of representation, have as their only recourse a mimetic reproduction of the very strategies that 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins deploys: recursive proliferation, negation, and substitution. 
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PART II:  
BORROWINGS AND TAKINGS:  
FICTIONALITY IN LAW AND THE LEGALITY OF FICTION 
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Chapter 3 
“Not Intended to Deceive”:  
Legal Fictions, the Transhistorical Slave, and the Mythology of American Law 
 
While Chapter 1 considers the negation of black subjects in both law and literature, Chapter 2 
examines instead the difficulties that faced law and literature in reading or managing 
proliferating black fugitive personae. Both of these chapters have made a case for the shared 
project of law and literature in the antebellum period with respect to slavery and black 
subjectivity more generally. In Chapter 3, I turn to a particular literary device—the legal 
fiction—in the adjudication of slaves’ rights to petition for freedom.  
 In the 1840s and 1850s, the ideological distance between slave and free jurisdictions 
became all the more contentious as state governments increasingly established their own unique 
systems to manage black bodies. The regulation of fugitive slaves took on particular 
significance, most notably in the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which essentially required 
government officials—even in free states—to enforce the capture and return of fugitive slaves to 
their southern owners. This sweeping federal legislation was part of the legislative bundle known 
as the Compromise of 1850, a collection of five statutes intended to bring order to the 
contradictory legal rules in slaveholding and non-slaveholding jurisdictions. At the heart of this 
legislative package was a tension over how to absorb various bodies into existing categories such 
as citizen, slave, and free person. Slavery, and its insistent muddying of the line between person 
and property, posed particular challenges to these categories, especially since legal definitions of 
slaves varied by jurisdiction. Increased travel and mobility also created new categories of 
persons who had been slaves at one point but became free, whether through escape or 
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manumission.104 Several generations of slaveholding had also produced a number of bi- and 
multi-racial subjects born into slavery who were nevertheless at least half (and often more than 
half) white. In short, in these decades leading up to the Civil War, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to confidently ascertain a person’s racial, and thus legal, status without recourse to 
evidence other than physical appearance. A palpable collective anxiety arose around how best to 
narrate categories of personhood—legal institutions were particularly susceptible to the narrative 
challenges of representing slaves without disrupting the tenuous prevailing laws of slavery. 
 The legal system necessarily developed procedures to address some of the more 
complicated questions of racial identity. In slaveholding jurisdictions, blackness was generally 
prima facie evidence of enslavement,105 and a black person asserting a right to freedom bore the 
burden of proof in establishing that he or she had been wrongfully enslaved, typically as the 
result of kidnapping or fraud. Another common legal rule used to definitively “sort” black 
persons into the category of “slave” was the status of that person’s mother; the theory that the 
child followed the condition of the mother meant that if a person’s mother was a slave, then that 
person was also a slave, regardless of racial identity. These rules, ostensibly made to promote a 
kind of certainty within the law, created bright-line categories for legal racial status—bright-line 
categories that also then created the conditions for a person to assert that he or she had been mis-
categorized.  
																																																								
104 For Edlie Wong, travel is central to her consideration of freedom suits in Neither Fugitive Nor 
Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel (New York: NYU P, 
2009). 
105 I take up this particular legal rule later in the chapter in my discussion of Boulware v. 
Hendricks, 23 Tex. 667, 667 (1859). 
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 For persons asserting wrongful enslavement, legal procedure posed a specific obstacle: in 
general, slaves were not permitted to sue as plaintiffs in civil courts, nor were they typically 
permitted to offer in-court testimony as witnesses.106 As a means of avoiding this legal 
predicament, law recognized a new genre of civil proceeding, the freedom suit. Individual states 
established their own methods for adjudicating these cases where people held in slavery alleged 
wrongful enslavement or wrongful imprisonment. The most famous of these freedom suits is 
undoubtedly Dred Scott v. Sandford, the 1857 case in which the Supreme Court, under Justice 
Taney’s pen, declared federal citizenship unavailable to any persons of African descent.107 The 
St. Louis Circuit Court Historical Records Project currently houses what is generally regarded as 
the largest collection of freedom suit filings, a total of 301 petitions for freedom from the years 
1814 through 1860.108 These records are primarily the petitions themselves, rather than written 
court opinions adjudicating the status of the petitioners. This archive has formed the basis for 
much of the recent scholarship on freedom suits and offers a kind of primer on what we might 
consider their generic attributes. 
 
																																																								
106 However, as Ariela Gross argues in Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the 
Antebellum Southern Courtroom (67-69), slave testimony often entered the courtroom as hearsay 
or	through various local practices that created exceptions on an ad hoc basis. (Princeton UP, 
2000). 
107 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
108 See St. Louis Circuit Court Historical Records Project, Freedom Suits Case Files, 1814-1860. 
Available at http://www.stlcourtrecords.wustl.edu/about-freedom-suits-series.php. It is difficult 
to estimate the total number of freedom suits filed nationwide—many of these suits were not 
reported in official court reporters, or only entered the official legal record at the appellate stage. 
This difficulty in locating the underlying petitions for freedom is unsurprising, given the nascent 
status of legal publishing and the pervasive pattern of archival silence that tends to occur around 
the histories of slaves.	
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 Procedurally, there was a general prohibition on slaves bringing civil suits as plaintiffs; 
freedom suits carved out a temporary suspension of this prohibition, creating an exception to that 
prohibition that allowed slaves to file these specific petitions against their owners. Typically, a 
freedom suit consists of a petition alleging the basis for wrongful enslavement. The form here is 
critical in that a freedom suit in no way challenges the legitimacy of slavery as an institution; 
rather, it forces a slave to implicitly accept the legitimacy of slavery by instead alleging that he 
or she has been mischaracterized as a slave through mistake or fraud. In Neither Fugitive Nor 
Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and the Legal Culture of Travel (5), Edlie Wong refers to 
this feature of freedom suits by noting that “the slave had to acknowledge the idea of just 
subjection under slave law in order to petition courts for emancipation based on wrongful 
enslavement.”109 Here, law’s typology of slaves appears in sharp relief. As I discuss later in this 
chapter, law insists elsewhere that enslavement is an innate status; the freedom suit, however, 
stages enslavement as a fictional category, an attribute or characteristic to be applied to 
individuals either rightly or wrongly. 
 Because freedom suits thus embrace the question of fictionality at such a broad level, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the use of specific legal fictions are also critical to the operation of 
individual freedom suits. Legalized slavery itself depends on the existence of living property, a 
category that permits ownership over human beings who are analogized to myriad other forms of 
property. As I will discuss later in this chapter, those analogies run the gamut from so-called 
“chattel slavery,” in which slaves are considered personal chattels, to the legal treatment of 
slaves as real estate or “immovables.”110 No matter which jurisdiction is operative, however, the 																																																								
109 New York: NYU P, 2009. 
110 These distinctions were often contradictory or confusing even within jurisdictions. See for 
example Girard v. New Orleans, 2 La. 897 (La. 1847), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court 
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one category consistently unavailable to slaves is that of full legal persons or citizens. This broad 
and diverse basis for legalized slavery is itself a legal fiction, a creation of law that demonstrates, 
in Karla Holloway’s words, how “[t]here is an out(side of)law and irregular quality to embodied 
blackness.”111 The law names black subjects even as it insists on their situation outside 
institutional protections—outside citizenship, outside personhood—and yet refuses to grant black 
subjects their own unique status, instead repeatedly analogizing them to various other types of 
property.  
 In a suit for freedom, slavery’s biggest, most outrageous lie—that black subjects were not 
persons at all—posed a particular problem for the continuity of legal precedent. A slave, who 
normally would enter a courtroom only in chains as a criminal defendant, temporarily entered the 
courtroom as a legal actor, endowed with the capacity to sue another person—a white 
slaveholder, no less. One legal fiction thus came to substitute for another. An action for freedom 
suspended the legal fiction of the slave as property in favor of another temporary legal fiction of 
the slave as person entitled to assert a right to personal liberty. This chapter examines these 
particular legal fictions, those surrounding the legal personality of slaves during adjudications of 
freedom; my methodology here is one that combines legal history with literary critique in order 
to elucidate the precise mechanisms by which literary practices act on or within legal institutions. 
These particular legal fictions, I argue, reveal how law construes itself in the antebellum United 
States, as both uniquely American and simultaneously the product of a long and substantial 
history. I do not mean to suggest here that legal fictions are somehow unique to the antebellum 
																																																								
holds that slaves are not real estate, but “immovables.” An immovable is the equivalent of a 
fixture, an item which, by virtue of its permanent attachment to a plot of real estate, conveys 
along with the property. 
111 Legal Fictions: Constituting Race, Composing Literature (Duke UP, 2013) (3).	
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period or to the laws of slavery. Rather, as Stewart Motha (330) writes, “[T]here is no way 
around the fictive narratives that sustain our social and political life.” Instead, my goal in this 
chapter is to examine the specific legal fictions that accrue around legal representations of slaves 
as a means of understanding how those fictions animate the legal and cultural narratives from 
which they borrow and in which they participate. I further argue for fictionality not merely as 
shared terrain between law and literature but as a citational practice that facilitates the generic 
crossings I address in Chapter 4. 
* * *  
It is useful here to establish a working definition of legal fictions more generally. In Legal 
Fictions, Lon Fuller offers the following much-quoted distinction between a legal fiction and a 
simple lie: “For a fiction is distinguished from a lie by the fact that it is not intended to deceive” 
(6).112 This distinction supplies a ready logic for the way that law deploys fictions; when a court 
opinion holds that a slave is chattel property, one hardly supposes that any of the legal actors or 
readers are fooled into thinking that slaves are inanimate objects like other types of chattel 
property. This aspect of a legal fiction—a disjuncture between the literal “truth” of the statement 
and its legal effect—is arguably an instance of law’s efficiency, as Fuller himself notes when he 
recognizes that legal fictions are often tolerated on account of their “utility” (9).  
 
																																																								
112 Stanford UP, 1967. Fuller (9) further defines legal fictions as falling into one of the following 
two categories: “(1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its 
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.” 
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Another way of understanding the legal fiction is through the “as if” construction that 
Stewart Motha favors. Building on Derrida’s theorization of the “as if,”113 Motha distinguishes 
between “as such” and “as if,” with the former approximating a characterization of something 
“in fact” and the latter approximating law’s legal fiction. To continue with the example of chattel 
property, law makes the analogy not merely by holding that a slave is chattel property, as such—
rather, law will treat a slave as if  he or she is chattel property. These formulations of legal 
fictions do rhetorical work on two levels. First, the legal fiction gives law the appearance of 
efficiency, as Fuller notes when he suggests that the perceived utility of legal fictions is at least 
partially responsible for their prevalence. However, on the second level, the “as if” construction 
of a legal fiction, by being labeled “useful” or “efficient,” thus supports the apparent utility that 
attaches to the institutions it regulates. In the chattel slavery example, the presumption of the 
fiction’s efficiency assumes that chattel slavery is a useful institution in the first place. Thus, the 
supposed efficiency of the legal fiction rather confirms the usefulness of chattel slavery. 
In their application, legal fictions tend to betray the sharp tension in law between facts 
and legal principles—it is for this reason that Motha offers “as such” as the counterpoint to the 
“as if,” as a means of keeping both literal fact and legal fiction in play. As judicial holdings or 
terms of art, legal fictions should theoretically fall in the category of “legal principles” rather 
than “facts.” At some point, the distinction between fact and law ceases to matter—part of the 
work of a legal text is to blend the two together to establish a coherent application of realness to 
the circumstances in question. And yet, as a literary matter, this distinction helps explain the 
process of fictionalization in law beyond the use of specific legal fictions. The continued use and 																																																								
113 See, e.g., Derrida, “The Future of the Profession or the University Without Condition (Thanks 
to the “Humanities,” What Could Take Place Tomorrow) in Jacques Derrida and the 
Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge UP, 2002). 
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absorption of certain legal fictions into the cultural lexicon has the tendency to push those 
fictions toward statements that sound suspiciously “factual” and implicitly beyond interpretation. 
Once a statement has been classified as “factual finding,” it has already been adjudicated—
relegation to the realm of judicial “fact” does not make the statement any more “real” or “true,” 
but it does mean that a court will not expend any additional judicial labor interpreting it. Rather, 
so-called facts are accepted at face value. 
When legal fictions become used repeatedly over time, what was initially a genuine 
matter of legal interpretation has the tendency, therefore, to migrate out of the “legal” category 
and into the “factual” one. For example, when a court simply describes a slave as chattel without 
explicitly citing a legal rule or justification for that proposition, it becomes evident how this 
particular legal fiction has invaded language to such an extent that its paradoxical nature goes 
unremarked. The question of slaves’ status as chattel is presented as self-evident condition rather 
than legal conclusion. In other words, readers and litigants would be so familiar with this specific 
legal fiction that it could be asserted by judge and layperson alike without necessitating any legal 
or ideological explanation: the legal fiction has become shorthand for an entire set of legal 
principles and precedents.  
This apparent utility of legal fictions actually depends on a series of contingencies in 
language’s connotative and descriptive force. The hearer or reader of a legal fiction, much like a 
reader of any foreign language, must possess a certain facility with metaphor and other figures of 
speech in order for the legal fiction to maintain any legibility, much less descriptive traction. For 
this reason, Fuller frequently refers to the metaphorical, linguistic, and literary nature of legal 
fictions. It is worth pausing to consider the nature of fictionality more generally in the context of 
literary fiction, where readers are less suspicious of it. Literary fiction, like law, depends upon 
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the construction of plausible narratives and literary worlds.114 The main difference between a 
literary fiction and a legal fiction, of course, is that law carries with it the force to compel or 
mandate its conclusions in the “real world.” It is this nature of law that Robert Cover refers to in 
“Violence and the Word” (1601) when he writes, “Legal interpretation takes place in a field of 
pain and death.” At law, the act of interpretation—and fictionalization—occurs in the domain of 
language, but the language itself has the tendency to bridge the gap one imagines between the 
fantasy of legal fiction and the reality facing those who stand before law and await its judgment. 
As Cover (1604) writes, “Law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality.”  
This projection of an imagined future on top of, or in addition to, so-called reality sounds 
remarkably similar to literary fiction, where authors construct narratives that depend both on 
creative imagination and also on the plausibility of the fictional worlds as coherent versions of 
“the real world.” Whereas law projects—or mandates—future worlds onto real ones, fiction 
might be better described as projecting possible worlds onto real ones. Both discursive postures, 
however, are transformative projections that test the borders of what we experience as “real”; 
given the stakes of legal adjudications for our “real” words, we should take seriously fiction’s 
role in shaping law. As Colin Dayan writes (150-51) in The Law is a White Dog:  
Once the word ‘legal’ is attached to words such as conscience, 
intellect, or choice, they no longer mean what we thought they 
meant. It is as if whenever ‘legal’ is used, it erodes not just the 
customary and normal but the very facts of existence. This 
																																																								
114 For a fuller discussion of worldbuilding, see my chapter “Bartleby, Barbarians, and the 
Legality of Literature” in Latour and the Passage of Law, ed. Kyle McGee (U of Edinburgh P, 
2015). 
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transforming power gives law a reality that flies in the face of logic, 
and the most fantastic fictions are put forth as the most natural, the 
most reasonable thing in the world.  
Despite the inherent similarities between legal and literary fictions, the important difference is 
the way in which we encounter each type of fiction. As Dayan notes, legal fictions have the habit 
of naturalizing the fictional into the real. A kind of inverse truth operates in literary fictions, 
which we typically (though not always) encounter as somehow adding to, or transforming the 
real into something more than real. 
By taking fiction seriously as a technology of law, I push past the basic assertion of law 
as a social construction to plumb the depths of this tension in law among the categories of real, 
natural, and fictional—categories that, rather than operating as distinct states, constantly 
interrogate and overlap with each other. For this reason, I hew somewhat closely to Fuller’s 
characterization of the legal fiction as an untruth that is deployed with some aim other than 
deception. It seems always that the legal fiction is doing something much more powerful and sly 
than merely deceiving, and part of its power derives explicitly from the fact that it does not ask 
us to believe the truth of it what it explicitly offers. As Fuller notes, the legal fiction frequently 
occurs for purposes of efficiency, to shore up some other assumed premise (51-53), or any other 
number of reasons. The main distinguishing feature of the legal fiction, however, is that it always 
operates on two planes—the declarative and the analogous. As a declarative strategy, legal 
fictions supply names and labels, typically borrowed terms that are, on a literal level, untrue. On 
the plane of analogy, however, legal fictions use approximations and metaphors to generate 
connections between that literal untruth and the favored legal conclusion.   
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Here, I am concerned primarily with the legal fictions at work in the adjudication of free 
or slave status, and the manner in which such legal fictions constantly substitute, displace, or 
oscillate with each other. At the center of this particular set of legal fictions is the contested site 
of the black body and its classification into one of several available and pre-existing categories. 
As Karla Holloway (4) writes, “What makes a body visible enough for literary act and legal 
notice?” The visibility of black bodies during the antebellum period is a condition that 
necessitated the creation of new legal procedures but also called attention to specific 
inconsistencies in the narrative of the United States as an Anglo-Saxon nation. The difficulties of 
absorbing black bodies into the body politic—a fantasy of the United States as a space of white 
citizenship—resulted in a series of legal fictions that struggled to establish coherent American 
law without disrupting a historical narrative that grounded the United States in an Anglo-Saxon 
tradition.  
These legal fictions perpetuate a mythology of American law connected with the 
Republic’s project of nation-building during the nineteenth century, forging a transhistorical 
narrative out of the legal fictions that continually interrupt judicial reasoning during the 
adjudication of slaves’ claims of wrongful enslavement. The persistent intrusion of metaphor and 
analogy into law has the habit of calling the reader’s attention to the fact that law, by itself, lacks 
the language to fully account for those it adjudicates. These fictions, which appear to “interrupt” 
legal reasoning, in fact help create its continuity—metaphor and analogy are the devices that 
help law bridge the gap of an otherwise unresolvable legal problem, such as how to account for 
slaves’ bodies and legal personalities.115  
																																																								
115 In An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, Bruno Latour (165) uses the term “hiatus” to describe 
apparent interruptions or gaps that actually preserve the continuity of networks or institutions. In 
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Further, the practice of transhistorical narrative creation is a literary act. Once exposed, it 
sets the stage for the use of literary fiction as a site of legal critique and radical re-making. This 
chapter examines what it means that fiction, typically considered the domain of literature, is the 
technology of the metaphors and analogies that arise around the body of the slave. If works that 
we recognize as literary fiction—novels, short stories, and the like—share infrastructure with 
legal texts, then literature emerges as a possible site in which to critique and even re-write law. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the extent to which law is already engaged in the production of 
literature and the conclusion that literary and legal fictions are, at some point, inextricable. 
* * * 
When the United States declared its independence from Great Britain in 1776, it “inherited” 
previously existing British common law. In common law cases, British common law essentially 
formed a point of departure for judicial opinions in early U.S. courts, leading to the formation of 
new legal holdings and rules that slowly accrued their own precedential weight. By the 1840s, 
U.S. federal law was still less than a century old. At the state and local levels, court reporting of 
judicial opinions occurred somewhat unpredictably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and new 
states were entering the Union on a regular basis—often entering as either “slave” or “free” 
states. In short, both geographical and legal maps were in a state of constant flux. Adjudication 
of wrongful enslavement followed a variety of different procedures throughout the country, with 
distinctions that ranged from regulations of who could bring freedom suits to the proper court 
filings necessary to make a claim for wrongful enslavement. 
																																																								
“Bartleby, Barbarians, and the Legality of Literature,” I theorize the legal fiction as an example 
of such a hiatus. 
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 As early as the eighteenth century, Virginia law sought to establish a narrative of the 
slave’s body as something other than the body owned by a white person. While the freedom suit 
procedure temporarily suspended a slave’s status as “out(side of)law” in Karla Holloway’s 
description, the earlier fictionalization of the slave’s body drew on existing legal categories to 
produce the illusion that slavery had some rightful place in American legal philosophy. For 
instance, a 1705 Virginia statute declared “Negro, mulatto, and Indian slaves within this 
dominion to be real estate.”116 That statute appeared to acknowledge the fictive nature of the 
pronouncement, offering the following justification:  
For the better settling and preservation of estates within this 
dominion . . . that all negro, mulatto, and Indian slaves, in all courts 
of judicature, and other places, within this dominion, shall be held, 
taken, and adjudged to be real estate (and not chattels;) [sic] and 
shall descend unto the heirs and widows of persons departing this 
life, according to the manner and custom of land of inheritance, held 
in fee simple. 
Perhaps because of the striking oddity of declaring people to be real estate, the statute provides 
the logic of its provision as the promotion of efficient inheritance of landed estates. In the law of 
property, chattels do not convey or descend to heirs as part of real estate; this theoretical division 
between chattel and real property is the principle that prevents furnishings from automatically 
conveying in the sale of real estate. Presumably, characterizing slaves as chattels would have 
increased the administrative burden on executors, whereas classifying slaves as real estate meant 
																																																								
116 Acts of the Virginia Commonwealth, October 1705, Ch. XXIII, 3:33. Available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/slavery/experience/legal/docs1.html. 
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that relatives who inherited a plantation would automatically also inherit the entire labor force 
that powered it. 
 Apart from promoting efficient inheritance, by equating slaves with real estate, law 
anchors slaves—literally in the land—to a natural, and insurmountable condition of subjugation. 
In property law, real estate held in fee simple refers to absolute ownership. By classifying the 
ownership of slaves as fee simple, the Virginia statute essentially makes it difficult if not 
impossible for anyone to interfere with a master’s enforceable legal title to his slaves. As with 
the later statutory provision that likens slaves to paupers, this early Virginia statute also resorts to 
approximation, but it approximates slaves not to other living humans but to land itself. This de-
naturing of the slave, the evacuation of the body and temporary substitution with the body of the 
pauper, participates in the narrative of slavery’s existence within American law more generally. 
The 1705 statute, promulgated during British colonial rule, narrates the slave in conjunction with 
the distinctly British system of landed estates and real property ownership. The continuation of 
this metaphor of the slave as real estate persisted in Virginia long after independence, however, 
moving through several transformations as lawyers, legislators, and judges slowly established a 
body of new American law. When a later statute affords slaves the right to sue for their own 
freedom in forma pauperis, law then re-narrates the slave, shifting him or her from a 
geographical condition to one of indigence. 
 In Virginia, procedures for freedom suits had also been in place since the eighteenth 
century, when the Statutes at Large of Virginia provided, “That, when any person shall conceive 
himself or herself illegally detained as a slave in the possession of another, it shall and may be 
lawful for such person to make complaint thereof . . . .” The statute further prescribed the means 
of a freedom petition, noting that the slave should “petition[ ] the said court to be allowed to sue 
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therein in forma pauperis, for the recovery of his or her freedom.”117 This statutory enactment 
would form the basis for freedom suits filed in the state throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century, and it embraces several key concepts. First, in creating a category of illegal detention, 
the statute imagines a status of wrongful enslavement. Although the statute is silent on the 
characteristics of illegal detention, the provision explicitly concerns illegal detention in slavery, 
as opposed to wrongful imprisonment more generally. The possibility of “illegal” detention thus 
carves out a presumption that slavery in other circumstances is legal—if not natural. In fact, the 
statute appears to construe slavery not as a natural condition of birth, but as a man-made 
institution subject to error. The construction of slavery—its existence as a legal as opposed to 
natural creation—is thus implied in the statute’s language. 
 If this aspect of the statutory language feels somewhat straightforward, the procedural 
steps outlined in the statute move closer to metaphor or analogy. For those bringing freedom 
suits, the statute provides that courts have the power to allow these slaves “to sue therein in 
forma pauperis,” or in the manner of a pauper. This legislative sleight-of-hand both denies a 
slave’s legal personhood even as it provides a substitute: the slave, not a citizen and thus not a 
proper civil plaintiff, may sue as though he or she is a poor person. Proceedings in forma 
pauperis, which typically waive court costs and other filing fees, are primarily the domain of 
indigent and incarcerated plaintiffs seeking judicial relief. In making this type of pleading 
available to slaves, the statute also limits its application—the designation of in forma pauperis 
occurs only to these freedom petitions and not to any other type of civil proceeding. The analogy 
links the slave explicitly to both poverty and incarceration. While appearing to “make room” for 
																																																								
117 General Assembly of Virginia, Statutes at Large of Virginia, from October Session 1792 to 
December Session 1806, Inclusive, in Three Volumes, Laws of Virginia, 1795, Ch. 11 (364). 
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the slave at law, this judicial procedure calls attention to the slave’s lack of citizenship rights and 
links the slave’s status as property to the slave’s condition as having no property of his or her 
own.  
 The statute thus nuances the legal fictions at work; by fictionalizing the slaves as paupers, 
the statute’s analogy, in comparing slaves to indigent people, only underscores that slaves 
themselves lack legal rights to their own bodies. The predominant legal fiction in play is that 
slaves do not have, or own, their bodies—they are bodies that belong to others. The Virginia 
statute temporarily vanishes the slave’s body and substitutes the figure of the pauper in its 
place.118 This approximation of the slave as an indigent or prisoner establishes the kind of logical 
symmetry that law favors; the slave, after all, is seeking relief for illegal “detention,” and the 
prescribed form of pleading in forma pauperis mirrors the status of a prisoner seeking relief for 
wrongful imprisonment more generally. Absent this one exception that allowed a slave to 
petition for freedom, slaves typically only otherwise entered the courtroom as criminal 
defendants. The efficiency of this substitution (the pauper or prisoner in place of the slave) also 
forecloses any legal concession that a slave possesses either the right or the capacity to hold 
property of his or her own. The equation of the slave with the criminal participates in a much 
larger narrative at work in the antebellum period—and very much in force up to the present day. 
This relatively small act of describing slaves as indigents or prisoners thus establishes a set of 
connotations that characterizes—an act that we typically regard as the provenance of literary 
fiction—slaves as impoverished and criminal.  
																																																								
118 Note how this substitution also mirrors the fiction about the slave’s lack of ownership over his 
or her body. By figuring the slave as a pauper, law suggests that the slave is impoverished rather 
than utterly excluded from the entire system of economic participation. In fact, the slave was 
more likely to enter the marketplace as goods than as a consumer. 
	 137	
 In addition to the statutory provisions regarding petitions for freedom, Virginia case law 
repeatedly fictionalized the slave’s body when interpreting the statutory mandates and 
adjudicating slave’s rights to freedom. The importance of temporality in these fictions 
demonstrates the extent to which these particular legal fictions participate in larger narratives 
about the formation of U.S. law. In 1859, Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in Shue v. Turk (15 Gratt. 256), a case in which a recently emancipated slave submitted a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus when a creditor claimed a right to collect the slave as a lien 
on a debt. The opinion reveals the set of contingencies and fictions that arise around a slave’s 
body when the legitimacy of enslavement is at issue. Despite concerning an emancipated slave, 
the opinion never names the slave, referring to him instead as simply “Slave S.” The court 
describes the central legal issue as follows: “The matter in controversy is not whether the 
petitioner is a freeman or a slave: but whether, as an emancipated negro, he is liable for a debt of 
Hanna, his former owner—that is to say, whether, being free, he is subject to a lien, the 
enforcement of which may have the effect of reducing him again to the condition of slavery” 
(260). The case is therefore not a freedom suit per se, though it demonstrates that even 
emancipation was extremely precarious for former slaves. In discussing the nature of the contract 
between the slave’s former owner and the creditor and its contradiction of public policy, the 
court notes that “If, however, any contract of this character can ever be, this one is, free from the 
objection that the slave is put in a condition between freedom and slavery” (267).119 The court’s 
continued reference to the petitioner as a slave somewhat undercuts the claim that the petitioner 
is “between freedom and slavery.” Though the court ultimately orders the former slave released 
																																																								
119 The court is unhelpfully creative with sentence structure in this excerpt. It may be more 
helpful to read this quote as saying “If any contract of this character could ever exist, this one fits 
the bill, except for the fact that it puts the slave in a condition between freedom and slavery.” 
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from custody, this refusal to call the petitioner by name—and continued characterization of him 
as a slave—makes clear that the stain of slavery outlives even manumission or emancipation. 
 It is against this backdrop that the court also considers a second, procedural issue that 
fictionalizes this otherwise nameless slave’s body. The fact that the former slave filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus necessitated some judicial debate regarding the propriety of that 
pleading. Though one justice dissented, the majority of the court held that the habeas petition 
was proper—precisely because the former slave was able to show that he had already been 
emancipated. As the court notes, “It is well settled that a negro, claimed and held as a slave, 
cannot litigate his right to freedom under a writ of habeas corpus. In this case, however, the 
petitioner produces his papers showing, on their face, that he has been regularly emancipated” 
(259-60). The court ultimately holds that because emancipation has already occurred, the habeas 
writ is proper in this case. In reaching this holding, the court cites Ruddles Ex’r v. Ben, 10 Leigh 
467 (1839), where a similar question was in dispute. In that earlier case, the court held that there 
was “no reason for denying to the petitioner the benefit of the great and salutary writ of habeas 
corpus” (476). It is thus clear from both Ruddles and Shue that the availability of habeas relief is 
a badge of, if not citizenship, freedom. Both cases assert that someone who is claimed as a slave 
must file in forma pauperis for freedom rather than through submission of a habeas petition. 
Though the cases refer to the Virginia statute prescribing the requisite form of pleading in 
freedom suits, there is no other discussion regarding the inappropriate nature of a habeas 
petition. 
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The writ of habeas corpus, literally “you may have the body,”120 is the petition typically 
used by people claiming unlawful imprisonment. By distinguishing unlawful imprisonment more 
generally from unlawful slavery, Virginia law establishes certain contingencies and temporalities 
for slaves’ bodies. Prior to some adjudication of freedom, the slave has no body—he or she is a 
body that is considered, for all legal purposes, as real estate. It is not only through the analogy to 
real estate, however, that slaves’ bodies are revealed as complicated sites of potential self-
ownership.121 Concerning a Virginia case on manumission, Colin Dayan (146) writes, “Release 
through manumission, then, was not simply a gift but an act of creation. Since the slave had no 
capacity to become free and could never gain it, emancipation meant something new . . . . [H]ow 
do you bequeath freedom to enslaved persons who might not be capable of receiving it?” 
Dayan’s analysis demonstrates not only the problem of the slave’s legal personhood—the lack of 
a legal body in which he or she has an ownership interest—but also the birth of the legal body 
through manumission or emancipation. Manumission creates the body that the slave then has a 
legal right to control. This act of creation is a paradox, a granting of legal personality to a human 
being the law has already declared to be a non-person, forever incapable of achieving 
personhood.  
 
																																																								
120 Others have translated the phrase as “you shall have the body” or “you must have the body.” 
Crucially, petitioners seek the writ either to secure the release of an improperly detained prisoner 
or to produce a witness for testimony or examination. 121	In The Law is a White Dog, Colin Dayan considers the 1858 Virginia case of Bailey v. 
Poindexter’s Executor, in which a slaveholder bequeathed a complicated future grant of freedom 
to his slaves, a grant that essentially asked the slaves to choose between being sold at auction or 
being hired out to raise the funds for their own emancipation. Though not a comparison to real 
estate, Bailey offers another example of how even manumission generates complicated fictions 
of slave bodies.	
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Petitions for freedom resolve this paradox—the absence of a legal body, or the presence 
of a human body that nevertheless fails to rise to the level of legal person—by temporarily 
embodying the slave in another category of person recognized in law. Freedom petitions do so by 
creating a new fiction of the slave in forma pauperis for purposes of the freedom litigation. It is 
only after being freed, whether through emancipation or litigation, that the slave acquires his or 
her own legal body and thus recourse to habeas relief. By denying habeas relief to the slave prior 
to emancipation, the law refuses to grant a slave his or her own body—and rejects the possibility 
of doing so. This legal distinction operates in part because, in the case of unlawful imprisonment 
by someone other than the owner, a slave would have no legally enforceable interest in his or her 
own body; were a slave detained, it would be the master who would instead have standing to 
assert a right to his unlawfully detained property. Here it is increasingly difficult to distinguish 
legal fictions from literary fictions, except that legal fictions appear in legal texts and documents. 
The legal fictions take a set of facts and re-narrate them to fit them into the desired legal premise, 
to produce the desired legal outcome. 
 This trajectory of the slave—from real estate to indigent to legal body—establishes a 
temporal dimension to the movement from slavery to freedom. Whatever the outcome of a 
petition for freedom, the slave’s status as a pauper is a temporary one that exists solely for 
purposes of that litigation. This fictionalization of the slave at three different stages of 
adjudication hews to existing legal categories of property, liberty, and personhood—though it 
sometimes claims to promote efficiency, this fidelity to existing categories actually creates an 
unwieldy system of classification and pleading during and even after the adjudication of a slave’s 
right to freedom. What, then, is the legal payoff for this complicated set of legal fictions from 
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slavery to freedom? By using approximations and analogies—law’s metaphors—legal texts 
preserve the continuity of precedent, reaffirming law as a source of order and governance. 
 It would be equally possible for law to simply create a new category of property devoted 
specifically to slaves. Doing so would arguably be the most efficient means of regulating slavery, 
and it would not require the suspension of disbelief that arises in the face of implausible legal 
fictions that ask readers to imagine slaves, for example, as plots of land. But the creation of a 
new category of property altogether would be a sharp departure from a legal tradition that 
recognized discrete forms of ownership and limited legal personhood to one specific population. 
Instead, law read slaves back into a system of regulation that had never anticipated them in the 
first place—the act of inserting slaves into existing categories of property served to manage the 
contentious claim that law itself was in some way a “natural” system of rules. As James Kent 
writes in Commentaries on American Law: 
There has been a difference of opinion among writers, concerning 
the foundations of the law of nations. It has been considered by some 
as a mere system of positive institutions, founded upon consent and 
usage; while others have insisted that it was essentially the same as 
the law of nature, applied to the conduct of nations, in the character 
of moral persons, susceptible of obligation and laws . . . . There is a 
natural and a positive law of nations. By the former, every state, in 
its relations with other states, is bound to conduct itself with justice, 
good faith, and benevolence; and this application of the law of 
nature has been called by Vattel, the necessary law of nations, 
because nations are bound by the law of nature to observe it; and it 
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is termed by others, the internal law of nations, because it is 
obligatory upon them in point of conscience. 
Kent draws a distinction between “the law of nature” and “instituted or positive law, founded on 
usage, consent, and agreement,” ultimately claiming both aspects of law in the American legal 
tradition and casting natural law as the “point of conscience” that animates codified national 
legal standards. Kent’s pairing of law and nation-state is persistent; in his formulation, it is 
incumbent on nations to construe natural law responsibly and morally. The implication here is 
that a moral national legal system is the mark of a mature and legitimate nation-state. 
 In fact, Kent opens this lecture with the genealogy of U.S. law in a European tradition, 
writing, “When the United States ceased to be a part of the British Empire, and assumed the 
character of an independent nation, they became subject to that system of rules which reason, 
morality, and custom had established among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law.” 
This opening gambit situates U.S. law both within and without the “civilized” nations of Europe, 
arguing that the United States, as an independent nation, was thus responsible for honoring the 
same general code of decency that existed among the other powerful, white, European nations. 
Kent goes so far to say, “The faithful observance of this law is essential to national character, 
and to the happiness of mankind.” For Kent, fidelity to European morality and legal custom thus 
marks the United States as a participant on the global stage, and it is central to the collective 
character of the newly formed nation. 
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 This mythology of American law as both preceding from and in contrast with the British 
and European legal traditions is a defining aspect of legal philosophy in the nineteenth century. 
The existence of legalized slavery in the United States in the antebellum period posed a textual 
problem for the creation of law that participated in and perpetuated this national legal 
mythology. While earlier British law regulated slavery, including the 1705 Virginia statute 
defining slaves as real estate, Britain had abolished slavery altogether in 1833 after first 
abolishing the slave trade in 1807.122 The American system of legalized slavery, pervasive and 
violent as it was during the first half of the nineteenth century, essentially created a new set of 
legal problems that existing European law was ill-equipped to manage. As Kent’s Commentaries 
suggest, however, American legal thinkers during the antebellum period sought to preserve the 
commonality between American and British law as a means of legitimizing the United States as 
a formidable, “civilized,” and globally relevant nation-state. 
 As the Virginia statutes and case law demonstrate, the adjudication of a slave’s right to 
freedom underscores this tension between history and genealogy on the one hand and the idea of 
national progress on the other. By fictionalizing the slave’s body as real estate, law implicitly 
suggests that slaves belonged in the existing frameworks of ownership and property, that it was 
not only logical but also natural for slaves to be legally tied to a master, as well as a fixed place. 
If, as Kent suggests, positive law is connected to a natural code of justice, then positive law 
permitting the ownership of human beings required a certain amount of linguistic gymnastics to 
square it with the conscience-clouding moral compass inherent in natural law. 
																																																								
122 Kent’s lectures began as early as 1794 and initially published as the Commentaries in 1826. 
Though some of his lectures predate the abolition of slavery in Britain, the circulation of the 
Commentaries during the antebellum period suggests their influence during the decades leading 
up to the Civil War.  
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 These fictions of the slave’s body—as non-existent, as real estate, as indigent—also 
depend deeply on a set of temporal contingencies. As I have already argued with respect to the 
development of law in Virginia, legal procedure as a path to freedom must unfold in a set of 
clearly defined steps: each moves the slave closer to legal personhood even as they prop up the 
larger apparatus that supports legalized slavery. The effect of these fictions is that the slave’s 
body is at once a historical object and a transhistorical subject. The mythology of American law 
insists on the slave as a naturally occurring phenomenon in legal systems of property ownership. 
At each stage of adjudication, the slave’s body is an object that accords with the history of law, 
suspended in a temporary assignation of property. And yet, these fictions do not accord with 
each other; in law, the slave cannot simultaneously be real estate, prisoner, and free legal person. 
Each legal fiction depends on the cancellation of the others.123 As we see from the court’s 
treatment of the freed slave in Shue v. Turk, however, the slave remains a slave even after 
manumission or emancipation. This figuration of the slave is also a fiction, though not merely a 
legal one—for this is a fiction that outlasts any legal actions, demonstrated by the fact that the 
fiction holds even after the slave ceases to “technically” (legally) be a slave.  
Thus, the figure of the slave is a transhistorical one that hovers alongside or outside these 
temporary legal fictions—a status that aligns with what Saidiya Hartman refers to as “the 
disparate temporalities of unfreedom.”124 Hartman uses this phrase to describe the temporal 
conflation between slavery and its modern remnants, wherein modern traces of slavery persist in 
																																																								
123 Note the parallel here to Williams/Thornton/Wilkins’s practice of fugitive personhood as a 
series of personae that arise and cancel one another out, at least temporarily. The resonance with 
his authorial practices as a fugitive slave suggest an intimate connection between the authorial 
and discursive strategies of fugitive personhood and the legal fiction strategies of adjudicating 
petitions for freedom.  
124 See “The Time of Slavery” at 763. 
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their feeling of currentness and presentness, in spite of our supposed historical distance from 
legalized slavery. These “temporalities of unfreedom” also inhere in the legal fictions 
surrounding the slave’s body in judicial opinions such as Shue v. Turk, however, reminding us 
that history is always a matter of degree and perspective. Even in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
figure of the slave was already peculiarly transhistorical, harkening back to an imaginary history 
of American law that fantasized slavery’s rightful place in the legal landscape—and thus 
American law’s rightful place in a European, and specifically Anglo-Saxon, tradition. This 
fantasy of the slave’s long, natural history in American law was also a forward-looking 
projection in that the stain of slavery attached even to freed slaves.  
 Even courts recognize this broader fictionalization of the slave through recourse to the 
old distinction between fact and law, a dichotomy that we might think of here as standing in for 
the dichotomy between fact and fiction. Kim Lane Scheppele (58) describes the use of fact in 
legal interpretation by noting that “fictions are not wholly legal judgments but not wholly factual 
descriptions either…And in this respect, fictions are no different from many other apparently 
factual descriptions that use legal categories.”125 As suggested by Scheppele’s observation, this 
affinity between legal facts and legal fictions complicates the question of where narration ends 
and “law” begins—or if it is ever possible to separate the two. In an 1859 opinion, the Supreme 
Court of Texas held that “Negroes, in this state, are prima facie slaves; and when held as such, 
they are slaves de facto, whether de jure, or not.”126 From a legal perspective, the classification 
of blackness as prima facie evidence of slave status means that the slave bears the burden of 
proving that he or she is wrongfully held in slavery—that, though a slave in fact, his or her “real” 
																																																								
125 “Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation.” Representations 30 (1990): 42-77. 
126 Boulware v. Hendricks, 23 Tex. 667, 667 (1859).	
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status is not one of legal enslavement. In describing this type of legal rule, in which blackness is 
presumptive evidence of slavery, Cheryl Harris writes that “whiteness became a shield from 
slavery, a highly volatile and unstable form of property.”127  
Indeed, in a system that equates blackness with slavery, the ability to claim whiteness is a 
mechanism for staving off challenges to claims for freedom—and the enforceability of clear title 
is the basis for all types of property. But the placing and shifting of legal burdens is itself also a 
temporal one because it determines which actor must make the first, or next, step in litigation. 
An actor without a burden has no responsibility to mount a case at all.128 These temporal 
qualifiers are important because taking a legal action or figure out of its chronology tends to 
disrupt the other operative legal fictions, causing the metaphors to lose their traction. Whatever 
utility exists in referring to a slave as real estate, for instance, becomes nonsensical if a slave in 
another context is a legal person. Where blackness itself is prima facie evidence of slavery, the 
fiction of the slave as a transhistorical figure further complicates the temporal sequences that 
move a person from legal slavery to legal freedom.  
In Boulware v. Hendricks, after declaring this distinction between slavery de facto and de 
jure, the court continues, “If they [slaves] are dissatisfied with their condition, and have a right to 
be free, our courts are open to them, as well as to other persons, to assert their right. As long as 
they fail to do so, they recognize their status as slaves, and so long, the mutual obligation of duty 
and protection subsists. Any other doctrine would complicate this relation, whose simplicity and 
																																																								
127 “Whiteness as Property,” 106 Harv. L. Rev. 8, 1707-91, 1720 (June 1993). 
128 The most common and well-known example of this phenomenon occurs in a criminal case, 
where the prosecution bears the burden of proof. Criminal defendants are not required to present 
any evidence since the burden is on the prosecution. This is the same reason that the prosecution 
must always present its case in its entirety before the defense has the option to present any of its 
own evidence.	
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certainty is most beneficial to both parties to it,--the master and the slave.”129 The 
perambulations and circular logics of this holding necessitate some parsing. One might 
summarize the holding as follows: (1) Black people are presumed to be slaves. (2) But if they 
have a right to be free (in other words, if they are not “true” slaves and ought not be enslaved), 
they have access to the courts. (3) If they do not petition for their freedom, they assent to their 
status as slaves, which in turn transforms them into slaves—even if they, as free people, ought 
not be slaves in the first place. Translated into plain language, this series of legal holdings sounds 
nonsensical because these categories simultaneously presume that slavery is a natural condition 
into which some people are born, and that slavery is sometimes contingent merely on one’s 
condition as slave, a condition that is in one’s power to transcend if the enslavement is illegal in 
the first place. In other words, slavery is both natural and constructed, but only one of those 
categories at a time. It is the chronology, or temporality, that determines what a slave “is” at any 
given point in time. Despite offering a set of confusing and circular logics, one thing the opinion 
explicitly does not do is provide any guidance as to when a slave petitioning for freedom might 
actually become free. The persistence of phrases like “as long as” and “so long” underscores 
that, for slaves submitting petitions, freedom is available only conditionally, provisionally, or 
temporarily. 
These adjudications of freedom, then, are a means of suspending or freezing the 
otherwise nonsensical temporality that governs the body of the slave. Being a slave de facto, or 
in fact, is merely another way of saying that one is a slave during a certain period of time. That 
“now,” or at the time of litigation, that person is being claimed by someone else as property. But 
the slave may have had an entirely different status at birth, or indeed may have another status 																																																								
129 Boulware v. Hendricks, 23 Tex. at 669. 
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pending the outcome of the litigation. But law, rather than acknowledging the slipperiness of 
temporality, relegates the matter to a question of fact—which is another way of saying “reality.” 
For in the example from Boulware v. Hendricks, the supposed distinction between de facto and 
de jure appears on its face to be supporting a kind of legal efficiency, a way of taking a snapshot 
of a slave’s status at a particular point in time. Without applying this temporal dimension, 
however, the numerous legal fictions of the court’s holding are nonsensical—they cannot 
simultaneously co-exist. What initially appears to be an exercise in legal efficiency becomes, on 
closer inspection, a remarkably unwieldy methodology for thinking about slavery more 
generally. 
What does it mean, then, that the figure of the slave is not only fictional but also 
polytemporal? First, it helps explain the difficulties that law repeatedly has when it attempts to 
read, name, or adjudicate slaves. As was the case in the way that law responded to David 
Walker’s Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, law has the peculiar habit of over-
representing those it appears to want to vanish. A similar result occurs here when courts attempt 
to adjudicate a slave’s right to freedom. By fictionalizing the slave’s body as, in part, a temporal 
construction, law also creates a need to pull the slave briefly out of that temporality for the 
purposes of adjudication—this suspension appears to occur in cooperation with the mythology of 
the slave as a natural part of the American legal landscape, but it also has the strange effect of 
rendering the slave as a transhistorical figure.  
Despite the law’s best efforts to reduce or altogether deny the personhood or humanity of 
the slave, the slave’s shadow on American law thus acquires a suprahuman, rather than 
subhuman, quality. The slave, unlike the free citizen, can infiltrate and upset any category and 
classification into which he or she is assigned. The need to resort to metaphor and legal fiction 
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only underscores the uncontainability of the slave’s body—there is always a remainder, an 
excess that law must analogize and approximate because it cannot otherwise account for the 
surplus.  
These questions of approximation, excess, and temporality appear in sharp relief in the 
1859 case of Stephenson v. Harrison, 3 Head 728 (Tenn. 1859). In that case, a slaveholder died, 
leaving a will that specified the disposition of his various property. Specifically, the will 
expressed the decedent’s desire for his slaves to continue serving his wife for the remainder of 
her life. At her death, the slaves would be freed, and the cost of their repatriation to Liberia 
would be funded through the sale of certain specific holdings in his estate. His heirs sought to 
use the proceeds of those funds for their own remuneration, and the slaves sued via next friends 
for the protection of those assets. As a legal procedural matter, suing via a “next friend” is a 
practice available to those who otherwise lack capacity to sue and is most commonly used for 
guardians to sue on behalf of minors or disabled adults. Here, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
(732) held, “…that slaves, while in that condition, cannot come into a court, except to assert the 
right to freedom, and the incidents thereto.” In this case, the slaves were not asserting their right 
to freedom, but the protection of assets for their future use, and thus the slaves could not bring 
suit. By using the language “while in that condition,” the opinion calls attention to the temporal 
boundaries that attach to enslavement in this case. Citing the interests of justice, however, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee does recognize another possibility of redress: “Here is a certain 
right to liberty given, but the time of its enjoyment is postponed until the happening of a future 
certain event. Connected with this bequest of freedom, there are certain rights of property, or 
money, given. How are these to be protected, but by the slaves through the next friend?”130 																																																								
130 Id. 
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Ultimately, the court authorizes the creation of a kind of trust for the funds to be used by the 
slaves upon their grant of freedom. While this opinion appears—perhaps surprisingly—to protect 
the financial interests of the slaves in future, it deploys the same legal fictions that operate 
elsewhere to dehumanize slaves and deny their rights. 
In Stephenson, the court acknowledges the present status of the slaves as slaves, as 
property; this status precludes them from suing their owners except through the fiction of the 
next friend. While this exception appears to circumvent the prohibition against slaves suing as 
civil plaintiffs, it does so by figuring the slaves as incapacitated or disabled. Rather than figuring 
the slaves as either property or persons, the law analogizes the slaves to children or disabled 
adults; significantly, it does so only because of the future grant of freedom. This remedy would 
not be available to other slaves who wanted to sue their owners for other reasons. Here again, it 
is the temporality that controls—now a slave, tomorrow a free man—a move that confirms and 
denies both of the dueling propositions of “born a slave, always a slave” and “once free, always 
free.” In Stephenson, both the current slavery and the future freedom are revealed as fictions, and 
it is only through the next friend that the court can address these fictions out of order, by putting 
in place the protections of freedom while the condition of slavery persists. The opinion itself thus 
manages the excesses of slavery and freedom—the establishment of a trust accounts for the 
excess of freedom that hovers over the slaves, and the insistence that the slaves bring the suit via 
next friend accounts for the excess enslavement that attaches to the slaves’ future rights. Once 
again, law manages these excesses through fictions that both reduce the slaves to something less 
than human and mark the status of slave as exceptionally potent and persistent. 
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Likewise, these fictions both clarify and mystify the plane of the “real” in legal language. 
The power of metaphor is in its capacity to gesture toward the ineffable, to provide an 
approximation that gives the reader a sense of the meaning while also acknowledging the 
impossibility of expressing it in language. In this way, metaphor is a perfectly apt vehicle for the 
problem of the slave’s body at law—it gestures toward the tendency of the slave’s body to 
exceed or outlast the legal categories in which it is placed. In accordance with Fuller’s 
characterization of legal fictions, these metaphors of the slave’s body are emphatically not 
intended to deceive. Rather than deception, the legal fictions of the slave’s body in adjudications 
of freedom emerge first and foremost as attempts to preserve the continuity of legal reasoning; as 
the legal reasoning becomes more strained, the fictions become more unwieldy, until eventually 
the slave becomes a superhuman, transhistorical personality with the terrifying capacity to act 
upon both slaveholders and freed slaves. For slaveholders, the slave is property to be managed 
and contained, and the slave’s uncontainability continually presents challenges at law. For freed 
slaves, the persistence of the slave’s body as a figure is a haunt that attaches and outlasts even 
legal emancipation.  
The nature of fictionality at law thus opens out onto fictionality more generally. In 
statutes and judicial opinions, fiction is a technology that propels law intentionally into a specific 
direction—the legal fiction animates or enlivens law to reach into corners where straightforward 
declarations cannot. In the specific context of antebellum adjudications of freedom petitions, 
metaphors and analogies re-purpose existing legal categories of personhood to expand or restrict 
their scope and to characterize each category’s membership class. These characterizations are 
transformative, both rhetorically and in their application—the shifting of a person from one 
category to another can mean the difference between enslavement and some version of freedom. 
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But the fictions also narrate a larger mythology of American law and American legal history, 
seeking to adopt taxonomies of personhood that accord with the desired narrative of the United 
States as a contender on the global—and specifically European—political stage.  
More to the point, the existence of legal fictions makes clear that narrative exists on both 
the micro and macro levels in law—not only do cases and statutes narrate broad legal questions, 
but legal fictions themselves are narratives within narratives. Though often intended as practical 
measures to improve efficiency, their charged language can also conjure connotations and 
conclusions that subvert the institutions they appear to support. In Chapter 4, I argue that this 
capacity of legal fictions—to transform actors and institutions by placing them within or outside 
of specific histories—is also present in literary fiction. I examine a work of literary fiction that is 
also comprised of narratives within narratives; I consider the intricate and mysterious ways that 
literary fiction encrypts legal narratives and vice versa. I argue that not only is fiction a site of 
potentially radical critique of legal narratives, but legal documents and literary fictions might 
best be understood as encrypted extensions of one another. Chapter 4 considers the ways that 
fictionality arises as the shared terrain of legal and literary landscapes, suggesting not merely the 
pliability and fictionality of law but also the inherent legality of literature. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Ciphers, Citations, and Encryptions:  
The Bondwoman’s Narrative and the Case of Jane Johnson 
 
“It must be a strange state to be prized just according to the firmness of your joints, the strength 
of your sinews, and your capability of endurance. To be made to feel that you have no business 
here, there, or anywhere except just to work—work—work—And yet to know that you are here 
somehow, with once in a great while like a straggling ray in a dark place a faint aspiration for 
something better, with a glimpse, a mere glimpse of something beyond. It must be a strange state 
to feel that in the judgement of those above you you are scarcely human, and to fear that their 
opinion is more than half right, that you really are assimilated to the brutes, that the horses, 
dogs and cattle have quite as many priviledges, and are probably your equals or it may be your 
superiors in knowledge, that even your shape is questionable as belonging to that order of 
superior beings whose delicacy you offend. 
 
It must be strange to live in a world of civilization and, elegance, and refinement, and yet know 
nothing about either, yet that is the way with multitudes and with none more than the slaves. The 
Constitution that asserts the right of freedom and equality to all mankind is a sealed book to 
them, and so is the Bible, that tells how Christ died for all; the bond as well as the free.” 
 
      —Hannah Crafts, The Bondwoman’s Narrative131 
 
In the first three chapters of the dissertation, I have explored the mechanisms by which law and 
literature act in concert with respect to slavery in the antebellum period. The yield of those three 
chapters is a kind of un-doing of what we might suppose we already know about what constitutes 
“law” and what constitutes “literature.” In Chapter 1, I examine the ways that black protest 
literature and confession surreptitiously structure laws that ostensibly vanish or destroy black 
bodies. In Chapter 2, I argue for the productive capacity of fugitivity to create multiple legal and 
																																																								
131 Warner Books, 2002 (201). 
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literary personae—none of which can be said to fully contain the fugitive slave’s body, much 
less his or her identity. Chapter 3 considers the legal fiction as a specific legal mechanism that 
both attempts and fails to place the slave’s body in accepted legal categories, primarily in 
freedom suits and other adjudications of a slave’s status as property or free. In Chapter 3, I argue 
that the literary dimensions of legal fictions—their metaphoricity and reliance on analogy—
make visible the slave’s capacity to exceed any categories that law contemplates as appropriate 
“containers” for slave subjectivity. Given the intimate and interconnected relationship I have 
traced between law and literature, Chapter 4 turns to literary fiction to explore the relationship 
between African American fiction and the law of slavery.  
I argue here that fiction and law operate not merely as mutually constitutive intertexts but 
as extensions of one another, encoding multiple narratives with little regard for generic 
boundaries or discursive traditions. My primary texts in this chapter are The Bondwoman’s 
Narrative, the fictionalized autobiography written by Hannah Crafts in the 1850s, and the legal 
testimony offered by Jane Johnson in connection with the trial of the abolitionist who allegedly 
helped her flee from slavery. The connection between these two texts, I argue, reveals that 
literary characters and legal subjects are practically indistinguishable in antebellum African 
American fiction. Fiction emerges as a locus for documenting and re-writing law, while law 
encodes the literary past of legal actors in “legal time,” a transhistorical feature of legal texts that 
confines slaves in bondage into perpetuity.  
*** 
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In 2002, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. published The Bondwoman’s Narrative, a previously 
unpublished novel by an apparent antebellum author named Hannah Crafts. In the 2002 edition, 
Gates offers a host of authenticating materials associated with the manuscript, which Gates had 
purchased at auction the previous year. After consulting with a number of scholars and experts, 
Gates concluded that the novel had been written sometime between 1853—the year of 
construction for a Washington, D.C. statue referenced in the text—and the onset of the Civil 
War.132 Although Gates was unable to definitively identify Hannah Crafts, he and other scholars 
were able to identify many of the people referenced in the novel, including John Hill Wheeler, 
her owner in Washington, D.C. and North Carolina during the 1850s. Gregg Hecimovich has 
since identified Hannah Crafts as Hannah Bond, a slave who escaped from Wheeler’s North 
Carolina plantation in approximately 1857 and ultimately re-settled in New Jersey.133 
Hecimovich’s conclusion has been reviewed and accepted by a number of scholars, including 
Gates. 
 The question of Crafts’s identity and the “truthfulness” of the events in The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative have haunted literary critics in a manner similar to the controversy and 
discomfort surrounding the slave narrative of James Williams. In addition to the 11-year quest to 
positively identify the woman known only as “Hannah Crafts,” scholars have also grappled with 
how best to classify The Bondwoman’s Narrative generically. It bears certain similarities to a 
slave narrative, in that it claims in the Preface to be a “record of plain unvarnished facts” (3), and 
Crafts identifies herself on the title page as “A Fugitive Slave Recently Escaped From North 
Carolina” (1). Like most slave narratives, The Bondwoman’s Narrative also offers an 																																																								
132 See Appendix A, The Bondwoman’s Narrative. 
133 See Julie Bosman, “Professor Says He Has Solved a Mystery Over a Slave’s Novel.” New 
York Times, 18 Sept. 2013.  
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autobiography of Crafts’s life within slavery, opening with a description of the narrator’s 
childhood that mirrors the genealogical absences typical of fugitive slaves: “No one seemed to 
care for me till I was able to work, and then it was Hannah do this and Hannah do that . . . . Of 
my relatives I knew nothing. No one ever spoke of my father or mother, but I soon learned what 
a curse was attached to my race, soon learned that the African blood in my veins would forever 
exclude me from the higher walks of life” (5-6). Crafts thus opens her narrative in the familiar 
format of a slave narrative, acknowledging her fugitivity, claiming a truthfulness in the 
“unvarnished facts” of her story, and establishing her origin story as an apparently orphaned 
slave. 
 Despite these affinities with the slave narrative, The Bondwoman’s Narrative makes a 
sharp departure from the genre in several important respects. First, unlike the slave narratives 
published by abolitionist societies, The Bondwoman’s Narrative lacks an amanuensis, appearing 
instead to be truly and fully written by Crafts herself. This detachment from abolitionist 
infrastructure means also that Crafts’s manuscript is not subject to the political aims and 
proprieties of an abolitionist culture that frequently privileged its own institutional survival and 
publicity over its concern for the slaves whose narratives it cannibalized.134 More than this 
institutional independence, however, The Bondwoman’s Narrative displays other traits that are 
much more commonly associated with fiction, or the novel in particular. Well-documented 																																																								
134 See Teresa Goddu’s work in Selling Anti-slavery for a discussion of the anti-slavery 
movement’s embrace of corporate culture in disseminating and publicizing its own products. As 
Goddu argues in Selling Anti-Slavery, and as suggested by my analysis in Chapter 2, anti-slavery 
societies appropriated slave narratives as part of their corporate branding and publicity. As the 
case of James Williams demonstrates, this appropriation was swiftly disclaimed when the 
accuracy of the Williams Narrative came under suspicion in the press. In disclaiming its 
affiliation with Williams, the American Anti-Slavery Society demonstrated that, despite its 
willingness to appropriate Williams’s autobiography for its own ends, the Society’s loyalty to 
and advocacy for Williams was equivocal at best. 
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intertexts such as Bleak House permeate The Bondwoman’s Narrative, and scholars have also 
noted Crafts’s use of gothic tropes such as the linden tree whose ominous creaks portend death 
and doom.135 These discursive borrowings from fiction suggest that Crafts located her text within 
that genre, despite how rooted it apparently was in the details and facts of her own life.  
Finally, and perhaps most prosaically and obviously, The Bondwoman’s Narrative looks 
like a novel in various basic respects. Crafts divides the text into chapters, each with its own 
epigraph. Rather than limiting the novel to her own autobiography, Crafts uses her text to narrate 
the stories of numerous characters. For instance, Chapters 14 and 15 are titled “Lizzy’s Story” 
and “Lizzy’s Story, Continued,” respectively, self-consciously ceding narrative space to another 
slave. The result is a text that looks a good deal more like Uncle Tom’s Cabin than the Narrative 
of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave. In fact, Crafts’s novel virtually bursts at the seams 
with the many biographies and narratives contained within it. Often, the most glancing reference 
in the text actually encodes and abridges another biography that could have, on its own, served as 
the framing structure for an entirely separate novel.  
The final chapter, “In Freedom,” offers an example of this textual pregnancy, in which 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative seems always on the verge of giving birth to another narrative 
world. In that chapter, Crafts writes of her life after slavery, where she runs a school for black 
children. In describing life in the North, Crafts (237-38) writes of her unlikely reunion with her 
own mother: 
																																																								135	For a fuller discussion of the novel’s use of gothic themes, see Bridget Marshall’s work in 
“Slave Narrative and the Gothic Novel: Hannah Crafts’s The Bondwoman’s Narrative” in The 
Transatlantic Gothic Novel and the Law, 1790-1860 (Ashgate Publishing, 2011). 
	 158	
Can you guess who lives with me? You never could—my own dear 
mother, aged and venerable, yet so smart and lively and active, and 
Oh: so fond of me. There was a hand of Providence in our meeting 
as we did. I am sure of it. Her history is most affecting and eventful. 
During my infancy she was transferred from Lindendale to the 
owner of a plantation in Mississippi, yet she never forgot me nor 
certain marks on my body, by which I might be identified in after 
years. She found a hard master, but he soon died, and she became 
the property of his daughter who dwelt in Maryland, and thither she 
was removed. Here she became acquainted with a free mulatto from 
New Jersey, who persuaded her to escape to his native state with 
him, where they might be married and live in freedom and 
happiness. She consented . . . . We met accidentally, where or how 
it matters not. I thought it strange, but my heart yearned towards her 
with a deep intense feeling it had never known before. 
In this passage, Crafts condenses what might have been her own mother’s autobiography or slave 
narrative into a brief summary. This excerpt narrates her mother’s separation from her, as well as 
her journey north out of slavery and into freedom. Crucially, Crafts supplies a number of 
geographical details, such as specific states of residence, but minimizes the moment that might 
bear the greatest narrative fruit—she writes of their initial reunion, “We met accidentally, where 
or how it matters not” (238). Though she proceeds later to tell of their tearful realization of their 
connection to each other, Crafts glosses over this first meeting, denying the reader any narrative 
suspense or drama associated with the details or “Providential” happenings that actually brought 
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these two women face to face against unimaginable odds. Though Crafts appears to be supplying 
a short biography of her mother’s life after slavery, this summary is more of a cipher than an 
elaboration. Crafts offers enough details to make her mother’s story legible, but she also denies 
enough information that the reader has the feeling of having reached merely the tip of the 
iceberg.  
 These literary excesses—in which the novel generates a surplus of narratives that threaten 
to burst through the central plot—counsel in favor of what Nicole Aljoe describes as “embedded 
slave narratives.” In Creole Testimonies: Slave Narratives from the British West Indies 1709-
1838, Aljoe argues for the possibility of recovering slave narratives that have been embedded 
elsewhere, often in fragmentary form.136  Focusing primarily on the testimonio, a Caribbean 
analogue to the freedom suit, Aljoe also locates testimonial slave narratives in places such as 
anti-slavery periodicals and even James Thistlewood’s diary. For Aljoe, regardless of the slave 
narrative’s generic legibility, these instances of fragmented narratives have one thing in 
common: first-hand testimony about the experiences of enslavement. This testimonial capacity of 
slave narratives is, for Aljoe, the central aspect of a reparative reading of unexpected archives in 
order to bring un-examined narratives into scholarly notice. Aljoe’s theorization of embedded 
narratives is especially useful to my consideration of The Bondwoman’s Narrative, and it is a 
starting point from which I branch out into several simultaneous directions. 
 
 
																																																								
136 Palgrave, 2012. 
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 On one hand, it is possible to read The Bondwoman’s Narrative (and I do) as embedding 
multiple other slave narratives, such as those of Lizzy or Crafts’s mother, as suggested above. 
However, rather than using Crafts’s text as a repository for other recoverable slave narratives, I 
argue that it is also encoding a number of legal narratives—legal narratives that, in turn, further 
encode slave narratives. To this end, the intersection of literary personhood and legal personhood 
emerges as a peculiarly fraught generic crossing, in which it becomes increasingly difficult to 
discern a meaningful difference between the two—in which the possibilities and limitations of 
language figure slave personality while also participating in a never-ending citational practice of 
encryption, suggesting that other textual remainders of slave personality can be located 
elsewhere. The narrative world of The Bondwoman’s Narrative claims the stories and persons 
encoded within it, while also suggesting that some textual “elsewhere”—perhaps legal materials, 
census records, or other historical archives—can accommodate the textual overflow that exceeds 
the novel’s parameters.  
This aspect of my analysis offers my most visible departure from Aljoe. While her work 
suggests the recoverability of intact testimonies—separated though they may be from a visibly 
literary context—I argue for a process of encryption in which literary and legal texts take up 
various narratives, transform them through addition, subtraction, or modification, and deploy 
them in a way that nevertheless preserves the visibility of the connections among the texts. While 
the nature of “encryption” might suggest the existence a decipherable, pure original, I use the 
term somewhat differently here. Rather, I treat encryption as a citational practice that continually 
cites and re-shapes existing narratives. This practice of encryption is not protecting or 
safeguarding any mythical “original,” nor does any mythical key unlock the encryptions that 
occur. My analysis ultimately places law and literature in a never-ending feedback loop, each 
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citing and encrypting the narratives that appear to belong to the other, always adding layers to 
narrative histories and never taking any of those layers away. Encryption, I argue, is a process of 
accrual and accumulation. 
*** 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative contains a rich set of references and terms that suggest Hannah 
Crafts’s self-conscious engagement with legal rhetoric and practice. Whether through the 
character of Trappe, an unscrupulous lawyer who blackmails light-skinned women passing for 
white, or references to legal terms of art such as “chain of evidence” (44), or even direct 
addresses to lawmakers, the novel is thick with law. The brief appearance of a single character, 
however, is a cipher for a rich and well-publicized legal trial from the mid-1850s. Jane Johnson, 
referred to simply as “Jane” in the novel, serves as a specific intersection between the novel’s 
quasi-fictional world and the so-called “real world” of the legal system that faced fugitive slaves 
during the antebellum period. 
 In The Bondwoman’s Narrative, the narrator Hannah traces her movement from her 
original station at the Lindendale plantation to a series of other locations on her way to ultimate 
freedom in New Jersey. Her initial escape from Lindendale occurs in cooperation with her 
mistress, a young woman born a slave and under threat of exposure by the blackmailing of 
Trappe, an unscrupulous lawyer. When the two women are captured and imprisoned, her 
mistress ultimately hemorrhages to death from a ruptured blood vessel, leaving Hannah in the 
hands of Trappe, who sells her to a slave trader. During transport, however, their carriage 
overturns, killing the slave trader and leaving Hannah in a precarious position of unsettled 
ownership. The Henry family takes Hannah into their service while communicating with the next 
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of kin of her last living owner. Hannah’s prospects are thus already imbued with legal meaning 
and legal tension. Laws of inheritance determine who has an enforceable claim of ownership 
over her body, and the uncertainty of her ownership becomes a torturous condition, as Hannah 
begs the relatively kind Henrys to buy her and save her from the devil she doesn’t know. Rather 
than buying her themselves, however, the Henrys arrange for the sale of Hannah to the Wheelers, 
distant relatives in North Carolina. It is through Hannah’s intersection with the Wheelers that 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative encodes not merely Hannah’s legal narrative, but also that of Jane 
Johnson. 
 Jane’s literary treatment in the novel is brief. The reader learns that Mrs. Wheeler is in 
need of a new lady’s maid because her previous slave, Jane, has disappeared. The details of 
Jane’s disappearance are scant, with Mrs. Wheeler initially saying merely that “Jane ran off” 
(149). Displeased with Hannah’s efforts to comb hair, Mrs. Wheeler elaborates: “Jane was very 
handy at almost everything . . . . You will seldom find a slave so handy, but she grew 
discontented and dissatisfied with her condition, thought she could do better in a land of 
freedom, and such like I watched her closely you may depend” (149). In between pulls on her 
snarled hair, Mrs. Wheeler continues (149), “Oh dear, this is what I have to endure from losing 
Jane, but she’ll have to suffer more, probably. I didn’t much like the idea of bringing her to 
Washington. It was all Mr. Wheeler’s fault. He wanted me to come, and I couldn’t think of doing 
without her in my feeble health.” This introduction to Jane, appearing almost casually in the text 
amid Mrs. Wheeler’s pleas for Hannah to be gentle with her hair, underscores the extent to which 
intense questions of legal personhood and slavery suffuse and infiltrate the most prosaic aspects 
of daily life in the antebellum South. Reading the subtext of Mrs. Wheeler’s characterization that 
Jane “grew discontented and dissatisfied with her condition,” it seems clear enough that Jane 
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became a fugitive slave. By suggesting that Jane simply changed her status on becoming 
dissatisfied, Mrs. Wheeler’s euphemistic description affords Jane an agency that obscures the 
obvious legal and personal risks associated with fugitivity. Hinting merely that Jane will “suffer 
more, probably,” Mrs. Wheeler gestures toward the possibility of re-capture and punishment 
without naming it, choosing instead to frame Jane’s absence as a matter of intense personal 
inconvenience. Jane’s interchangeability within another slave comes into focus when Mrs. 
Wheeler says of Hannah, “She could fill the place of Jane so exactly” (152). Jane is not a person 
in this characterization, but a space to fill—a space that fits exactly the shape of another female 
slave. While the reader never obtains access to Jane’s own words—thus keeping this narrative 
out of what Nicole Aljoe would consider embedded testimony—Jane’s narrative is instead a 
wheel within the wheel of Hannah Crafts’s larger novel, and her evacuation from the Wheeler 
home and the novel is an invitation for Hannah to enter and occupy both spaces. 
But despite the reader’s inability to hear from Jane directly, the novel’s backstory on Jane 
also encodes a legal drama that unfolded in Pennsylvania in 1855—and that legal drama does 
offer some of Jane’s first-hand testimony. The Wheelers described in The Bondwoman’s 
Narrative are thought to be John Hill Wheeler, state legislator and federal appointee, and his 
family. Acting on information first asserted by Dorothy Porter, the manuscript’s previous owner, 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr. confirmed this identification in the introduction to the 2002 edition of The 
Bondwoman’s Narrative (xlii-lvi). The Wheelers’ slave, Jane Johnson, featured prominently in a 
well-known court battle over fugitive slaves in 1855. Despite the novel’s glancing references to 
“Jane,” the circumstances surrounding Jane Johnson’s escape from the Wheelers received 
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considerable media attention, primarily in the Philadelphia area.137 Crafts is ambiguous about the 
geographical specifics of Jane’s escape, leaving merely the suggestion, through Mrs. Wheeler’s 
comment that the mistress “didn’t much like the idea of bringing [Jane] to Washington” (149), 
that Jane fled while in the nation’s capital. In fact, Jane Johnson’s escape occurred while the 
Wheelers stopped in Philadelphia while traveling from New York to Nicaragua, where Colonel 
John Hill Wheeler was to begin a diplomatic position. 
On July 18, 1855, accompanying the Wheeler family, Jane Johnson arrived in 
Philadelphia along with her own sons, Daniel and Isaiah, whose names and existences are 
completely absent from The Bondwoman’s Narrative.  It was during this stop that Johnson, with 
the assistance of several abolitionists, made her escape, taking her children with her.138 Passmore 
Williamson and William Still, the abolitionists who assisted Johnson, subsequently found 
themselves at the center of a legal drama after Johnson’s successful flight from the Wheelers’ 
household. In an effort to effect Johnson’s return, Colonel Wheeler filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a federal district court. In that petition, 
Colonel Wheeler urged the court to compel Passmore Williamson to produce Jane Johnson and 
her children.139  The request itself was unusual because habeas petitions most commonly compel 
the government to release a prisoner, rather than compelling a private citizen to produce another 
																																																								137	See, e.g., “The Case of Colonel Wheeler’s Slaves. Decision of Judge Kane” in The National 
Era; “The Wheeler Slave Case. Passmore Williamson Committed for Contempt” in Frederick 
Douglass’ Paper (reprinted from The Philadelphia Bulletin); “The Wheeler Slave Case—
Testimony of Jane Johnson” in The Liberator. 	
138 “The Liberation of Jane Johnson.” Jane Johnson Online Exhibit, Library Company of 
Philadelphia. Hereafter “JJOE.” 
139 United States v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 682-95 (1855) (Case Nos. 16,725 and 16,726). 
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private citizen.140 Nevertheless, Judge John Kane granted Wheeler’s petition and ordered 
Williamson to produce Johnson and her children.141 Williamson declined to do so, and on July 
27, 1855, Judge Kane imprisoned Williamson in Moyamensing Prison on a charge of contempt; 
142 he would remain there for nearly four months until his eventual release in November 1855.143  
Despite Johnson’s evasion of Wheeler, however, she offered her own written and oral 
testimony in connection with Williamson’s imprisonment.144 First, Jane Johnson submitted an 
affidavit in an attempt to exonerate Williamson during his habeas and contempt proceedings; 
Judge Kane refused to acknowledge Johnson’s standing in the court, however, and denied the 
affidavit. Meanwhile, William Still, an African-American abolitionist faced criminal charges in 
the Court of Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia, a state court145 (Williamson Narrative 13).  Jane 
Johnson appeared in person to testify in that trial, in which Still and a handful of other 
defendants were acquitted of most of the charges against them (Williamson Narrative 16). The 
																																																								
140 This procedure of law also marks a sharp contrast with Johnson’s own inability, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, to file a writ of habeas corpus to secure her own release from imprisonment as one of 
the Wheelers’ slaves. 
141 Id.   
142 Id. 
143 JJOE.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Judge Kane’s decision in September 1855; 
Judge Kane himself finally relented and granted Williamson his freedom in November 1855, 
following months of motions and arguments. 
144 Compare Johnson’s strategies of evasion with those of Williams/Thornton/Wilkins. Johnson 
generated printed text in furtherance of her fugitivity; by contrast, Williams/Thornton/Wilkins 
generated non-written personae, and his persistent textual unavailability from judicial records 
routinely frustrates courts’ ability to document his existence or identity with certainty. 
145 Still and a handful of African-American co-defendants faced charges for riot, assault, and 
battery, among other things.  See Narrative of Facts in the Case of Passmore Williamson 
[hereafter Williamson Narrative] at 16. 
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media coverage of the Williamson and Still litigations was extensive, casting the white 
abolitionist Williamson as a folk hero during his imprisonment.146 
 The trials of Williamson and Still, and in particular Williamson’s imprisonment, 
generated considerable attention in an era of fraught politics regarding fugitive slaves. 
Pennsylvania, a free state, had long been a site for legal posturing regarding fugitive slaves. In 
the 1842 case Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the United States Supreme Court had essentially voided a 
state law that prohibited the transport of free persons out of Pennsylvania and into slavery.147 
Widely regarded as an obstacle for slaveowners seeking to recover fugitive slaves, the Court held 
that the state law could not supersede the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which was then in force. 
With the passage of the Federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the rights of slaveholders further 
expanded, allowing state and local authorities to be compelled to assist in the recovery and return 
of fugitive slaves, even in free jurisdictions.  
Against this backdrop of geographical and ideological division, the abolitionist press in 
particular paid close attention to litigation surrounding fugitive slaves; Jeannine DeLombard’s 
compelling account of the “trial” of slavery both in actual courts and the court of public opinion 
demonstrates the salience of legal battles in the public consciousness during the nineteenth 
century. As DeLombard notes, over five hundred people visited Passmore Williamson during his 
imprisonment (7; internal citation omitted).  Indeed, the media coverage of the Jane Johnson 
escape and subsequent litigations ranged across and beyond the abolitionist press, achieving 
notoriety in publications such as The National Era, Frederick Douglass’s Paper, and The 
																																																								
146 For instance, in 1855, the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Society published the Williamson 
Narrative as a pamphlet. Media coverage was also extensive, including articles in Frederick 
Douglass’ Paper, The National Era, and others.   
147 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
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Philadelphia Bulletin.148  Such far-reaching media coverage makes it possible, even where the 
legal records themselves may be sparse or missing, to locate corroborating coverage in other 
contemporary documents.149 Indeed, a number of media accounts and legal records entirely 
corroborate Johnson’s participation, however tenuous, in both the Williamson and Still 
proceedings. 
Johnson’s participation in these proceedings took two very different forms—written 
affidavit and recorded testimony—each of which yields different information and presents 
different problems for critical consideration. However, the particular status of the documents 
within the legal realm does offer a certain amount of documentary reliability, as rules of 
procedure require the authentication of documents entered into evidence. Though these legal 
documents and appearances present their own questions of authenticity and authorship, 
theorizing them is not so different from theorizing more traditional slave narratives, where 
similar questions also arise in the context of slave testimony. 
																																																								
148 See, e.g., “The Case of Colonel Wheeler’s Slaves. Decision of Judge Kane” in The National 
Era, and “The Wheeler Slave Case. Passmore Williamson Committed for Contempt” in 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper (reprinted from The Philadelphia Bulletin). 
149 Today, court decisions are typically “reported” by courts in official “case reporters.”  The use 
of case reporters began at different times in different jurisdictions.  Pennsylvania, where the 
Johnson litigations occurred, presents an example of how case reporting varied among different 
courts.  For instance, the Passmore Williamson litigation took place in federal court, in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  As a federal court case, the proceedings of the Williamson 
litigation were reported in Federal Cases, a publication covering cases as early as 1789. 
However, the Still trial took place in the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions, a local 
Pennsylvania court.  Case reporters for Pennsylvania district and county reports did not begin 
publishing case reporters until 1918. Therefore, the Still trial materials are not part of an official 
reporter, and this project looks instead to accounts of the Still litigation from newspapers and 
other archival sources from 1855. 	
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In the Williamson litigation, Johnson attempted to offer a written affidavit into the 
record. Johnson’s sworn affidavit to Judge Kane150 urged him that Passmore Williamson had not 
abducted her. Johnson signed the affidavit with an “X” and the notation “Her mark;”151 there is 
no suggestion that Johnson was literate, and the “X” in place of her name seems to confirm her 
lack of formal education. This “X” is also a reminder of her fraught status as a quasi-legal 
personality by virtue of her enslavement and fugitivity—the substitution of her name with an 
“X” enacts on one hand a denial of her subjectivity and individuality, while on the other hand 
claiming her right to submit the affidavit and be heard by the court. In addition to the “X,” there 
are other indicators that she did not personally draft the content of the affidavit.152  For instance, 
it contains legal jargon as in the following phrase: “That she is one of the three parties named in 
the aforesaid writ of habeas corpus, and the mother of the two children, Daniel and Isaiah, also 
named therein and thereby required to be produced.”153 Throughout the affidavit, references to 
Johnson herself appear as references to “your petitioner” (Johnson, as the affiant, submitted the 
affidavit as a petition to Judge Kane). These linguistic and stylistic features counsel in favor of 
an attorney or other legal expert having drafted the affidavit on Johnson’s behalf. 
 
																																																								
150 See 28 F. Cas. at 687.  Johnson swore this affidavit before a Massachusetts District Court. 
151 Id. 
152 In fact, and owing most likely to a fear of recapture, Johnson submitted the affidavit through 
an appearance of her two attorneys, Joseph Townsend and John Read (See Case of Passmore 
Williamson: report of the proceedings on the writ of habeas corpus, issued by the Hon. John K. 
Kane, judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in 
the case of the United States of America ex rel. John H. Wheeler vs. Passmore Williamson at 
164. Hereafter, “Case of Passmore Williamson.” 
153 28 F. Cas. at 687. 
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Though this revelation complicates the question of authorship, it is customary for 
attorneys to draft affidavits on behalf of clients and witnesses. Moreover, in the traditional 
generic slave narrative, an amanuensis frequently acted as the scrivener for a former slave’s 
narration. Thus, the slave narrative was also mediated through a third party, and the question of 
authorship presents a similarly fraught scenario.  Therefore, the problem of authorship in the 
Johnson affidavit is not so far afield from the same problems of authorship frequently present in 
a traditional slave narrative.  Indeed, the fact that Johnson signed the affidavit, and that it was 
sworn under oath, both authenticate the document and support its credibility, at least in the eyes 
of the law.  These authenticating gestures are of a piece with authentication of other, more 
traditional slave narratives, where the marks on a former slave’s body might authenticate that 
slave’s claims of physical abuse. These similarities with the slave narrative thus locate Johnson’s 
narrative within this legal document in a manner consistent with Aljoe’s theorization of 
embedded narratives. This particular narrative, however, is not only embedded within the 
affidavit but also re-inscribed and encrypted in The Bondwoman’s Narrative.  
The content of Johnson’s testimonial narrative offers an elaboration on her brief 
appearance in Crafts’s novel. In the affidavit itself, Johnson asserts that she “was very desirous 
of procuring the freedom of herself and her children” and that “she wished to be free.”154 
Johnson thus repeatedly affirms her own agency and her desire to escape from Colonel 
Wheeler—in describing her flight, Johnson casts her freedom as the product of her desire and 
her “wish[] to be free.” Throughout the affidavit, Johnson repeatedly makes similar assertions, 
including a claim that none of the abolitionists ever restrained or coerced her in any way. In fact, 
Johnson states that several servants who assisted her during her escape “took her children with 																																																								
154 See U.S. v. Williamson at 687. 
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her consent.”155 By establishing herself as someone entitled to, and capable of, offering her 
consent, Johnson asserts not only that she was a free person but also that she was already free 
when she left Colonel Wheeler in Philadelphia. The capacity to give consent, like the capacity to 
contract, is a privilege of free personhood; consent was completely unavailable to slaves, whose 
consent had been stolen by a legal system that treated them as various types of property. 
Johnson’s affidavit in the Williamson litigation does not contain detail about her life as a slave—
in fact, based on Hannah Crafts’s descriptions of life with the Wheelers, the novel promises 
greater information about what Johnson’s daily life must have been like at the side of Mrs. 
Wheeler, a conniving and manipulative mistress preoccupied with her own vanity and quest for 
status. But even without any elaboration on her daily life as a slave, the affidavit does explicitly 
express Johnson’s desire to escape from slavery and her insistence on herself as an agent of her 
own liberty.  
The legal system’s reception of this affidavit, on the other hand, throws into relief just 
how contentious Johnson’s self-determination really was. Judge Kane ultimately refused to admit 
this affidavit into evidence, using a host of dubious justifications for this exclusion. In a 
particularly suspicious moment of legal reasoning, Judge Kane claimed to be unable to confirm 
that Jane Johnson was the same person referred to in Wheeler’s petition, noting that the latter 
document referred only to “Jane” and omitted a surname.156  The judge did, however, concede 
that Johnson’s testimony might have been properly admissible had she been either a party to the 
litigation or a witness called to testify in court.157 His general holding was that Johnson lacked 
“status” in the court—a move that technically referred to the fact that she was not a party to the 																																																								
155 Id.	
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
	 171	
litigation but obliquely called attention to the fraught nature of Johnson’s status as a legal 
“person”—in Pennsylvania, a free state, she had personhood; by contrast, in North Carolina, a 
slave state, she was Colonel Wheeler’s property.158  
Despite Johnson’s claims to her own agency, Judge Kane’s legal reasoning demonstrates 
the extent to which law’s institutional weight pushed against a slave’s desire for freedom, even 
after a successful escape from slavery. Without explicitly saying so, what Judge Kane actually 
denied Johnson was a recognition of her status as a person entitled to testify in court. Judge Kane 
gestures toward the unique and ambiguous status Johnson occupied—a former slave, ostensibly 
free, whose agency and very identity were at the heart of the trial of a white abolitionist. He 
writes:  
The very name of the person who authenticates the prayer is a 
stranger to any proceeding that is or has been before me. She asks 
no judicial action for herself, and does not profess to have any right 
to solicit action in behalf of another: on the contrary, her counsel 
here assure me expressly, that Mr. Williamson has not sanctioned 
her application. She has therefore no status whatever in this Court.159  
By casting Johnson as a “stranger” to the court proceedings, Judge Kane emphasizes that 
the legal proceedings revolved not around Jane Johnson herself but Passmore Williamson, the 
white abolitionist accused of helping her escape. But more than simply a stranger in the sense of 
someone who is not a party to the litigation, Kane’s language calls attention to the strangeness of 
																																																								
158 See id. at 694. 
159 Case of Passmore Williamson at 188-89. 
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Johnson as a legal personality—indeed, she is the body, or corpus, being sought by Wheeler’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Yet, in spite of her intimate connection to the case, Johnson 
thus remained a “stranger” even to the litigation of her own freedom.160 At this point, Johnson is 
neither wholly slave nor wholly free. As Judge Kane points out, Johnson “has therefore no status 
whatever in this Court”—her lack of status refers to the fact that she is not a named party to the 
litigation, but it also underscores the many broader ways in which Johnson could be said to be 
status-less. She lacks standing to bring a lawsuit of her own. She lacks status as a citizen entitled 
to the rights and privileges of other free persons. And given that “status” and “state” share the 
same Latin root, Kane’s severe language reminds the reader that Johnson lacks any meaningful 
belonging in either Pennsylvania or the United States as a nation-state. 
Despite Judge Kane’s exclusion of Johnson’s affidavit from evidence, the affidavit itself 
nevertheless appears in its entirety as part of the decision in the Williamson litigation.161 In this 
way, Johnson’s affidavit—though not admitted—remains hidden in plain sight, inscribed within 
the legal archive of the Williamson litigation and also reprinted in the Williamson Narrative, the 
pamphlet that documented Passmore Williamson’s lengthy legal battle. Though Johnson was not 
a party to the litigation, and though this case was not a freedom suit of the sort in which one 
would expect to encounter documents such as the Johnson affidavit, Johnson’s story is yet a part 
of the legal record—and in that context it offers more insight into law’s treatment of slaves, even 
																																																								
160 Note the parallel here to the legal proceedings outlined in Chapter 3, where slaves in certain 
jurisdictions could seek freedom through the legal mechanism of the “next friend,” relegating the 
slaves themselves to the margins and making free white persons the parties to the actual 
litigation. 
161 28 F. Cas. at 687. 
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in free jurisdictions, than it does about Johnson’s personal experience as the property of the 
Wheelers. 
Whereas Johnson submitted a written affidavit in the Williamson litigation, her in-court 
appearance at William Still’s trial proved to be her most dramatic participation in the legal 
actions surrounding her escape from Wheeler. Still and several co-defendants faced criminal 
charges in the Court of Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia for assault and battery, as well as riot-
related charges (Williamson Narrative 16).  On August 29, 1855, Johnson appeared in-court at 
Still’s trial (Williamson Narrative 13).162 According to Still, as well as the Williamson Narrative, 
Johnson testified orally in court.163  Indeed, in Still’s work The Underground Railroad, 
Johnson’s testimony appears in quotes and contains language that is suggestive of oral, as 
opposed to written, testimony.  For instance, it begins as follows: “My name is Jane—Jane 
Johnson” (Still 94).164  The repetition of the name Jane is strongly suggestive of oral testimony, 
as such a colloquial construction would be unusual in a formal legal document.165 Indeed, there 
appears to be little dispute that Johnson’s testimony was offered orally,166 and in any event, the 																																																								162	Though the legal record of the Still trial is somewhat muddy, owing to its occurrence in state 
(rather than federal) court, there are several accounts of Johnson’s appearance and testimony, all 
of which substantially corroborate each other.  Still himself, in The Underground Railroad, 
devotes an entire section of his book to the Johnson escape and subsequent trials.  His account of 
her appearance at the trial contains a lengthy reproduction of her testimony (94-95).  	
163 For a press account of Johnson’s testimony, see “The Wheeler Slave Case—Testimony of 
Jane Johnson” from The Liberator. 
164 Note that this phrase does not appear in the account from the Williamson Narrative. 
165 Compare this language with written affidavit from the Williamson litigation as reported in 28 
F. Cas. at 687. 
166 The Williamson Narrative (13-14) also includes a lengthy account of Johnson’s oral 
testimony. What is unusual about Still’s account, however, is an indication at the conclusion of 
Johnson’s testimony that she signed her mark (95).  This may be best explained by a prefatory 
comment by Still that “[s]ubstantially, her testimony on this occasion . . .  was in keeping with 
the subjoined affidavit, which as follows . . . .” (Still 94). This remark suggests that Johnson may 
have submitted an affidavit in addition to her oral testimony, or it may refer simply to the 
affidavit she submitted in the Williamson litigation. Note, however, that Johnson’s in-court 
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Williamson Narrative corroborates and supplements Still’s account of Johnson’s testimony. As 
with the written affidavit submitted in the Williamson litigation, Johnson’s oral testimony at the 
Still trial was subject to various methods of authentication.  She testified under oath, with the 
judge’s acquiescence.  There does not, however, appear to have been cross-examination of 
Johnson by the prosecution; if there was cross-examination, the transcript of those remarks has 
been absorbed into the general transcript or has not survived.  
What Johnson’s written affidavit lacks in data about her life as a slave, her oral testimony 
compensates for in greater detail. As Johnson spoke of her escape from Colonel Wheeler, she 
first identified herself and her children (Still 94). In a turn familiar within traditional slave 
narratives, Johnson betrayed her lack of verifiable genealogy, stating, “I can’t tell my exact age; I 
guess I am about 25; I was born in Washington City” (Williamson Narrative 14). She also spoke 
of a third, estranged child, a boy living in Richmond, Virginia: “I have not seen him for about 
two years; never expect to see him again . . . .” (Still 94). The opening of her oral testimony thus 
mimics the traditional introductions to slave narratives and indeed the opening of the fictional 
narrative offered in The Bondwoman’s Narrative. Johnson, like Crafts, characterizes herself 
through a series of negatives. Whereas Crafts’s novel opens with her assertions of “no training, 
no cultivation” and her claim that “[o]f my relatives I knew nothing,” (Crafts 5), Johnson 
commences her testimony unable to tell her “exact age” and certain that she “never expected” to 
see her third son again. For both women, these evacuations of history and familial connection 
operate as a kind of authentication of the autobiographies that follow—as though in order to 
																																																								
appearance at the Still trial took place on August 29, 1855, whereas she submitted her written 
affidavit in the Williamson litigation in October 1855.	
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qualify for slave autobiography in the first place, it is necessary to establish the gaps that 
enslavement has wrought in their personal and familial histories.167 
In her oral testimony, Johnson continues by describing her journey with Colonel Wheeler 
en route to Nicaragua, noting that while they were in Philadelphia, “Mr. Wheeler kept his eye on 
me all the time except when he was at dinner” (Still 94). This documentation of Wheeler’s 
constant surveillance of Johnson establishes her incarceration, a claim that becomes even more 
visible when she describes Wheeler’s limitations on what she might disclose about her own 
circumstances to those she met during the journey. According to Johnson’s testimony, Wheeler 
had admonished her “not to talk to colored persons; to tell everybody I was traveling with a 
minister going to Nicaragua; he seemed to think I might be led off . . . .” (Williamson Narrative 
14). Johnson’s own testimony again underscores her self-characterization as an agent. Though 
she relays Wheeler’s instructions to her, she maintains an awareness of his intentions, as when 
she says, “he seemed to think I might be led off.”  
Rather than acting as her owner’s mere puppet, capable only of obedience, Johnson 
reveals herself as a keen judge of character—this moment captures not only her awareness of 
Wheeler’s fears about her possible escape, but also her awareness of his relation to her as a 
subjugated person or an object. She writes that he feared that she “might be led off,” a 
grammatical construction that casts her as an object; rather than worrying that she might run 
away of her own volition, she understands Wheeler’s fear to be one of, essentially, 
misappropriation—that someone else might lure her away from him and “steal” her. In this 
																																																								
167 Compare these evacuations of personal history with the acts of self-erasure wrought by 
Williams/Thornton/Wilkins in Chapter 2. The act of absenting oneself from a knowable family 
history is a practice that both authenticates a slave narrative as generically legitimate, and serves 
as an evasive strategy of fugitivity.  
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moment, Johnson succinctly characterizes the depth of Wheeler’s belief in her status as 
subjugated, but her mere description in these terms reveals her perceptive ability. And in the end, 
despite Wheeler’s efforts to shield Johnson from anyone who might encourage her to escape, a 
group of abolitionists nevertheless approached her while she remained in Wheeler’s company. 
When the “white gentleman” (presumably Passmore Williamson) asked Johnson if she 
wished to be free, she replied that she did but noted that she was Wheeler’s property and could 
not be free (Still 94-95). Johnson testified that, upon hearing that freedom was hers for the taking 
if she desired it, she left Colonel Wheeler immediately. Addressing any argument that she had 
been persuaded or otherwise coaxed to leave, she said, “I did not say I did not want my freedom; 
I have always wanted it; I did not say I wanted to go with my master; I went very willingly to the 
carriage; I was very glad to go” (Williamson Narrative 15).168 In the dramatic conclusion to her 
testimony, Johnson said, “I had rather die than go back [to Wheeler].  I wish to make this 
statement before a magistrate, because I understand that Mr. Williamson is in prison on my 
account, and I hope the truth may be of benefit to him” (Still 95).169  
 
																																																								
168 Note the additional resonance with the conditions of fugitive personhood discussed in Chapter 
2. There, I argue that Williams/Thornton/Wilkins constructs himself through a series of absences 
and erasures, and that legal language in turn constructs him through negative proofs and other 
negations. Johnson’s testimony here appears to engage a similar strategy, where she employs a 
double negative in her first sentence and then alternates sentence construction between positive 
and negative verbs. 
169 This last reference to Williamson suggests that this portion of her testimony may have been 
part of a written affidavit, sworn before a magistrate judge.  It is unclear whether Still has 
conflated her oral and written testimony, or whether there is some conflation of the materials 
from the Williamson and Still litigations. 
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As is evident in her written affidavit, Johnson’s oral testimony is unwavering in its 
assertions of her agency. Her habit of starting each sentence and clause with “I” offers a 
grammatical reinforcement of her insistence on herself as a subject; in fact, her description of her 
departure refuses the abolitionists any credit for her escape. Whether or not this refusal was an 
intentional effort to assist the abolitionists in their legal battles, Johnson’s oral testimony is a 
persistent demand on her listeners to encounter her as a fully realized and constituted subject. 
Moreover, she leaves little room for counterargument about her intentions; she claims that she 
“had rather die than go back” to slavery and asserts that she had “always wanted” her freedom—
a backwards-looking statement of intent that again refuses to afford the abolitionists any of the 
credit even for instigating her desire to be free. Essentially, Johnson testified not as a fugitive 
slave but as a free person. The distinction is critical because Johnson, rather than proving that her 
otherwise illegal flight from an owner was justified, instead argued that she existed legally as a 
free person who had legally exercised her free will in leaving Wheeler. 
In William Still’s account of Johnson’s in-court appearance, he notes that Johnson 
arrived in court “veiled, and of course was not known by the crowd, as pains had been taken to 
keep the public in ignorance of the fact, that she was to be brought on to bear witness” (Still 94).  
This description evokes and erodes the similar “white envelope” associated with traditional slave 
narratives that are mediated by the labor of white amanuenses.  Johnson was cloaked in-court 
literally by her veil and also by the phalanx of abolitionists who escorted her to the courtroom. 
What her testimony offers, however, is a moment of revelation—a lifting of the literal and 
metaphorical veils that hung between Johnson and her audience, particularly the judges presiding 
over the trials of Williamson and Still, and allowing her a moment of unmediated speech. Thus, 
despite the fact that her narrative may be less visible—owing to its location within other people’s 
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criminal trial materials—Johnson’s testimony nevertheless offers direct, tangible links to her 
own experience. 
* * * 
While self-authored accounts of her experience may inhabit the legal narrative surrounding 
Passmore Williamson and William Still, it is more appropriate to say that it is the legal narrative, 
rather than the personal or slave narrative, of Jane Johnson that inhabits the fictional world of 
The Bondwoman’s Narrative. Mrs. Wheeler’s descriptions of “Jane” in the novel make little 
reasonable sense, indeed, when de-coupled from the legal narratives that offer context for Jane’s 
escape. While the novel suggests to the reader that Jane was “discontented and dissatisfied with 
her condition” (149), Johnson never actually appears in the novel except through the dubious and 
brief narration of Mrs. Wheeler—whose own manipulations to purchase Hannah cast doubt on 
her reliability as a truth-teller.170  
In fact, the novel offers yet another explanation for Johnson’s flight; a young slave boy 
reports that Jane had received a letter from “the ‘Hio man,” who turns out to be, in Mrs. 
Wheeler’s description, “The Senator from Ohio . . . who professed a great regard for slaves and 
negroes . . . . This fellow was thought to have his master’s concurrence in persuading servants to 
abandon their masters; it was even suspected that the grave senator assisted in spiriting them 
away.”171 When pressed by Hannah on whether the Wheelers took efforts to recover Jane, Mrs. 
																																																								
170 In the novel, Mrs. Wheeler dictates a letter to the man who has inherited Hannah following 
the slave trader’s untimely death. In that letter, which Hannah herself is forced to transcribe, 
Mrs. Wheeler describes her as “very homely, and what was worse a bigot in religion; that [she] 
wept and shuddered at the idea of being transferred to his family” (153). These assertions, all of 
which are patently untrue, make Hannah deeply uncomfortable; Mrs. Wheeler employs these 
machinations as a means of securing a lower purchase price. 
171 See Crafts at 150-51. 
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Wheeler replies, “Oh, no; Mr Wheeler said that it would be of no use, and then he disliked 
making a hue and cry about a slave at the Federal Capital, so we said little as possible about it” 
(151). 
The novel thus departs in several ways from certain specifics that are verified in the legal 
record: Crafts has Jane disappear in Washington, D.C. rather than Philadelphia; the suggestion is 
that she was assisted not by abolitionists but by an Ohio Senator; there is no mention whatsoever 
of her children; and finally, that the Wheelers made no efforts to recover her after her escape. 
These departures mark the novel’s reference to the legal record not merely as citational but as 
encrypted. It is obviously impossible to say with any certainty whether Crafts’s changes were 
attempts to protect her identity or that of Johnson, though her retention of the Wheeler family 
name certainly makes it less likely that these editorial changes were tactics of evasion. It is 
equally impossible to know whether Crafts herself was aware of the highly publicized legal trials 
that followed Johnson’s escape.  
However, the novel’s factual alterations both call attention to the relevant legal narrative 
and re-cast its terms. First, the novel makes an intimate connection between Johnson’s escape 
and federal government. The fictional treatment of the escape occurs in the nation’s capital under 
the supposed assistance of a U.S. Senator. Moreover, Mrs. Wheeler claims to have been 
“attending a party at the Russian Minister’s” (151) when Jane fled. These details characterize the 
Wheelers as Washington power-brokers, mingling with diplomats. Even Mrs. Wheeler’s—
presumably mendacious—claim that Mr. Wheeler thought pursuit would be useless inscribes the 
terminology of federal government: “he disliked making a hue and cry about a slave at the 
Federal Capital, so we said as little as possible about it” (151). 
	 180	
Why, the reader might wonder, would it be especially unseemly to pursue a fugitive slave 
in the District of Columbia? Though the novel’s chronology is somewhat uncertain, it is 
generally accepted to have been written sometime in the 1850s. Johnson’s flight and the ensuing 
legal actions took place in 1855, suggesting that, regardless of when the novel took place, it was 
written sometime after 1855. Washington, D.C. in the 1850s was at the heart of the slavery 
debate both literally and symbolically. Though slave trading had been banned in the District in 
1850, slaveholding was still perfectly legal there until 1862, and the city had sizeable populations 
of both enslaved and free African Americans. Though Mrs. Wheeler fails to elaborate on this 
peculiar claim about their unwillingness to “make a hue and cry” about Johnson’s escape, her 
comment calls attention to the symbolic weight of the District of Columbia in questions of 
slavery’s legality. To “make a hue and cry” about their fugitive slave in the “Federal Capital” of 
all places would seem to throw into controversy the legality of slavery in a very concrete and 
visible manner. Given the intense legislative battles around the Compromise of 1850 and the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in particular, the novel’s re-casting of Johnson’s escape thus places 
slavery, quite literally, at the federal government’s doorstep. And the introduction of foreign 
diplomats into this equation further exposes a tension between the notion of the United States as 
a “civilized” international state and an uglier image of the United States as entirely unable to 
manage its own domestic affairs or to keep the peace between slaveholding and non-
slaveholding jurisdictions.  
As a result, the novel’s treatment of “Jane” the slave reveals far less about Jane Johnson 
than it does about the Wheeler family and about various legal narratives surrounding slavery, 
suggesting that it is not Johnson’s narrative embedded within The Bondwoman’s Narrative, but a 
much thornier legal and cultural narrative—a narrative for which the literary character of “Jane” 
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is a cipher. The veil that Johnson wears during her in-court appearance thus accrues additional 
meaning in the context of The Bondwoman’s Narrative—if Johnson’s in-court veil is symbolic 
of her remove from the legal system in which she speaks, she is doubly veiled in the novel, 
where the reader can only come to know her through inference and imagination. Moreover, the 
novel’s fictionalization of Jane—whether that fictionalization occurs solely at the hands of 
Hannah Crafts or by virtue of Mrs. Wheeler’s deception—establishes the intersection of Jane 
Johnson’s legal personhood and her literary personhood as a character in a work of fiction. Her 
literary self and her legal personality can certainly be read together, but as with the case of the 
man known as James Williams, these various selves cannot coalesce into a single, coherent 
whole by merely placing the texts alongside one another. Instead, the novel introduces new 
questions into the narrative offered by the legal record, and vice versa. 
In addition to the specific departures that The Bondwoman’s Narrative makes 
surrounding the “real-life” events in Jane Johnson’s life, the novel repeatedly engages other 
strategies of encrypting and encoding legal narratives through plot, characterization, and 
occasional addresses directly to the reader. In other words, it is not solely through the 
fictionalization of Jane Johnson that The Bondwoman’s Narrative encrypts and re-casts law. In a 
novel that seems always on the verge of erupting into yet another slave’s biography, the law 
lingers at the margins and in the depths of what we are urged to read as the autobiography of 
Hannah Crafts. I have already alluded to some of the ways that legal language and theme 
permeate the text, as with the character of Trappe and the persistent use of legal terms of art. In 
one such example, as the narrator hesitates to write Mrs. Wheeler’s false account of her 
character, Hannah confesses (153), “No one can doubt that I hesitated to pen such a libel on 
myself,” once more infusing plot with (accurate) legal conclusions. But in particular, one of the 
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novel’s peripheral characters demonstrates how Crafts’s literary strategies engage explicitly with 
legal personhood. In Chapter 14, “Lizzy’s Story,” the narrator of the novel makes plain how 
these capsule narratives are more than mere flourish—and in particular how what is embedded 
within these narratives is not the slaves’ own testimonies but the author’s commentary on the 
laws of slavery. 
 Lizzy is a slave whom Hannah first knew at Lindendale, the plantation on which the 
novel opens. While owned by the Wheelers and still in Washington, D.C., Hannah has a chance 
encounter with Lizzy while she runs errands for Mrs. Wheeler. In another example of the novel’s 
resemblance to nesting dolls in its narrative architecture, “Lizzy’s Story” is not the story of 
Lizzy’s experiences; instead, it is a story about the current master and mistress of 
Lindendale…as told to Lizzy by yet another slave named Lilly. These relentless layers of remove 
demonstrate on the level of form that the novel takes great pains in refusing to claim that it is an 
anthology of individual slaves’ narratives. Given the multiple tiers of narration, “Lizzy’s Story” 
cannot reasonably be read as containing embedded testimony—instead, it is explicitly offered not 
for its testimonial truth but for its narrative significance.  
In Lizzy’s account, the mistress at Lindendale has recently discovered that her husband 
has fathered several children with slaves on the estate; in her rage, she demands that the women 
and children be sold out of state entirely. What begins as an entirely too familiar plantation 
drama explicitly engages law in its framing. When confronted by his wife, the master first says, 
“And I say . . . that there is law in this country for the slave as well as the free, and if you attempt 
to injur[e] them you will find it so to your sorrow. Proud as you are, and rich as you think you 
be, the key of the prison door has been turned on richer and nobler people times without number” 
(176).  
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His implication is clear: that, should his wife attempt to interfere with his property, he 
will ensure that she suffers the legal consequences for the property damage or loss. Perversely, 
his declaration begins with the claim “that there is law in this country for the slave as well as the 
free,” suggesting that slaves themselves actually benefit from laws regarding their treatment. In 
fact, as his monologue immediately becomes visible as a threat, it is evident that his reference to 
“law for the slave” actually refers to law for the slaveholder. Whether his threat to his wife is the 
product of some obscene affection for the women is, of course, immaterial—their status as his 
property is the lever across which he is able to intimidate his wife under threat of incarceration 
for property interference. 
The presence of slave law thus frames the encounter between husband and wife. As the 
husband, Mr. Cosgrove, eventually yields to his wife’s demands, Lizzy’s story takes an even 
more revolting turn. Several days after this marital dispute, a slave trader arrives at Lindendale to 
examine and purchase the women and children in question. When one of Cosgrove’s children 
calls him “Pa” and implores his father not to sell him, the child’s mother takes unimaginable 
action against her other child, an infant in her arms (177-78):  
. . . with a motion so sudden that no one could prevent it, she 
snatched a sharp knife which a servant had carelessly left after 
cutting butcher’s meat, and stabbing the infant threw it with one toss 
into the arms of its father. Before he had time to recover from his 
astonishment she had run the knife into her own body, and fell at his 
feet bathing them in her blood. She lived only long enough to say 
that she prayed God to forgive her for an act dictated by the wildest 
despair. 
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This gruesome scene takes advantage of specific imagery to unmistakably interrogate the slave’s 
status as living property. By seizing a butcher’s knife still dirty from carving meat, the desperate 
mother aligns her own flesh—and her infant’s flesh—with that of livestock. In this rapid murder 
and suicide, the slave mother butchers her own child and herself, gesturing toward the oft-
repeated comparisons between the legal status of slaves and animals (and livestock in particular). 
She tosses the dead infant into its father’s arms, and her own dead flesh literally lands at his feet. 
By heaping these slave bodies onto the master—who is also the father and rapist/lover of the 
casualties—the narrative repeats the trope first suggested in Mrs. Wheeler’s description of Jane’s 
flight. In that earlier example, the specter of an escaped slave in the nation’s capital would cast 
an uncomfortable shadow on any myths of benevolent slaveholding. Similarly, Cosgrove is left 
to contend with the obscenity of his own actions—his hands are literally full and his feet are 
drenched from the bloody corpses of the mother and child. By the scene’s end, the woman and 
her baby are so much meat. 
 In the aftermath of this violence, Cosgrove’s threat to his wife about property interference 
hovers with renewed force. The dead slave at his feet, the property in question, has effectively 
violated the law of slavery that Cosgrove previously deployed against his wife. This upsetting of 
legal norms—in which the ostensibly objectified slave becomes the agent of her own 
destruction—is a radical re-casting of the law that Cosgrove cites. In this account, the property 
dies, testing the borders of ownership but also of what it means to be owned. Cosgrove’s 
ownership of this woman, despite his posturing to his wife, turns out to be far from absolute.172  
																																																								
172 The dead woman, unnamed in the novel, thus also echoes Jane Johnson’s claim that she “had 
rather die than go back [to Wheeler].” (Still 95). 
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 The narration of this scene, however, contains another invocation of law that offers an 
even more direct example of how the novel encrypts and re-casts legal narratives. After Lizzy’s 
story of Lindendale concludes, the narrator’s voice intrudes in a striking address directly to 
imagined readers. Here is the narrator’s commentary (178) 173 on the scene Lizzy has described, 
with the dead mother at the feet of her master: 
She smiled faintly, turned her eyes to the child which had breathed 
its last. A slight spasm, a convulsive shudder and she was dead. 
Dead, your Excellency, the President of this Republic. Dead, grave 
senators who grow eloquent over pensions and army wrongs. Dead, 
ministers of religion, who prate because poor men without a 
moment[‘]s leisure on other days presume to read the newspapers 
on Sunday, yet who wink at, or approve of laws that occasion such 
scenes as this. 
The abrupt narrative turn, from the inward-facing world of the scene just described to the outer-
most reaches of possible audience, marks a shift from literary fiction to legal protest. The 
subjects of the address range from the President to senators to religious ministers, all of whom 
are marked with responsibility for the young woman’s death. This linkage of an unnamed slave 
																																																								
173	In the 2002 edition of the novel, editor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. inserts a double quotation mark 
in brackets at the conclusion of this passage, presumably considering it part of Lizzy’s narration. 
In the context of the chapter, however, it makes little sense for this interruption to occur within 
Lizzy’s storytelling. First, the preceding chapter concludes with Hannah and Lizzy congregating 
behind stacked lumber in order to “be effectually screened from observation” (171). The two 
women settle in so that Lizzy may relate this story to Hannah, and Hannah alone. It makes little 
sense for Lizzy to conclude her story by addressing the President, senators, and religious 
ministers. It is far more plausible, on the other hand, to read this final section as Hannah’s 
commentary on the story she has just heard.	
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to the uppermost echelons of power and law rehearses the same trope that appears elsewhere in 
the novel, as with the Wheelers’ reluctance to draw attention to Jane’s escape.  
The moment of actual death is almost unremarkable, “a slight spasm, a convulsive 
shudder” preceding the nothingness of an unnamed slave’s death. The lightness of the death and 
the anonymity of the slave stand in stark contrast with the weight of those whose hypocrisy the 
narrator exposes.174 The narrator specifically addresses both lawmakers and religious leaders 
who approve of brutal slave laws while obsessing over trivial matters, explicitly making the 
slave’s death a matter of law. Specifically, the address recasts the death as a crime, for which the 
lawmakers—and not the slave herself, or even her owner—are responsible. In a remarkable 
parallel with the language used to condemn Nat Turner to death, the narrator triples the word 
“dead,” addressing each instance to a different audience. Unlike the tripling of “dead” in the 
Turner context—in which the overkill is directly solely at one subject, Turner, and in which the 
overkill appears intent on ensuring that Turner dies and remains so—this tripling works to a 
rather different effect. Though it reminds its audience of the woman’s death, the tripling of 
“dead” in the novel works rather to enliven rather than destroy or purge the body it describes.  
By rhetorically killing the slave three times, in three separate contexts, the narrator re-
animates the corpse before each address, so that the woman appears to die three separate times 
after her actual death at her owner’s feet. Each deployment of “dead” figuratively places her 
body at the feet of each audience. Beginning with the President himself, whom the narrator 
somewhat sarcastically refers to as “your Excellency,” the dead body first rests before “the 
																																																								
174 It should be noted that it is manifestly unclear who the narrator is in this moment. I read the 
passage as though it proceeds from the novel’s main narrator, Hannah; while Lizzy could 
plausibly be the narrator in this section, the diction and style hew more closely to the literary 
personality of Hannah. 
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Republic.” This move again insists on the connection between legal slavery and the U.S. as a 
nation-state, troubling the myth of the United States as a civilized nation and instead littering the 
ultimate seat of power with the corpses of slaves. Should this association be ambiguous, the 
narrator then addresses Senators, ensuring that the legislative branch of government—and 
specifically, that representatives of individual states—also bear responsibility for this woman’s 
death. There is no distinction here between Senators from slave or free jurisdictions, suggesting 
instead that the existence of legalized slavery anywhere has corrupted the legislative process 
everywhere. To underscore the pervasiveness of law’s hypocrisy, the address ends with religious 
ministers who “wink at, or approve of laws that occasion such scenes as this.” The tripling thus 
unites all three audiences in a conspiratorial network of complicity in the enterprise of slavery. 
Here, the fact that the woman appears to die three times in succession demonstrates how the 
legally-sanctioned violence is excessive, wasteful, and obscene. 
By bookending this scene in legal language—first with Cosgrove’s assertion of law and 
later with the address to lawmakers—the novel encrypts law within its own narrative, seizing on 
law as an appropriate frame and then turning the law back onto itself. As a result, the novel 
absorbs law but reimagines it in radically subtle ways. Like David Walker, who reappropriates 
the structure of the Declaration of Independence in order to argue against the constitutionality of 
legalized slavery, Crafts borrows from legal norms and principles in order to expose the intense 
culpability of lawmakers for the violence carried out by individual slaveholders. The epigraph to 
this chapter includes a passage from the novel that explicitly enacts a project similar to Walker’s, 
in which Crafts writes (201), “The Constitution that asserts the right of freedom and equality to 
all mankind is a sealed book to [slaves].” Her citation of the Constitution both verifies her own 
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legal consciousness—she is acutely aware of the Constitution’s guarantees—and claims that, in 
the hands of lawmakers, that same document is unable to deliver on its promises.  
This reading of the Constitution as simultaneously self-evident and also imperfectly 
constructed is a sophisticated and nuanced interpretation of law. It reveals an understanding of 
the legal philosophical distinction between natural and positive law and also locates the 
Constitution as a particularly troubled site of the tension that Kent refers to when he writes, 
“States, or bodies politic, are to be considered as moral persons . . . inasmuch as they are 
collections of individuals, each of whom carries with him, into the service of the community, the 
same binding law of morality and religion which ought to control his conduct in private life.”175 
Crafts’s handling of the Constitution and her address to specific lawmakers are indictments of 
the very hypocrisy Kent warns against, in which the collective “morality” of a nation becomes 
subject to a lower standard than that required of an individual. 
For Crafts, this hypocrisy is linked explicitly with the question of personhood—the 
question of which persons may reap the benefits and protections of law. In the passage where the 
novel’s narrator invokes the Constitution, she has just completed her journey with the Wheelers 
from Washington, D.C. to their plantation in North Carolina. The change in scenery is 
horrifying, and Hannah regards the slaves’ living conditions with sorrow—the field slaves live in 
crowded huts, and Hannah observes, “If the huts were bad, the inhabitants it seemed were still 
worse. Degradation, neglect, and ill treatment had wrought on them its legitimate effects” (200). 
As with the earlier aside to the President, Senators, and religious leaders, the narrator pauses to 
address her reader again (201): “What do you think of it? Doctors of Divinity Isn’t it a strange 
																																																								
175 See Commentaries on American Law (1826-1830), Lecture I. 
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state to be like them. To shuffle up and down the lanes unfamiliar with the flowers, and in utter 
darkness as to the meaning of Nature’s various hieroglyphical symbols, so abundant on the trees, 
the skies, in the leaves of grass, and everywhere.” Addressing “Doctors of Divinity,” the narrator 
asks the reader to imagine how it feels to be a slave. In her characterization, to be a slave is an 
endless shuffle in darkness, illiterate to the point of regarding all of nature as a set of 
incomprehensible hieroglyphics. 
This passage from the novel resonates with Nietzsche’s famous description of cattle in 
Untimely Meditations: “Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by; they do not know what 
is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from 
morn till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure, and 
thus neither melancholy nor bored.”176 Like Crafts’s description of slaves, Nietzsche’s cattle 
perceive neither time nor history, merely shuffling and grazing endlessly. In fact, as with the 
earlier description of the slave who kills herself with a butcher’s knife, Crafts explicitly links the 
slaves in the huts to the livestock of the plantation: “It must be a strange state to feel that in the 
judgement of those above you you are scarcely human, and to fear that their opinion is more than 
half right, that you really are assimilated to the brutes, that the horses, dogs and cattle have quite 
as many priveledges, and are probably your equals or it may be your superiors in knowledge, that 
even your shape is questionable as belonging to that order of superior beings whose delicacy you 
offend” (201). This juxtaposition of slaves and livestock appears within that address to Doctors 
of Divinity, in which her use of the second-person places the reader in the place of the slaves she 
describes. 
																																																								
176 Cambridge UP, 1997, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
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Despite her own past as a slave, the narrator nevertheless reserves her description to the 
realm of the hypothetical, writing that “it must be” strange to be like these slaves—for Hannah, 
the house slave, her own experience remains outside the degradation she describes. Indeed, she is 
educated, aware of her condition, and acutely aware of history, unlike these other slaves, whose 
very “shape” is practically unrecognizable as human. The connections are unmistakable; Hannah 
writes that the Constitution is “sealed” to these slaves, who, for her, do not qualify as humans—
much less legal persons—in any meaningful way. Unable to perceive history or their place 
within it, these slaves exist in a state of strangeness—the narrator’s repetition of the word 
“strange” throughout this passage calls attention to the slaves’ status as not only bizarre, but also 
estranged and alienated. Like Judge Kane’s characterization of Jane Johnson as a “stranger” to 
the Williamson court proceedings, these slaves too are strangers—to history, to knowledge, and 
even to themselves. The narrator’s comparison of slaves with animals is an undeniable reckoning 
with their legal status; the animals, she notes, have access to various rights and privileges that 
exceed the rights of slaves, after all. This juxtaposition, rather than simply equating slaves with 
animals, raises complex questions about the nuances of a slave’s legal personality. The law, as 
the narrator notes, is not so blunt as to merely treat slaves as though they are animals; it does, 
however, fail to account for slaves to such a degree that slaves often have fewer rights than 
livestock. 
* * * 
As a work of literary fiction, The Bondwoman’s Narrative contains a complicated network of 
characters, plot devices, and nods to various other literary genres. But more than a compendium 
of various fictionalized slave narratives, the novel also acts as a cipher for various legal 
narratives and ultimately for a set of legal arguments about the failures and injustices of slavery. 
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It encodes specific legal narratives of actual slaves, as in the case of Jane Johnson—an 
encryption that, first, places the novel in relation to the legal documents containing Johnson’s 
testimony and second, critiques the prevailing law that applied to Johnson’s fugitivity. The legal 
record thus becomes not only an intertext for the novel but also an internal narrative within the 
novel’s larger structure. 
The novel also encodes more general legal narratives that are de-coupled from official 
legal records or identifiable slaves. As in the case of the unnamed slave who kills herself and her 
baby, the novel uses law as a framing device for plot lines—and then subsequently uses the plot 
lines to entirely upset and re-write the expected legal outcomes. Literary fiction thus emerges as 
a site in which to expose and re-imagine various legal fictions and legal theories. Law is present 
at every turn in The Bondwoman’s Narrative, even embodied by Trappe, the unscrupulous 
lawyer who relentlessly pursues Hannah’s mistress from Lindendale and reappears with 
implausible frequency—he turns up at exactly the house where Hannah and her mistress are 
hiding, and Hannah even encounters him on the street in Washington, D.C. long after her 
mistress has died. This fog of law hangs over the entire novel, and each time Trappe reappears in 
the literary landscape, it is a reminder that we are never firmly outside of law or wholly inside 
fiction.  
I suggest that this inextricability urges a reading of the literary fiction as, on some level, 
inherently legal. The practices we might think of as “literary”—the characterization, the 
recasting of legal principles, the encryption of other types of narratives—look remarkably similar 
to the discursive strategies of legal writing. Rather than reading fictionality as a literary tactic 
that somehow undermines the realness of other, non-literary texts, I read it as a mark of 
rhetorical and political power. In Chapter 1, the fictionality surrounding the sentencing of Nat 
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Turner signifies as law’s violent potential; in Chapter 2, fictionality signifies as a problematic for 
white abolitionists, slaveholders, and literary critics, as well as a potential source of productive 
fugitive personhood; in Chapter 3, fiction animates the law of slavery as a means of regulating 
petitions for freedom and narrating national mythologies. Here, in Chapter 4, fictionality is a 
device of encryption that enables generic and disciplinary crossings. In each instance, fictionality 
materializes around the intersections of legal and literary personhood, suggesting that fictionality 
is not the primary domain of either law or literature—rather, fictionality may actually be 
contingent upon the collision and complicity of the two. 
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